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The Process of Marriage Equality
by JOSH BLACKMAN* & HOWARD M. WASSERMAN*

Introduction
1

The two-year race from United States v. Windsor to Obergefell v.
2
3
Hodges produced an inconceivable sea change in substantive
constitutional law. But just as important as the right to marry was the
process through which that right was vindicated. Marriage equality
was established via parallel litigation in thirty-seven states covering
eight federal circuits. And that litigation triggered a complex twoyear interaction of the doctrine governing injunctions, precedent,
stays, concurrent state-federal litigation, and abstention.
Many books and articles have and will be written about the
4
marriage equality movement’s rapid success. This is not one of
those. Instead, as the title suggests, this article tells the story of the
process of marriage equality and how four aspects of federal
procedure and jurisdiction doctrine both enabled and frustrated
marriage equality’s advance to the Supreme Court.

* Associate Professor, South Texas College of Law, Houston.
* Professor of Law, FIU College of Law. The authors thank William Baude,
Joshua Block, Brooke Coleman, Amanda Frost, Douglas Laycock, David Marcus, James
Pfander, Richard Re, Martin Redish, and Kevin Walsh for comments and suggestions.
1. United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013).
2. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015).
3. Coincidentally or otherwise, Obergefell was decided on June 26, 2015, two years
to the day after the Court issued Windsor and twelve years to the day of Lawrence v.
Texas—all decisions authored by Justice Kennedy. During arguments in Obergefell,
Kennedy pointed out that the twelve-year period since Lawrence in 2003 was roughly
comparable to the thirteen years that elapsed between Brown and Loving v. Virginia. See
argument in Obergefell v. Hodges, No. 14-556, at 6–7 (question from Justice Kennedy),
http://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/14-556q1_6k47.pdf.
4. See, e.g., MICHAEL J. KLARMAN, FROM THE CLOSET TO THE ALTAR: COURTS,
BACKLASH, AND THE STRUGGLE FOR SAME-SEX MARRIAGE (2014); KENJI YOSHINO:
SPEAK NOW: MARRIAGE EQUALITY ON TRIAL (2015); Michael J. Perry, Obergefell v.
Hodges: An Imagined Opinion, Concurring in the Judgment, http://ssrn.com/abstract
=2624022; Louis Michael Seidman, The Triumph of Gay Marriage and the Failure of
Constitutional Law, SUP. CT. REV. (forthcoming 2016).
[243]
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The first procedural issue relates to the scope of the injunctions
barring enforcement of the state marriage bans. Courts, parties, and
the public struggled to understand and define who was obligated to
abide by any injunction and who was guaranteed a marriage license
or recognition of a marriage under it. The answer involves a complex
interaction among the concepts of judgments, injunctions, precedent,
and departmentalism in constitutional interpretation. A court’s
judgment and injunction compel conduct by the named defendants as
to the named plaintiffs—in other words, only the named defendant
5
officials had to issue marriage licenses to the named plaintiff couples.
As to everyone else, the judgment functions merely as precedent—
persuasive when from the district court, binding regionally when from
the court of appeals, and binding nationally when from the Supreme
6
Court. And precedent, whether binding or persuasive, does not
directly control real-world conduct. It instead must be put into effect
by a court issuing a new judgment and injunction compelling new
named defendants to issue licenses to new named couples.
What we actually saw during the marriage equality litigation was
widespread voluntary compliance by nonparty officials as to nonparty
couples—once an injunction compelled marriage licenses as to some
same-sex couples, officials began issuing licenses to other similarly
situated couples—even though they were not required to do so by a
court order. As a result, most courts never had to grapple with the
proper scope of the injunction, the meaningful differences between
judgment and precedent, the different effects of persuasive or binding
precedent, or the limits on attempts to enforce injunctions. One
exception, which one of us previously explored, was Alabama, where
many officials refused to voluntarily comply with persuasive district
7
court precedent.
That refusal, which was procedurally proper,
prompted unfortunate and inaccurate comparisons to George
Wallace and massive resistance to Brown and desegregation.
Problems over the scope of injunctions continued following
Obergefell, as parties and courts struggled to understand the effect of

5. DOUGLAS LAYCOCK, MODERN AMERICAN REMEDIES 217 (Concise 4th ed.
2012); see also David W. Marcus, The Public Interest Class Action, 104 GEO. L.J.
(forthcoming 2015) (manuscript at 27–28), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?
abstract_id= 2565988.
6. Richard H. Fallon, Jr., As Applied and Facial Challenges and Third-Party
Standing, 113 HARV. L. REV. 1321, 1339–40 (2000); Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Fact and
Fiction About Facial Challenges, 99 CALIF. L. REV. 915, 924 n.31 (2011).
7. Howard M. Wasserman, Crazy in Alabama: Judicial Process and the Last Stand
Against Marriage Equality in the Land of George Wallace, 110 NW. L. REV. ONLINE 1
(2015), http://www.northwesternlawreview.org/online/crazy-in-alabama.
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the Court’s decision, how to implement it, how it affected pending
litigation, and how it applied to new state officials. These struggles
culminated in the infamous events in Rowan County, Kentucky,
where a county clerk was held in contempt and jailed for failing to
obey a district court injunction compelling issuance of marriage
8
licenses to same-sex couples.
The second procedural issue involves the pivotal but
underappreciated role of stays pending appeal. Following Windsor,
federal district courts in more than two dozen states enjoined
enforcement of bans on same-sex marriage. Judges then had to
decide whether to stay those injunctions pending review. An
injunction alters the status quo. A stay of an injunction suspends that
9
alteration, while refusing to grant a stay allows that altered status
quo to take immediate, and perhaps irreparable, effect. Here, the
altered status quo meant issuance of hundreds or thousands of
marriage licenses.
In several cases, denial of stays triggered
simultaneous races to the courts of appeals and to the altars, with
couples trying to obtain marriage licenses before a higher court
intervened. Many local licensing officials promptly (and eagerly)
issued licenses, without waiting for an Article III-final judgment.
State attorneys general frantically—and sometimes prematurely—
sought emergency stays from the courts of appeals and the Supreme
Court.
Exacerbating these scrambles were shifting signals from the
Supreme Court through unexplained stays, denials of stays, and
denials of certiorari. William Baude identifies these orders as part of
10
the Court’s “shadow docket.”
Litigants and lower courts in the
marriage equality cases struggled to understand and respond to those
signals. The Court seemingly changed its stance in ways affecting the
propriety of stays four times. First, in early 2014 the Justices
intervened to stay two judgments from the District of Utah, signaling
that injunctions should be stayed pending review. Some lower courts
followed this signal, others distinguished it, and others simply ignored
it. Second, in October 2014, the Court denied petitions for certiorari
from five states in three circuits, establishing Article III-final
judgments invalidating their marriage bans. From that point forward,
most district courts ceased staying injunctions, as did the Supreme
8. See infra notes 128–34 and accompanying text.
9. Nken v. Holder, 129 S. Ct. 1749, 1758 (2009).
10. William Baude, Foreword: The Supreme Court’s Shadow Docket, 9 N.Y.U. J. OF
LAW & LIBERTY. 1, 3, 5 (2015).

246

HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY

[Vol. 43:2

Court, often over the dissent of Justices Scalia and Thomas. The final
period began in January 2015, when the Court granted certiorari on
the petition from the Sixth Circuit case that became Obergefell.
District courts differed over the significance of the grant and how to
resolve their pending cases with a final Supreme Court decision
looming.
The third procedural issue concerned attempts by state attorneys
general to move marriage cases out of federal court. In three states,
officials initiated mandamus proceedings in the state Supreme Court
for the express purpose of prohibiting local officials from issuing
marriage licenses based solely on voluntary compliance with federal
11
precedent. State officials then argued to the federal courts that the
pending mandamus actions stripped their jurisdiction or required
abstention in deference to the pending state actions they had
initiated. Acting correctly, federal courts forcefully rejected these
12
arguments.
Scholars will spend many years and pages exploring the rapid
establishment of the constitutional right to marriage equality. This
paper contributes to that conversation by focusing, for the first time,
on the critical, but underdeveloped, procedural nuances of highstakes constitutional and civil rights litigation. We offer both a
detailed historical record of the litigation that produced this
constitutional watershed, as well as a better understanding of how
procedure, jurisdiction, and the judicial process affect future
constitutional litigation. The results in the marriage litigation were
decidedly mixed. Courts and litigants often got procedure very wrong
in a way that confused, extended, and raised the cost of litigation and
that contributed to widespread public misunderstanding of these
issues.
We proceed in three parts. Part I clarifies the proper scope of
injunctions, highlights the confusion between judgments and
precedent, and explores how that confusion affected the marriage
equality litigation. Part II assesses how lower courts handled stays
pending review, particularly in light of the signals from the Supreme
Court’s grants and denials of stays and grants and denials of
certiorari. Part III analyzes state efforts to preempt federal litigation

11. Ex parte State ex rel. Ala. Policy Inst., No. 1140460, 2015 WL 892752, at *43 (Ala.
Mar. 3, 2015), abrogated by Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 1039 (2015); State ex rel.
Schmidt v. Moriarty, No. 112, 590 (Kan. Oct. 10, 2014); State ex rel. Wilson v. Condon, 764
S.E. 2d 247 (S.C. 2014).
12. Marie v. Moser, 65 F. Supp. 3d 1175, 1185 (D. Kan. 2014); Condon v. Haley, 21 F.
Supp. 3d 572 (D.S.C. 2014).
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through parallel state litigation, and how they offered unsuccessful
arguments about jurisdiction and abstention.

I.

Framing the Litigation and Framing the Injunction

On June 27, 2013, (the day after Windsor), marriage equality had
been established by legislation, popular enactment, or state court
judgment in thirteen states. What followed in the next two years was
a massive campaign of parallel constitutional litigation challenging
virtually identical same-sex marriage bans in thirty-seven states and
two territories, covering nine federal circuits.
Challenges to marriage bans typically were brought by one or a
small number of same-sex couples who could not obtain marriage
licenses or have out-of-state marriages recognized because of the
13
challenged state laws. The defendants were state, county, and local
officials responsible for issuing licenses or otherwise enforcing that
state’s same-sex marriage ban.
The challenges were largely identical because the bans in every
state were substantially identical in substance, if not in language.
Every state defined marriage as being between one man and one
woman and prohibited any other combination to be married,
recognized as married, or entitled to receive the benefits, protections,
and incidents of marriage. The challenged state action also was the

13. For example, Obergefell involved fourteen same-sex couples and two men
seeking marital status for their deceased same-sex partners, spread over four states.
Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015). More specifically, the Michigan case was
brought by one lesbian couple; the Kentucky case was two couples seeking Kentucky
marriage licenses and four couples seeking recognition of their out-of-state marriages; the
Ohio case involved four couples seeking recognition of out-of-state marriages for purposes
of their children’s birth certificates and two men seeking recognition of their marital status
on their same-sex partners’ death certificates; and the Tennessee case involved three
couples seeking recognition of out-of-state marriages. DeBoer v. Snyder, 772 F.3d 388,
396–99 (6th Cir. 2014).
Although never raised, there is at least a nice question whether plaintiffs properly could
sue together in this way. Parties may join as plaintiffs if their claims arise out of the same
transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences and if the claims raise
common questions of law or fact. FED. R. CIV. P. 20(a)(1)(A), (B). The second prong is
easily satisfied, as the legal question of the validity of the marriage bans is common to all
claims. But the first prong is far less clear, because there is no logical relationship among
the different plaintiffs’ claims—there is no connection among the couples or their desire to
marry, other than their wanting to engage in parallel conduct of getting married. The
counter is that the defendant officials applied the same law—the state ban on same-sex
marriage—in denying each plaintiff a marriage license. In any event, no one raised the
issue because even had the plaintiffs filed separately, the common questions of law or fact
allowed the cases to be consolidated and for certain issues, such as preliminary injunctions,
to be resolved together. FED. R. CIV. P. 42(a).
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same in every state—the refusal by a state official to issue a marriage
license or to recognize an out-of-state marriage for two people who,
but for being of the same sex, were entitled to receive marriage
licenses or have their marriages recognized in that state. Unique
among constitutional litigation challenging state laws, there was no
possibility of legal, factual, remedial, or administrative differences
14
among different cases or plaintiffs.
With so many states having
identical prohibitions on same-sex marriage, it functionally
established a nationwide prohibition on same-sex marriage, but one
that had to be challenged state by state.
In many cases, having declared the state marriage ban
unconstitutional, district courts entered exceedingly broad
injunctions. Several injunctions purported to both prohibit defendant
officials from ever enforcing same-sex marriage bans anywhere in the
state as to any couple or any person, and to require them to grant
marriage licenses to any couple requesting one statewide, even where
15
only one couple brought the action.
Consider Judge Vaughn Walker’s order from the Proposition 8
case in California that started it all:
[T]he court orders entry of judgment permanently
enjoining [Proposition 8’s] enforcement; prohibiting
the official defendants from applying or enforcing
Proposition 8 and directing the official defendants that
all persons under their control or supervision shall not
16
apply or enforce Proposition 8.
Or the order from Chief Magistrate Judge Candy Wagahoof Dale in
the District of Idaho:
The Court PERMANENTLY ENJOINS the State of
Idaho and its officers, employees, agents, and political
subdivisions from enforcing Article III, § 28 of the
Idaho Constitution; Idaho Code Sections 32–201 and
32–209; and any other laws or regulations to the extent
they do not recognize same-sex marriages validly

14. Maureen Carroll, Class Action Myopia, 65 DUKE L.J. (forthcoming 2016),
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2542303; Marcus, supra note 5, at 61.
15. Marcus, supra note 5, at 27 n.138.
16. Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921, 1004 (N.D. Cal. 2010).
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contracted outside Idaho or prohibit otherwise
17
qualified same-sex couples from marrying in Idaho.
Or the order from Judge Daniel D. Crabtree of the District of
Kansas:
Defendants are hereby enjoined from enforcing or
applying Article 15, § 16 of the Kansas Constitution
and K.S.A. § 23–2501 and any other Kansas statute,
law, policy or practice that prohibits issuance of
marriage licenses to same-sex couples in Kansas.
Defendants may not refuse to issue marriage licenses
on the basis that applicants are members of the same
18
sex.
State officials generally declined to challenge the scope of these
overbroad injunctions, either in the district court at the time of entry
or on appeal. And in affirming the invalidity of same-sex marriage
bans, courts of appeals generally did not explore or remark on the
purported scope or effect of these injunctions.
In fact, however, much of the procedural confusion and
controversy in the marriage equality litigation resulted from the
failure of attorneys, courts, and the public to understand procedural
and remedial issues—about the limited scope of injunctions, about
the differences between injunctions and precedent, and about how
judgments control real-world behavior and establish constitutional
change.
A. Injunctions, Precedents, and Constitutional Compliance
1.

Injunctions and Precedents

The “usual rule” is that litigation is conducted “on behalf of the
19
individual named parties only.” That principle extends to actions to
enjoin enforcement of unconstitutional state laws. A court can
“enjoin a defendant only with respect to defendant’s treatment of
plaintiffs actually before the court, either individually or as part of a
20
certified class.” As Richard Fallon argues, the prospective legal
17.
18.
19.
20.

Latta v. Otter, 19 F. Supp. 3d 1054, 1086 (D. Idaho 2014) (emphasis in original).
Marie v. Moser, 65 F. Supp. 3d 1175, 1206 (D. Kan. 2014).
Califano v. Yamasaki, 442 U.S. 682, 700–01 (1979).
LAYCOCK, supra note 5, at 217; see also Marcus, supra note 5, at 27–28.
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effect of a decision pronouncing a law unconstitutional derives from a
complex interaction among three distinct doctrines: injunction,
21
preclusion, and precedent. To understand Fallon’s framework, we
must understand precisely how precedent functions—that is, how
prior judicial decisions regulate the conduct of state officials charged
with enforcing a particular state law.
An injunction prohibiting enforcement of a constitutionally
invalid law only benefits the named plaintiffs and only binds named
22
defendants. It also may extend to the party’s officers, agents,
servants, and employees, as well as “other persons who are in active
23
concert or participation” with the party. The injunction (and the
opinion explaining and justifying the injunction) is directly,
immediately, and coercively enforceable against the named
defendants and for the benefit of the named plaintiffs. It compels the
former to perform (or refrain from performing) some acts for the
latter’s benefit. Failure to do so would be a direct violation of the
24
injunction, punishable by contempt of court. A final judgment also
has a preclusive effect in future litigation, but, again, only with respect
25
to those parties.
As to nonparties, the force of the judgment and opinion
justifying the judgment derives entirely from the doctrine of
26
precedent. Its precedential force depends entirely on the court that
27
rendered the judgment and where it stands in the judicial hierarchy.
A decision from the U.S. Supreme Court provides binding precedent
on every court within the United States, federal and state. A decision
from a regional court of appeals provides binding precedent on all
federal courts within the circuit, although not necessarily on state
28
courts and not on other circuits. A decision of a federal district
court, however, is not binding on any other federal or state court,
21. Fallon, supra note 6, at 1339–40; Fallon, supra note 6, at 923–24 n.31.
22. Doran v. Salem Inn, Inc., 422 U.S. 922, 931 (1975); Fallon, supra note 6, at 1340.
This changes if the litigation is brought as a class action. LAYCOCK, supra note 5, at 217;
see infra Part I.D.
23. FED. R. CIV. P. 60(d)(2), (3).
24. In re Debs, 158 U.S. 564, 594 (1895); S.E.C. v. Homa, 514 F.3d 661, 674 (7th Cir.
2008); LAYCOCK, supra note 5, at 4.
25. Fallon, supra note 6 at 1340; Fallon, supra note 6, at 923–24 n.31.
26. Fallon, supra note 6, at 924 n.31; Gary Lawson & Christopher D. Moore, The
Executive Power of Constitutional Interpretation, 81 IOWA L. REV. 1267, 1328 (1996).
27. Randy Kozel, The Scope of Precedent, 113 MICH. L. REV. 185–86 (2014).
28. See generally Amanda Frost, Inferiority Complex: Should State Courts Follow
Lower Federal Court Precedent on the Meaning of Federal Law?, 68 VAND. L. REV. 53, 55
(2015); Wayne A. Logan, A House Divided: When State and Lower Federal Courts
Disagree on Federal Constitutional Rights, 90 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 235, 236–37 (2014).
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including courts in the same state, district, and even as to the same
29
judge deciding a different case.
Regardless of type, however, precedent never directly regulates
executive officials’ real-world conduct or obligates them to act (or
refrain from acting) in any way. An official’s failure to abide by even
binding precedent—as opposed to a judgment—is not subject to
contempt of court or other direct enforcement. An individual seeking
the benefit of precedent must initiate new litigation and obtain a new
injunction compelling those officials to act or not act as to them.
Precedent will almost certainly drive the judicial resolution (through
binding or persuasive force, depending on the court) of that new
litigation. In other words, precedent is neither self-enforcing nor
directly controlling of real-world conduct of responsible executive
officers. Rather, it persuades or influences judges in future litigation
seeking new judgments and injunctions against those executive
officials. Precedent can be enforced as to those new parties only
through that additional step of new litigation; the next court applies
precedent to decide the next action involving the next set of parties
30
and enters a judgment and binding injunction as to them. It is that
new judgment and injunction that then directly controls new
defendants’ real-world conduct as to new plaintiffs and that is directly
enforceable through civil contempt.
Subsequent litigation applying precedent can take two forms.
First, when the challenged laws are criminal prohibitions enforced
through government initiated prosecution or litigation, precedent
affects resolution of that new case, requiring or suggesting the
31
dismissal of the prosecution.
Second, similarly situated persons
might file a new federal § 1983 action against different defendants to
enjoin enforcement of the challenged law as to them. Precedent from
the first case invalidating the law will compel or persuade (depending
on the issuing court) the same outcome in the new suit. Because bans
on same-sex marriage are “enforced” by the relevant official

29. Camreta v. Greene, 131 S. Ct. 2020, 2033 n.7 (2011); ASARCO Inc. v. Kadish,
490 U.S. 605, 617 (1989); Fallon, supra note 6 at 1340; Fallon, supra note 6, at 924 n.31.
30. Cf. Marcus, supra note 5, at manuscript 27–28 (acknowledging that this “remedial
parsimony” may seem “hard-hearted and inefficient”); but see Miller v. Davis, No. 15-cv44-DLB (E.D. Ky. Sept. 23, 2015) (unpublished memorandum order explaining extension
of injunction and stating that limiting injunction only to parties “would not only create
piecemeal litigation, it would be inconsistent with basic principles of justice and fairness”),
http://www.washingtonblade.com/content/files/2015/09/Judge-denies-Davis.pdf.
31. Fallon, supra note 6, at 924 n.31; see, e.g., Doran v. Salem Inn, Inc., 422 U.S. 922,
931 (1975); Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452, 456 n.3 (1974).
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declining to issue a marriage license (or some other benefit) to a
requesting couple, challenges to those bans involved only the second
type of litigation.
The precedent-injunction distinction further maps onto the
concept of departmentalism—that federal executive and legislative
32
33
officials, as well as state officials, wield independent power to
interpret the Constitution and to act on their own constitutional
understandings.
And that remains true even when those
interpretations depart from, or directly conflict with, judicial
interpretations, including interpretations from the Supreme Court.
34
Critics
Of course, departmentalism is not universally accepted.
argue that by denying an authoritative judicial voice about
constitutional meaning, departmentalism violates the rule of law,
creating chaos and uncertainty as to what the law is and how to
35
organize real-world conduct.
But judicial supremacy is neither
36
required by constitutional text nor structure. And any chaos or
conflict might be more feature rather than bug in a system of
37
separation of powers.
Gary Lawson proposes what he calls a middle-ground approach
to departmentalism, grounded in the precedent-judgment distinction,
that provides a clear stopping point on interbranch conflict. Political38
branch officials generally must enforce and obey a court’s judgment,
the “raw determinations of liability or nonliability (as opposed to the
explanations for those determinations embodied in judicial opinions)

32. Lawson & Moore, supra note 26, at 1269–70; Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Most
Dangerous Branch: Executive Power to Say What the Law Is, 81 GEO. L.J. 217, 220 (1994).
33. Gary Lawson, Interpretive Equality as a Structural Imperative (or “Pucker Up and
Settle This!”), 20 CONST. COMMENT. 379, 384 (2003).
34. Burt Neurborne, The Binding Quality of Supreme Court Precedent, 61 TUL. L.
REV. 991, 992 (1987).
35. Id. at 994; see also Lawson & Moore, supra note 26, at 1268; Paulsen, supra note
32, at 333.
36. Paulsen, supra note 32, at 221.
37. Lawson, supra note 33, at 384; Lawson & Moore, supra note 26, at 1329–30. In
response to a question about judicial supremacy, Justice Samuel Alito explained that all
branches of government “have a duty to adhere to the Constitution like” the Courts do.
He stressed in closing, however, that “We are a nation of laws. It is important for people
to respect the actions by the branches of government when they are acting within the
proper scope of their authority.” See Josh Blackman, Justice Alito Reflects on his Tenth
Anniversary on #SCOTUS, JOSH BLACKMAN’S BLOG (Sept. 21, 2015), http://joshblack
man.com/blog/2015/09/21/justice-alito-reflects-on-his-tenth-anniversary-on-scotus/.
38. Lawson & Moore, supra note 26, at 1325–27. Lawson allows for the possibility
that an official can disregard a judgment against him or that the President can decline to
enforce a judgment, but only in extreme circumstances. Id.
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39

rendered in specific cases.” But that obligation extends only to the
“raw judgment itself: the finding of liability or nonliability and the
specification of the remedy” compelling parties to act or refrain from
40
acting. It does not apply to the reasoning or the legal principles and
41
conclusions that the court used to justify its judgment. The court’s
opinion is merely an explanation for its order, having no independent
42
legal force. The legal conclusions stated in the opinion affect future
actors only through precedent or stare decisis, which provides an idea
of how future cases may be resolved, while imposing no legal
43
obligation to abide by the reasoning. Up to the point of a judgment
and injunction against them, therefore, state and federal actors can
proceed on, and argue for, their own best understanding of what the
Constitution requires, even if it conflicts with the Court’s. Once that
judgment comes, however, political actors must comply.
Lawson’s departmentalism rests on the idea that what makes
courts unique is that they decide cases and issue judgments and those
judgments control everyone who is subject to them or their
obligations. But the power to interpret the Constitution simpliciter is
not unique to the courts, but instead resides in all public officials (of
all branches and all levels) who swear an oath to uphold the
44
Constitution. Only when the judicial interpretation is reduced to a
judgment does it become supreme—and then only within the limited
scope of that judgment. To suggest otherwise would allow a court to
expand the scope of its otherwise limited judgment and injunction
45
simply by issuing a statement of reasons and constitutional analysis.
Merging Lawson’s departmentalism with Fallon’s precedentinjunction distinction offers a new insight, which Kevin Walsh labels
46
“judicial departmentalism.” Because only specific public officials
are enjoined only as to specific plaintiffs, the scope of the judgment is
necessarily limited. Public officials can continue to act on their
competing constitutional understandings as to similarly situated

39. Id. at 1271.
40. Id. at 1327.
41. Id. at 1327, 1328.
42. Wasserman, supra note 7, at 7.
43. Lawson & Moore, supra note 26, at 1328–29.
44. Lawson, supra note 33, at 384; Lawson & Moore, supra note 26, at 1269–70.
45. Id. at 1328.
46. Kevin C. Walsh, Combating judicial supremacy through containment and
conversion, MIRROR OF JUSTICE (Oct. 9, 2015), http://mirrorofjustice.blogs.com/mirrorof
justice/2015/10/combating-judicial-supremacy-through-containment-and-conversion.html.
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nonparties, even if those understandings conflict with the opinion
supporting the earlier judgment. That interpretive freedom ends as
soon as the courts speak as to the new parties and subject the
defendants to a new or expanded judgment and injunction. But that
judgment comes only after new or expanded litigation and a new
judicial order.
To be sure, the result is the same—public officials will abide by
binding precedent. But that does not mean we do or should live
under a regime of judicial supremacy, in which the executive is bound
by judicial interpretation. As Michael Paulsen argues, “we have
wrongly described as judicial supremacy what really is coordinacy
combined with inevitable (and proper) interpretive restraint by non47
judicial interpreters,” who adhere to the court’s particularized
48
judgment of liability and remedy.
2.

What Did the Courts Decide in the Marriage Equality Cases?

We now get a clearer picture of the real effect of the various
marriage equality decisions from the Supreme Court and the lower
courts. Obergefell reversed a decision by the Court of Appeals for
the Sixth Circuit reviewing district court decisions as to marriage bans
in Michigan, Ohio, Kentucky, and Tennessee. The ultimate result
was the entry of injunctions prohibiting officials in those states from
enforcing those bans and obligating them to issue marriage licenses or
49
recognize the marriages of particular couples bringing each action.
Prior to Obergefell, decisions invalidating and enjoining enforcement
of marriage bans and compelling the issuance of marriage licenses in
those states, had a similar effect on named defendants as to named
plaintiffs. This was true whether those decisions came from federal
50
51
district courts or were affirmed by a regional court of appeals.
But none of the injunctions entered in those cases on remand
directly compelled officials to issue licenses to similarly situated

47. Paulsen, supra note 32, at 343.
48. Lawson & Moore, supra note 26, at 1329.
49. See supra note 13 and accompanying text. The Supreme Court’s mandate did not
issue until twenty-five days after its decision, on July 28, 2015, allowing parties to request
reconsideration. The case was remanded to the Sixth Circuit, which in turn remanded the
cases to the respective district courts for entry of a permanent injunction and final order.
50. See, e.g., Strawser v. Strange, 44 F. Supp. 3d 1206, 1207–09, 1210 (S.D. Ala. Feb.
12, 2015) (issuance of licenses to four couples); Brenner v. Scott, 999 F. Supp. 2d 1278
(N.D. Fla. 2014) (one couple); Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921, 1004 (N.D.
Cal. 2010) (two couples).
51. See, e.g., Bostic v. Schaefer, 760 F.3d 352 (4th Cir. 2014) (two couples in
Virginia); Kitchen v. Herbert, 755 F.3d 1193 (10th Cir. 2014) (three couples in Utah).
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nonparty same-sex couples or to anyone other than the named
plaintiffs. Nor did they compel nonparty state officials, such as clerks
or judges in other parts of a state or in a different state, to issue
52
licenses to anyone. The prior judgments affected these people only
as precedent to be applied in subsequent litigation. Officials
remained free to believe that the prior court—including the Supreme
Court—had been wrong in its interpretation of the Fourteenth
Amendment, and they could continue to act on that understanding by
continuing to deny licenses. These officials also could continue to
argue that position in subsequent litigation, even knowing they would
lose absent a change in precedent. They became bound to act in a
particular way as to new couples only after another court in a
separate action involving those different parties applied precedent
and reduced it to a judgment against them. Once enjoined, however,
these officials become legally obligated as to those parties and subject
to civil contempt for noncompliance.
Obergefell, as Supreme Court precedent, bound every federal
and state court on the legal proposition that the Fourteenth
Amendment prohibits states from denying marriage licenses to same53
sex couples. Prior to Obergefell, a district court in Wisconsin or
Indiana would have responded similarly to Judge Posner’s decision
54
for the Seventh Circuit.
On the other hand, no court would be bound by prior precedent
from any district court invalidating a ban or enjoining its
55
enforcement. Thus, for example, when Judge Callie V.S. Granade
of the Southern District of Alabama declared the state ban
unconstitutional and enjoined a state official from enforcing it against

52. This point is qualified slightly, depending on the structure of state law and who
has the power to issue marriage licenses. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65(d) allows a
court to enjoin the party’s agents and “other persons who are in active concern or
participation” with a named defendant. FED. R. CIV. P. 65(d)(2)(C). For example, an
injunction against the attorney general would also bind county officials subject to her
control or supervision.
53. The latter is highly unlikely given the straightforwardness of the legal issue, the
identity of the challenged state laws, and the identity of the challenged conduct (denying
licenses or recognition. See Marcus, supra note 5, at manuscript 26–28. Cf. Costanza v.
Caldwell, No. 2014-CA-2090, 2015 WL 4094655, at *4 (La. July 7, 2015) (Hughes, J.,
dissenting) (“Does the 5–4 decision of the United States Supreme Court automatically
legalize this type of adoption? While the majority opinion of Justice Kennedy leaves it to
the various courts and agencies to hash out these issues, I do not concede the
reinterpretation of every statute premised upon traditional marriage.”).
54. Baskin v. Bogan, 766 F.3d 648 (7th Cir. 2014).
55. See supra note 50.

256

HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY

[Vol. 43:2

56

four plaintiff couples, a different district court hearing a challenge to
Alabama’s ban by a different couple would not have been bound by
the injunction or by Judge Granade’s analysis. That second court
could have performed its own constitutional analysis to reach its own
57
conclusion, without regard or deference towards the earlier decision.
In fact, Judge Granade herself could have reached a different
conclusion in a subsequent challenge to the Alabama marriage ban
(however unlikely that was to happen).
The extension of Obergefell still required subsequent litigation,
which tended to take two forms in the marriage equality campaign.
Courts in pending cases either imposed injunctions or lifted stays on
existing injunctions, directly binding defendant officials as to plaintiff
couples. Prior lower court decisions invalidating state bans and
enjoining their enforcement were now unquestionably correct in light
58
of Obergefell.
Alternatively, other couples, having been denied
licenses by officials not complying with precedent, had to initiate their
own litigation against the appropriate officers, seek a new injunction
prohibiting enforcement of the same-sex marriage ban, and compel
59
the defendants to issue licenses to them. The district court then
would apply Obergefell as precedent and compel the official to issue
marriage licenses to those plaintiffs, an easy decision that the court
60
likely would make relatively quickly.
The point remains that precedent has no effect until a new court
relies on that precedent to speaks to particular state executive
officials, as to particular plaintiffs, with respect to a particular law.
Until then, state officials remained untethered to the constitutional
understanding offered in Obergefell or in any other decision and free

56. Strawser v. Strange, 44 F. Supp. 3d 1206, 1207–10, (S.D. Ala. Feb. 12, 2015).
57. Wasserman, supra note 7, at 6–8.
58. See, e.g., Waters v. Ricketts, 798 F.3d 682 (8th Cir. 2015); Rosenbrahn v.
Daugaard, 61 F.3d 862 (8th Cir. 2015); Jernigan v. Crane, 796 F.3d 976 (8th Cir. 2015);
Campaign for Southern Equality v. Bryant, 791 F.3d 625 (5th Cir. 2015); DeLeon v.
Abbott, 791 F.3d 619 (5th Cir. 2015); Robicheaux v. Caldwell, 791 F.3d 616 (5th Cir. 2015);
Robicheaux v. Caldwell, Nos. 13-5090 C/W, 14-97, 14-327, 2015 WL 4090353 (E.D. La.
July 2, 2015) (unpublished order imposing injunction).
59. See, e.g., Miller v. Davis, No. 15-cv-00044-DLB, 2015 WL 4866729, at *1 (E.D.
Ky. Aug. 12, 2015); Laurel Brubaker Caulkins, Texas Couple Gets Marriage License After
Suing for Foot-Dragging, BLOOMBERGBUSINESS (July 6, 2015), http://www.bloomberg.
com/news/articles/2015-07-06/texas-couple-sues-clerk-claiming-foot-dragging-on-gay-marr
iage; Robert Wilonsky, Update: ‘A Historic Day for Hood County’ after lawsuit leads to
marriage license, DALLAS MORNING NEWS (July 6, 2015), http://thescoopblog.dallas
news.com/2015/07/same-sex-couple-of-27-years-sues-hood-county-clerk-for-refusing-to-iss
ue-marriage-license.html/.
60. Miller, 2015 WL 4866729, at *1.
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to abide by their own constitutional understandings in deciding
whether to issue licenses or otherwise recognize same-sex marriages.
State officials also remained free in subsequent litigation to argue, at
61
a minimum, that prior precedent should be modified or overturned.
Only when the officials lose in that subsequent litigation, and are
themselves enjoined from enforcing the challenged laws as to the
named plaintiffs, are they judicially obligated to follow the court’s
constitutional understanding.
B. Voluntary Compliance
1.

Precedent and Voluntary Compliance

The marriage equality litigation was atypical. We do not
regularly see new plaintiffs having to commence new litigation and
secure new judgments and injunctions in the wake of constitutional
decisions from the Supreme Court. The reason is that state officials
can, and usually will, conform their conduct to precedent as to
similarly situated persons. They decline to enforce a challenged law
or otherwise engage in conduct as to those people where that conduct
has previously been declared unconstitutional as to others. In fact,
courts likely issue those inappropriately overbroad injunctions in
constitutional cases on the assumption that officials will voluntarily
62
comply, so the scope-of-injunction question never arises.
Importantly, however, it remains a voluntary act of the officials
rather than a product of legal or judicial compulsion. Under the
departmentalist understanding, executive officials choose to proceed
under the new judicial interpretation of the Constitution in carrying
out their official conduct, but are not compelled to do so prior to
entry of a judgment against them; they retain authority to reach their
63
own constitutional conclusions. This is so even in the face of binding
authority, such as Obergefell or an Article III-final regional court-of64
appeals decision.
Perhaps this voluntary compliance derives from agreement with
precedent,
reached
following
independent
constitutional

61. FED. R. CIV. P. 11(b)(3).
62. LAYCOCK, supra note 5, at 217.
63. See supra notes 46-48 and accompanying text.
64. See, e.g., Bostic v. Schaefer, 760 F.3d 352 (4th Cir. 2014); Baskin v. Bogan, 766
F.3d 648 (7th Cir. 2014); Kitchen v. Herbert, 755 F.3d 1193 (10th Cir. 2014); see also infra
notes 99–100 and accompanying text.

258

HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY

[Vol. 43:2

65

deliberation. Perhaps it is out of convenience. Or perhaps it is out
of executive certainty that binding precedent preordains their liability
in the next lawsuit, such that the easiest course is to conform to
66
precedent even while believing it wrong. This last possibility recalls
Oliver Wendell Holmes’s insistence that law is merely prediction by
67
real-world actors of what courts will do.
It also means that departmental interpretation eventually yields
to the judicial interpretation—that is, executive departmentalism
yields to judicial departmentalism. While voluntary compliance with
precedent (without a further court order) is not compelled, judicial
and political processes incentivize it in a number of ways.
First, binding precedent creates a legal certainty that state
officials will lose the subsequent litigation and will be ordered to issue
licenses to the new couples. Even with a nonbinding district court
decision, procedural rules make a new or expanded injunction as to
new parties practically likely, even if not compelled by precedent.
For example, most federal districts have a related-case rule, whereby
cases raising similar legal and factual issues will be assigned to the
68
same judge. Thus, following Judge Granade’s decision requiring one
probate judge to issue licenses to four couples, any new constitutional
challenge to Alabama’s ban in the Southern District of Alabama
would have been assigned to Judge Granade, who was practically
69
certain (if not legally required) to reach the same conclusion.
Relatedly, and perhaps more importantly, any official who forces
that new lawsuit, loses, and is enjoined would be liable for the new
plaintiffs’ reasonable attorneys’ fees. Every new couple obtaining a
new injunction compelling the issuance of a marriage license would
qualify as a “prevailing party” in a § 1983 action, having obtained
70
injunctive or declaratory relief. While forcing the new lawsuit and

65. Paulsen, supra note 32, at 338.
66. See id. (describing “executive accommodation in light of the logical implications
of the coordinacy of the branches”).
67. Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457 (1897)
(“The object of our study, then, is prediction, the prediction of the incidence of the public
force through the instrumentality of the courts.”).
68. See, e.g., S.D. ALA. L.R. 3.3(a); see generally Katharine MacFarlane, Analyzing
The Southern District Of New York’s Amended “Related Cases” Rule: The Process For
Challenging Nonrandom Case Assignment Remains Inadequate, 69 N.Y.U. ANN. SURVEY
OF AM. L. 699 (2014).
69. Wasserman, supra note 7, at 8.
70. 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b) (2012); Lefemine v. Wideman, 133 S. Ct. 9, 11 (2012);
Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home, Inc. v. W. Va. Dep’t of Health & Human Res., 532 U.S.
598, 603–04 (2001); see, e.g., Stipulation and Agreement as to Costs and Attorneys’ Fees at
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new injunction may not cost the state, having to pay attorneys’ fees
for dozens or hundreds of new couples will.
A second, more remote incentive is that the similarly situated
couple denied a license might sue not only for an injunction
compelling the relevant officials to issue the license, but also for
money damages for past injuries caused by denial of the license,
which violates the Fourteenth Amendment under Obergefell.
Recovering damages depends not on the Constitution, which plainly
has been violated by the denial of the license, but on the sub71
constitutional defense of qualified immunity. That doctrine provides
that a defendant officer is liable for damages only if the right violated
was clearly established, such that a reasonable officer would be on
notice that his conduct (here, denying marriage licenses to these new
72
same-sex couples) violated the Constitution. Recent decisions have
elaborated on this requirement, insisting that qualified immunity is
designed to protect all but the “plainly incompetent,” meaning the
defense is not lost unless prior precedent places the constitutional
73
question “beyond doubt.” Further, the right cannot be defined at
too high a level of generality. Instead, precedent must establish the
right within at least a factually analogous context.
In addition, a couple also might seek damages not only from the
officer who denied the license, but also from the local governmental
entity for constitutional harm caused by its formal policies or by the
74
training and supervision of employees by the municipal policymaker.
This turns on a subsidiary question of whether a county clerk, in
making office policies with respect to marriage licenses, acts on behalf
75
of the county rather than the state. One district court concluded that
county clerks make policy for the state in Kentucky, precluding this
76
strategy there.

¶¶ 10–11, Wolf v. Walker, No. 14-CV-64, (W.D. Wis. Mar. 27, 2015), http://pdfserver.am
law.com/nlj/Wisconsin%20ssm%20fee%20stipulation.pdf.
71. Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259, 268–69 (1993); Scheurer v. Rhodes, 416
U.S. 232, 245 (1974).
72. Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 739 (2002).
73. San Francisco v. Sheehan, 135 S. Ct. 1765, 1774 (2015); Plumhoff v. Rickard, 134
S. Ct. 2012, 2023 (2014); Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 131 S. Ct. 2074, 2085 (2011).
74. Connick v. Thompson, 131 S. Ct. 1350, 1359–60 (2011); Cty. of Los Angeles v.
Humphries, 131 S. Ct. 447, 452 (2011); Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978).
75. McMillian v. Monroe Cty., 520 U.S. 781, 785 (1997).
76. Miller v. Davis, No. 15-cv-00044-DLB, 2015 WL 4866729, at *14 (E.D. Ky. Aug.
12, 2015).
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Following Obergefell, it might appear that a damages action by a
same-sex couple is very likely to succeed against truly recalcitrant
state officers and offices. A single decision from the Supreme Court
declaring that bans on same-sex marriage violate the Fourteenth
Amendment should be sufficient to clearly establish that right, given
the factual similarity of all flat bans on issuing marriage licenses to
couples who want them and who satisfy all other requirements. The
whole point of Obergefell is to place “beyond doubt” the question of
the constitutional protection for same-sex couples to marry on
identical terms as opposite-sex couples.
It is less clear whether damages would have been available in the
months prior to Obergefell. The doctrine is in flux as to whether onpoint circuit precedent can clearly establish a right within a circuit.
The Supreme Court has assumed it can, without actually deciding the
77
point, an approach that has cast doubt on the matter. Thus, for
example, we do not know if the Seventh Circuit decision in Wolf
clearly established the right to marriage equality within that circuit,
such that only a plainly incompetent official would have believed he
was justified in refusing to recognize or license a same-sex marriage.
On the other hand, a single or small number of nonbinding district
court decisions almost certainly do not clearly establish a right. In
any event, because there was a split among the courts of appeals as of
November 2014, the right likely was not clearly established prior to
the Court’s decision in Obergefell. If “judges thus disagree on a
constitutional question,” it is unfair to impose money damages on
78
executive officers.
Moreover, qualified immunity must take into account some of
79
the underlying facts and circumstances in defining the right at issue.
Thus, a clerk might be able to argue, at least in early cases, that while
Obergefell clearly establishes a broad right of same-sex couples to
marry, it does not clearly establish the right to have a specific public
official issue that same-sex license even if it offends the official’s
80
religious beliefs. These additional factual wrinkles mean it may take
77. Taylor v. Barkes, 135 S. Ct. 2042, 2045 (2015); Sheehan, 135 S. Ct. at 1776;
Reichle v. Howards, 132 S. Ct. 2088, 2094 (2012).
78. Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 618 (1999).
79. Plumhoff v. Rickard, 134 S. Ct. 2012, 2023 (2014).
80. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2625 (2015) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting); see
Miller, 2015 WL 4866729, at *1; see also Robyn Tysver & Cody Winchester, Out of
Nebraska’s 93 counties only one—Sioux County—refuses to issue same-sex marriage
licenses, OMAHA.COM (July 2, 2015), http://www.omaha.com/news/nebraska/citing-religi
ous-belief-clerk-in-sioux-county-nebraska-refuses-to/article_e35b4224-2021-11e5-ac56-0fe
660bec1e7.html.
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some time for the rights in Obergefell to become clearly established in
practice.
A final incentive for voluntary compliance is politics. The public
and media do not recognize or understand the distinctions among
injunctions, judgments, persuasive precedent, and binding precedent.
Thus, officials who adhere to formal procedure by awaiting a
subsequent suit and injunction, rather than complying with precedent,
risk accusations of defying or rebelling against the Constitution and
the federal judiciary. This is more or less what happened in Alabama
81
in the months prior to Obergefell.
Ironically, of course, political considerations might disincentivize
voluntary compliance. Elected officials may recognize the political
benefits of resisting, or at least seeming to resist, unpopular federal
82
precedent, which they can criticize as judicial overreaching. That
seems especially likely with controversial social issues such as samesex marriage. Ultimately, politics may be inextricable from cost.
83
84
Attorney’s fees and money damages come from the public fisc.
And as much as the public in some states might disagree with
Obergefell, there may (and even should) come a point at which the
public tires of officials spending public funds to continue losing in
federal court.
Given the nature of the same-sex marriage bans being challenged
in the states, the multistate litigation campaign made compliance with
precedent especially likely. The bans in every state were substantially
identical in substance, if not in language—marriage was between one
man and one woman and no other combination was entitled to be
married, recognized as married, or entitled to receive the benefits,
protections, and incidents of marriage. The constitutionally violative
state action was the same in every state—the denial by a state official
of a marriage license to two people who, but for being of the same
sex, were otherwise qualified for marriage in the state. The Ohio
marriage ban that Obergefell declared unconstitutional was identical
to the ban in Nebraska; the Virginia marriage ban that the Fourth
Circuit declared unconstitutional was identical to the South Carolina
81. See Wasserman, supra note 7, at 2–3, 8.
82. See Wasserman, supra note 7, at 16; see also, e.g., Roy Moore on gay marriage
ruling: ‘Christians are going to be persecuted’, AL.COM, (June 28, 2015, 2:15 PM),
http://www.al.com/news/index.ssf/2015/06/roy_moore_speaking_at_kimberly.html; Tysver
& Winchester, supra note 80.
83. Perdue v. Kenny A. ex rel Winn, 559 U.S. 542, 558 (2010).
84. Cf. Joanna C. Schwartz, Police Indemnification, 89 N.Y.U. L. REV. 885, 890–91
(2014).
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ban. Thus, there was virtually no way that an official could hope to
85
distinguish precedent in the event of future litigation. The outcome
of future litigation was even more certain than on other controversial
constitutional issues, such as whether government officials had taken
sufficient steps to integrate the schools. This similarity made it
sensible for officials to avoid future litigation that would produce an
inevitable defeat.
2.

Voluntary Compliance Before Obergefell

This network of incentives worked in many places prior to
Obergefell. Officials went beyond the limited enforceable scope of
the injunction, taking steps to issue licenses to similarly situated
couples throughout the state in light of binding or merely persuasive
precedent.
For example, thousands of marriage licenses issued in Utah in
the eleven days between the District of Utah enjoining enforcement
86
of that state’s marriage ban and the Supreme Court’s stay of the
87
injunction. Although the injunction itself guaranteed licenses only
to the three plaintiff couples, clerks issued licenses to all other
couples as an act of voluntary compliance with new precedent in
anticipation that, if they did not comply, they would be sued and
ordered to do so. In an even more extreme example, clerks in
Wisconsin voluntarily complied with a district court declaration that
the marriage law was void, without even waiting for any injunction to
88
issue.
A more expansive process played out in California. Two samesex couples had sued six executive officer defendants: the Governor,
the state attorney general, the director and deputy director of the
state Department of Public Health (DPH), and the county clerkrecorders (the officials who actually issue licenses) for two counties.
In August 2010, Judge Walker declared that Proposition 8 violated
the Fourteenth Amendment and permanently enjoined the six
89
defendant officials from applying or enforcing that law. The court
further directed them to ensure that all persons under their control or
90
supervision similarly did not enforce the ban. When the defendant
state officials declined to appeal the decision and the Supreme Court
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.

See Marcus, supra note 5, at 27.
Kitchen v. Herbert, 961 F. Supp. 2d 1181 (D. Utah 2013).
Herbert v. Kitchen, 134 S. Ct. 893 (2014); see infra Part II.A.
See infra Section II.C.3.c. and accompanying text.
Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921, 1003–04 (N.D. Cal. 2010).
Id.
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ruled three years later that the sponsors of the voter-enacted same91
sex marriage ban lacked standing to appeal, the injunction became
final and ready to take effect.
As discussed above, regardless of what the opinion said, the
court’s injunctive power was limited—the injunction itself could only
bind the two named county clerk-recorders to issue licenses to the
named couples. Other couples seeking licenses would need to initiate
their own litigation against the appropriate clerk-recorder and to
obtain their own injunctions. Further, because no one had standing
to appeal Perry and establish binding precedent, there would be no
binding authority on the matter. Judge Walker’s decision would
serve only as persuasive authority, leaving the next district court in
California free to reach a different conclusion.
Seeking to avoid this problem, nearly three weeks before
Hollingsworth was decided, California Attorney General Kamala
Harris advised that Judge Walker’s injunction would apply to all 58
counties and that “DPH can and should instruct county officials that
when the district court’s injunction goes into effect, they must resume
issuing marriage licenses to and recording the marriages of same-sex
92
couples.”
Because DPH controlled county clerk-recorders in
93
administering the state’s marriage license and certification laws, the
injunction against the DPH officers effectively enjoined every county
clerk-recorder. Of course, even if the injunction reached everyone
under DPH control, it still obligated them only as to the named
plaintiffs, not the thousands of other couples who might seek licenses.
Granting licenses beyond the plaintiff couples reflected further
voluntary compliance.
Harris’s order preempted discussions percolating among some
county officials about challenging, in state or federal court, the scope
of the Perry injunction or the attorney general’s supervisory authority
94
to compel licenses for all similarly situated couples. Hours after the

91. The Supreme Court’s determination that initiative proponents lacked standing to
appeal rendered the district court judgment and the injunction final. See Hollingsworth v.
Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652, 2659 (2013).
92. Letter from Attorney General Kamala Harris to Governor Edmund G. Brown Jr.
(June 3, 2013), http://oag.ca.gov/sites/all/files/agweb/pdfs/ht/ag_prop_8_letter.pdf.
93. Id.
94. Marty Lederman, The fate of same-sex marriage in California after Perry,
SCOTUSBLOG (June 26, 2013, 11:32 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2013/06/the-fate-ofsame-sex-marriage-in-california-after-perry/; Howard Wasserman, What’s next in
California, PRAWFSBLAWG (June 26, 2013, 11:48 PM), http://prawfsblawg.blogs.com/praw
fsblawg/2013/06/whats-next-in-california.html.
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Supreme Court’s decision in Hollingsworth, the Ninth Circuit sua
95
sponte dissolved its stay of the district court’s injunction. Circuit
Justice Kennedy then denied an application for a stay from the Prop 8
96
intervenors. And all county clerk-recorders in California quickly fell
97
in line.
But this is how voluntary compliance operates—the party
defendants chose to comply and to order those subject to their
supervision to comply. They proceeded as if the injunction protected
all couples and entitled them to licenses, without having to pursue
further litigation or secure a new injunction. And they ensured that
county-level officials did the same through their supervisory
authority. In fact, Harris performed the first same-sex marriage for
the plaintiffs in Perry hours after the Supreme Court issued its
98
ruling.
Officials in some states even sought to voluntarily comply with
court of appeals precedent dealing with a marriage ban from another
state within the circuit, even before their own state’s ban had been
invalidated.
For example, following Tenth Circuit decisions declaring invalid
99
marriage bans in Utah and Oklahoma, and the Supreme Court
100
denial of certiorari rendering those decisions Article III final, the
chief judge of the Tenth Judicial District in Kansas issued an
administrative order directing the clerk of that court (the local official
charged with issuing marriage licenses) to issue licenses to same-sex
couples. The chief judge was not compelled by any court order to do

95. The Ninth Circuit did not even wait for the Supreme Court’s mandate to issue
twenty-five days later. Josh Blackman, Prop 8 Supports File Emergency Motion With
Circuit Justice Kennedy To Stop SSM In California, JOSH BLACKMAN’S BLOG (June 29,
2013), http://joshblackman.com/blog/2013/06/29/prop-8-supports-file-emergency-motionwith-circuit-justice-kennedy-to-stop-ssm-in-california/
96. Id. Hollingsworth v. Perry, Supreme Court Docket No. 12-144, http://www.sup
remecourt.gov/search.aspx?filename=/docketfiles/12-144.htm. On July 29, 2013, the
judgment finally issued, but, by that point, same-sex marriages were being performed
throughout California.
97. Officials in Alabama responded in a very different manner. See Wasserman,
supra note 7, at 6–7; see also infra notes 171–78 and accompanying text.
98. Josh Blackman, Constitutional Weddings: Kristin M. Perry and Sandra B. Stier,
JOSH BLACKMAN’S BLOG (June 28, 2013), http://joshblackman.com/blog/2013/06/28/cons
titutional-weddings-kristin-m-perry-and-sandra-b-stier/.
99. Bishop v. Smith, 760 F.3d 1070 (10th Cir. 2014) (invalidating marriage ban in
Oklahoma); Kitchen v. Herbert, 755 F.3d 1193 (10th Cir. 2014) (invalidating marriage ban
in Utah).
100. Smith v. Bishop, 135 S. Ct. 271 (2014) (mem.) (case from Oklahoma); Herbert v.
Kitchen, 135 S. Ct. 265 (2014) (mem.) (case from Utah).
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101

this; neither the judge, the clerk, nor any Kansas couple was party to
or otherwise affected by the injunctions in the Tenth Circuit cases,
which did not even involve Kansas law. But the Kansas judge
recognized that the court of appeals decisions constituted binding
precedent for the legal proposition that the Fourteenth Amendment
required states to recognize same-sex marriages on the same terms as
opposite-sex unions. And it was legally certain what would happen
next—a Kansas couple seeking a license would sue the clerk in the
District of Kansas, the district court would be bound by Bishop and
Kitchen to similarly declare the Kansas ban invalid, and it would
enjoin the clerk not to enforce the state ban and to issue licenses to
the plaintiff couples. The prospect of federal litigation yielding an
adverse result was so certain that it made sense to voluntarily comply
with binding constitutional precedent, rather than forcing the
plaintiffs to file litigation and placing the government on the hook for
102
a new injunction and attorneys’ fees.
A similar sequence of events followed in South Carolina after the
103
Fourth Circuit affirmed the invalidation of Virginia’s marriage ban.
After the Supreme Court denied certiorari in that case, a probate
judge in Charleston County began accepting marriage license
applications from same-sex couples and indicated his intention to
104
issue licenses in compliance with Fourth Circuit precedent. Again,
the Fourth Circuit did not address South Carolina law, this probate
judge, or South Carolina couples. But it was binding circuit
precedent that made it legally certain that, if he declined to issue the
licenses and was sued in federal court, he would be enjoined to issue
the license, as well as made to pay attorney’s fees. Given that
105
prospect, voluntary compliance again made sense.
3.

Voluntary Compliance After Obergefell

Voluntary compliance was the predominant response to
Obergefell. On the day of the decision, fourteen states were not yet
101. Marie v. Moser, 65 F. Supp. 3d 1175, 1185 (D. Kan. 2014).
102. The attempt to voluntarily comply with precedent was thwarted by the Kansas
Attorney General, who initiated state court litigation to prevent enforcement of the
administrative order. State ex rel. Schmidt v. Moriarty, No. 112, 590 (Kan. Oct. 10, 2014);
see infra Section III.A.
103. Bostic v. Schaefer, 760 F.3d 352 (4th Cir. 2014).
104. Condon v. Haley, 21 F. Supp. 3d 572, 580 (D.S.C. 2014).
105. As in Kansas, however, attempt to voluntarily comply was thwarted by the state
attorney general through state court litigation. State ex rel Wilson v. Condon, 764 S.E. 2d
247 (S.C. 2014); see infra Part Section III.A.
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issuing same-sex marriage licenses under explicit state law, an Article
III-final injunction, or statewide voluntary compliance.
State
executives in numerous states—including the four states whose laws
were at issue before the Court—immediately ordered statewide
106
compliance with the decision and announced plans to issue licenses.
Although these states could have waited for the Court’s mandate
(due twenty-five days later), most chose not to wait.
The willingness of officials to voluntarily comply with Obergefell
as to similarly situated people meant these scope-of-injunction and
scope-of-precedent questions never were litigated, at least early on in
the process. This is likely because the legal distinction between
injunction and precedent carries no practical difference when the
107
precedent is a binding decision from the Supreme Court.
An
injunction directly binds the defendant officers as to the party
plaintiffs, compelling issuance of licenses to them. Precedent binds
the second court, compelling the same conclusion in the subsequent
litigation involving the similarly situated nonparty plaintiff couples
against these or other defendant officers. The second case necessarily
and certainly produces a new injunction compelling those officers to
issue licenses to these new couples. The outcome in the subsequent
litigation is certain and marriage licenses will issue to all same-sex
couples in the state requesting them.
Nevertheless, consider how Mississippi Attorney General Jim
Hood described Obergefell immediately after the decision. He
recognized that the decision was not immediately effective in
Mississippi and would not become so until the Fifth Circuit lifted the
stay on the district court injunction. Prior to that, the Supreme
Court’s mandate—issued in a case involving laws and parties in four
other states—did not affect laws, officials, or citizens of Mississippi.
Thus, no Mississippi officials were immediately obligated to issue
108
licenses to same-sex couples.
At least implicitly, Hood was
justifying the move in terms of the injunction/precedent distinction,
effectively demanding an order applicable to him and other state
officials as to specific Mississippi couples under Mississippi law.
One of two additional steps was necessary. The Fifth Circuit had
to lift the stay and affirm the district court injunction prohibiting

106. See, e.g., Miller v. Davis, No. 15-cv-00044-DLB, 2015 WL 4866729, at *1 (E.D.
Ky. Aug. 12, 2015).
107. Fallon, supra note 6, at 1340; Fallon, supra note 6, at 924 n.31.
108. Sarah Fowler & Kate Royals, Miss A.G.: Same-sex couples cannot yet marry,
CLARION-LEDGER (June 28, 2015, 12:11 PM), http://www.clarionledger.com/story/news/2
015/06/26/hinds-not-issuing-same-sex-marriage-licenses/29333011/.
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enforcement of the Mississippi ban, which it did five days after
109
Obergefell. Alternatively, the district court had to apply Obergefell
as precedent in a new action to enjoin enforcement of the Mississippi
ban as to new plaintiffs. Again, because Supreme Court precedent is
binding on all courts, these second steps were guaranteed to happen
in fairly short order and the result was preordained. But state
officials could, consistent with their constitutional oath and public
obligations, choose to await completion of the formal process, if they
were willing to bear the litigation costs and the political fallout.
Controversies over implementation of judicial decisions and
orders, both before and after Obergefell, predictably sparked
comparisons to Massive Resistance to Brown v. Board of Education
110
and school desegregation. Following Brown, officials in many states
refused to stop enforcing laws requiring segregated schools or to take
111
It took years of
steps to move their systems towards integration.
112
new lawsuits and new (often narrow) injunctions in different states,
a Supreme Court decision broadly asserting supreme judicial
113
114
authority to declare constitutional meaning, and political pressure
before something resembling integration began to take hold.
Beyond the pejorative term “Massive Resistance,” what really
happened after Brown was simply refusal by state officials to
voluntary comply with precedent—even precedent from the Supreme
Court—in the absence of a judgment and injunction binding on them
as to particular plaintiffs. Again, however, this was both substantively
and procedurally permissible, in light of departmentalism and the
115
necessarily limited reach of judgments and judicial orders.
At
worst, state officials failed to accommodate the realities of coordinate
interpretation in not deferring to the Supreme Court when the result

109. See cases cited supra note 59.
110. Wasserman, supra note 7, at 2, 9–10; see Mark Joseph Stern, Resistance to
Desegregation or Same-Sex Marriage, SLATE (July 6, 2015), http://www.slate.com/blogs/out
ward/2015/07/06/segregation_or_same_sex_marriage_take_our_quiz.html (offering quiz on
whether statements were made in response to Obergefell or desegregation).
111. MICHAEL J. KLARMAN, FROM JIM CROW TO CIVIL RIGHTS: THE SUPREME
COURT AND THE STRUGGLE FOR RACIAL EQUALITY 328–29, 330–31, 385 (2004); Carroll,
supra note 14, at 14–15; David Marcus, Flawed But Noble: Desegregation Litigation and Its
Implications for the Modern Class Action, 63 FLA. L. REV. 657, 692–93 (2011).
112. Carroll, supra note 14, at 15; Marcus, supra note 111, at 680–81.
113. Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958). But see Lawson, supra note 33, at 379;
Lawson & Moore, supra note 26, at 1293 n.124.
114. KLARMAN, supra note 111, at 418–19.
115. See supra Part I.A.1.
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116

of any litigation was inevitable.
Rhetoric aside, the real
constitutional problem in Cooper v. Aaron was not that the Little
Rock School Board refused to follow Brown, but that the Board
attempted to avoid complying with the district court’s approved
desegregation plan (issued based on Brown’s precedential effect)
117
binding the Board as to its constituents. And the real effect of the
Supreme Court’s ruling was to deny the Board’s request to suspend
that injunction, which the district court had granted and the court of
118
appeals had reversed.
Having been enjoined and having been
unable to get out of the injunction, the Board’s independent
constitutional authority ran out as to those parties.
The levels of resistance did not increase much in the early
months following Obergefell. There was some early posturing by
high-level officials in several southern states. Chief Justice Roy
Moore of the Supreme Court of Alabama argued that Obergefell was
119
worse than Plessy v. Ferguson and Supreme Court decisions about
120
Moore also warned that the decision would lead to
slavery.
121
persecution of Christians. The Attorney General of Texas opined
that individual employees could seek a religious accommodation from
122
issuing licenses to same-sex couples, while acknowledging that the
elected county clerk almost certainly would be sued if no one in the
123
office was able to provide the licenses.
Instead, the prevalent response was voluntary compliance. The
overwhelming majority of local officials in every state began issuing
licenses to same-sex couples shortly after the decision. Unlike with

116. Paulsen, supra note 32, at 338.
117. Cooper, 358 U.S. at 4–5.
118. Id.; see Justin Driver, Supremacies and the Southern Manifesto, 92 TEX. L. REV.
1053,1058–59 (2014).
119. Jeremy Diamond, Alabama chief justice: Marriage ruling worse than segregation
decision, CNN (June 26, 2015), http://www.cnn.com/2015/06/26/politics/roy-moore-conserv
atives-gay-marriage-alabama-react/.
120. Assoc. Press, supra note 82.
121. Id.
122. Letter from Ken Paxton, Attorney General of Texas, to Dan Patrick, Lt.
Governor (June 28, 2015), https://www.texasattorneygeneral.gov/opinions/opinions/
51paxton/op/2015/kp0025.pdf; see also Josh Blackman, Thoughts on the Texas Attorney
General’s Decision Concerning Same-Sex Marriage Licenses, JOSH BLACKMAN’S BLOG
(June 28, 2015), http://joshblackman.com/blog/2015/06/29/thoughts-on-the-texas-attorneygenerals-decision-concerning-same-sex-marriage-licenses/.
123. Letter from Ken Paxton, supra note 122. The letter cited Texas’s Religious
Freedom Restoration Act as the basis for the accommodation, although it is unclear
whether the statute is either necessary or sufficient to protect a public official in the face of
a constitutional claim by a same-sex couple denied a license.
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desegregation, public officials who were not inclined to comply
124
resigned and left the scene or made noise from the wings, but
without actively interfering with the enforcement of rights. One
report showed that approximately two months after Obergefell, fewer
than twenty counties in Southern states were not issuing licenses to
125
126
same-sex couples. And thirteen of those were in Alabama, where
some probate judges were waiting for the Supreme Court of Alabama
127
to vacate a mandamus order in light of Obergefell.
The most dramatic resistance came from Kim Davis, Clerk of
Rowan County, Kentucky. Under Davis’s instructions, the office
stopped issuing marriage licenses to any couples, same—or
opposite—sex. And she not only refused to issue licenses herself, but
prohibited her deputies from doing so. Citing her religious beliefs
and the state’s Religious Freedom Restoration Act, Davis insisted
that, because those licenses were issued in her name as Clerk of the
County, she was being compelled to recognize marriages in violation
of her deeply held beliefs. Judge David Bunning of the Eastern
District of Kentucky applied Obergefell, rejected her religious-liberty
128
arguments, and preliminarily enjoined her to begin issuing licenses.
Both Judge Bunning and the Sixth Circuit declined to stay that
injunction.
When Davis continued to refuse to issue licenses,
notwithstanding the injunction, Bunning held Davis in civil contempt
129
and jailed her over Labor Day weekend 2015. This sanction—which
the ACLU, representing the plaintiffs, had opposed—made Davis a
130
political celebrity.
Once deputies in the office began issuing

124. Entire Tenn. county clerk’s office resigns over same-sex marriage licenses, WKRN
(July 2, 2015, 3:47 PM), http://wkrn.com/2015/07/02/entire-tenn-county-clerks-officeresigns-over-same-sex-marriage-licenses/; Mark Joseph Stern, Two Clerks Resigned to
Avoid Issuing Gay Marriage Licenses. Good for Them!, SLATE (July 1, 2015, 9:48 AM),
http://www.slate.com/blogs/outward/2015/07/01/clerks_resign_to_avoid_issuing_gay_marri
age_licenses_good.html.
125. Greg Sargent, A Kentucky clerk is turning away gay couples. But she’s a real
rarity, WASH. POST (Sept. 1, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/plum-line/wp/2
015/09/01/a-kentucky-clerk-is-turning-away-gay-couples-but-shes-a-real-rarity/.
126. Id.
127. See infra notes 157–59 and accompanying text.
128. Miller v. Davis, No. 15-cv-00044-DLB, 2015 WL 4866729, at *1 (E.D. Ky. Aug.
12, 2015).
129. Miller v. Davis, No. 15-cv-44-DLB, (ED. Ky. Sept. 3, 2015) (minute order),
https://www.justsecurity.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/09/davis.contempt.order_.pdf.
130. Maxwell Tani, Kim Davis, the jailed clerk who refused to give out gay marriage
licenses, was just honored like a rock star at a surreal rally, BUSINESS INSIDER (Sept. 8,
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licenses, Bunning lifted the contempt order and released Davis after
131
five days, contingent on her not interfering with her deputies.
Bunning also clarified that the injunction required that licenses
be issued to all legally eligible couples, not only the named
132
plaintiffs. Unfortunately, his explanation for that extension showed
the typical misunderstanding of the limited scope of his equitable
power:
Had the Court declined to clarify that its ruling
applied to all eligible couples seeking a marriage
license in Rowan County, it would have effectively
granted Plaintiffs’ request for injunctive relief and left
other eligible couples at the mercy of Davis’ “no
marriage licenses” policy, which the Court found to be
in violation of the Supreme Court’s decision in
Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015). Such an
approach would not only create piecemeal litigation, it
would be inconsistent with basic principles of justice
and fairness. Thus, when the need arose, the Court
clarified that its ruling applied with equal force to all
marriage license applicants in Rowan County,
133
regardless of their involvement in this litigation.
While Judge Bunning’s heart was no doubt in the right place, the
reasoning is inconsistent with the limited scope of a court’s injunctive
2015, 4:06 PM), http://www.businessinsider.com/kim-davis-eye-of-the-tiger-jail-2015-9.
For a discussion of whether incarceration was even necessary, see Samuel Bagenstos,
Kentucky Clerk Kim Davis Never Should Have Gone to Jail, THE NEW REPUBLIC (Sept. 8,
2015), http://www.newrepublic.com/article/122758/kentucky-clerk-kim-davis-never-shouldhave-gone-jail; Marty Lederman, Does anyone have any idea what’s happening with
marriages in Rowan County, Kentucky?, BALKINIZATION (Sept. 5, 2015), http://balkin
.blogspot.com/2015/09/does-anyone-have-any-idea-whats.html.
131. Miller v. Davis, No. 15-cv-44-DLB, (E.D. Ky. Sept. 8, 2015) (order for the release
of Kim Davis), https://www.justsecurity.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/09/bunning .lift_.pdf.
The last piece of that order somewhat hearkens back to the 1960s, where a district court
similarly enjoined Alabama Governor George Wallace from interfering with other state
officials in complying with injunctions to integrate schools. See United States v. Wallace,
218 F. Supp. 290, 292 (N.D. Ala. 1963); Wasserman supra note 7, at 3, 9.
132. Miller v. Davis, No. 15-cv-44-DLB, (E.D. Ky. Sept. 3, 2015) (order granting
preliminary injunction), https://www.justsecurity.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/09/davis.inj
unction.amended.pdf.
133. Miller v. Davis, No. 15-cv-44-DLB, at *3–4 (E.D. Ky. Sept. 23, 2015) (mem.), http://
www.washingtonblade.com/content/files/2015/09/Judge-denies-Davis.pdf (emphasis added);
see also Howard Wasserman, Justice and Fairness v. Procedure, PRAWFSBLAWG (Sept. 24,
2015), http://prawfsblawg.blogs.com/prawfsblawg/2015/09/justice-and-fairness-v-procedure.ht
ml.
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power. In moving to extend the injunction, the plaintiffs had offered
a more plausible justification—that a pending motion for certification
of a Rule 23(b)(2) class made the broader preliminary injunction
134
appropriate to protect the interests of putative class members. But
the court declined to follow that path, leaving the class issue
untouched and leaving one issue on which he might be vulnerable for
reversal on appeal.
Other noncompliance was more symbolic than real. For
example, several weeks after Obergefell, the clerk in Hood County,
Texas, refused to issue a license to a same-sex couple, purportedly
because the office lacked the proper forms; when the couple filed a
civil action in the Northern District of Texas, the clerk issued the
135
license within a matter of hours.
It might be tempting to argue that the different response reflects
present-day society being more receptive to social change, including
judicially created social change. But two other possibilities carry
greater explanatory power. One explanation is administrative. States
could drag their feet post-Brown in part because of the massive
restructuring of state law and the operation of public schools
necessary to achieve integration. When the Supreme Court ordered
136
states to comply with Brown with “all deliberate speed,” it
recognized that the demand for forward progress had to be balanced
against these executive and financial burdens.
But no such
administrative burdens attach to approving or recognizing same-sex
marriages, except perhaps some de minimis costs in creating new
marriage license forms (that, for example, have two spaces for
“Applicant” rather than one for “Husband” and one for “Wife”).
This has two effects. First, it becomes more difficult for officials to
rely on anything other than “I disagree with the Supreme Court” to
justify noncompliance, which may not be a politically feasible
position. Second, federal courts hearing the lawsuits necessitated by
noncompliance are likely to be unsympathetic to defendant officials
and quick to enjoin them to recognize same-sex marriages in the
absence of countervailing state interests.

134. Miller v. Davis, No. 15-cv-44-DLB, 2015 WL 4747531 (E.D. Ky. Aug. 2, 2015)
(mem.); see also infra Part I.D.
135. Caulkins, supra note 59; Wilonsky, supra note 59; see Howard Wasserman, What
can plaintiffs sue for after Obergefell, PRAWFSBLAWG (July 6, 2015), http://prawfsblawg.
blogs.com/prawfsblawg/2015/07/what-plaintiffs-can-sue-for-after-obergefell.html.
136. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 349 U.S. 294, 301 (1955).
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A second explanation is procedural—the incentives for voluntary
compliance are more powerful today than in the period of Massive
Resistance following Brown. Actions for damages under § 1983 were
not a significant part of the civil rights landscape in the years just after
Brown. It was not until several years later that the Supreme Court
recognized that public officials are subject to liability even when they
137
act contrary to state law and that local governments are liable for
damages for constitutional harm resulting from their official
138
policies. Further, prevailing civil rights plaintiffs were not entitled
to attorney’s fees until Congress enacted the Civil Rights Attorney’s
139
Fees Award Act of 1976, legislation explicitly designed to offer
plaintiffs a greater chance at obtaining constitutional relief by
140
providing competent counsel.
These developments made Massive
Resistance to same-sex marriage significantly more expensive than it
was fifty years earlier, as fees easily could run into the hundreds-ofthousands of dollars, as Rowan County has discovered. It made fiscal
sense for state and county officials to defer to the Supreme Court’s
interpretation in Obergefell and avoid further interbranch conflict—
to practice what Michael Paulsen calls “coordinacy.”
C. The Limits of Persuasive Authority

The concepts of precedent and injunction overlap, at least as a
141
practical matter, when precedent is binding. Even if not bound by a
judgment and even if free to reach different constitutional
conclusions, state officials are likely to comply with circuit or
Supreme Court precedent as to similarly situated parties. They know
that binding precedent guarantees that they will lose in any
subsequent litigation, become subject to an injunction, and be made
to pay attorneys’ fees and perhaps damages. Thus, the cheapest,
simplest, and likely least controversial move is for officials to act as if
142
they are bound by a precedent.
This explains Nebraska’s postObergefell concession in the Eighth Circuit that it would abide by the
Court’s precedent and no longer attempt to enforce its marriage ban

137. Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961).
138. Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978).
139. Pub. L. 94-559, 90 Stat. 2641 (1976), codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b).
140. Evans v. Jeff D., 475 U.S. 717, 730 (1986); see also Monell, 436 U.S. at 751–52
(Brennan, J., dissenting).
141. Fallon, supra note 6 at 1340; Fallon, supra note 6, at 924 n.31.
142. Supra Part I.B.
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143

against the plaintiffs, although not bound by the judgment in the
case.
On the other hand, the concepts diverge when comparing district
court precedent, which is merely persuasive, to injunctions. Attorney
General Harris’ quick voluntary compliance in California preempted
discussions percolating among some county officials about
challenging, in state or federal court, the scope of the district court
injunction in Perry or the attorney general’s supervisory authority to
144
compel them to issue licenses to all similarly situated couples.
The effect of the gap between persuasive precedent and
injunction was illustrated by a series of genuinely wild and
misunderstood litigation moves in Florida and Alabama during the
six months prior to Obergefell. Judges in the Northern District of
Florida and the Southern District of Alabama declared their
respective state marriage bans unconstitutional and issued broad
injunctions prohibiting the defendant officers from enforcing the
145
laws. Both courts stayed their orders only for short periods, to give
146
state officials time to seek stays from reviewing courts. After those
147
appeals proved unsuccessful, both injunctions took effect.
The
plaintiff couples obviously were entitled to marriage licenses from the
named defendants, on pain of contempt. But no one—not the courts,
the litigants, the media, or the public—quite grasped what this meant
for the state as a whole, for similarly situated couples not protected
by the injunction, or for other state officials not bound by the
injunction.
In both states, the statewide organization for the local officials
(county clerks in Florida, probate judges in Alabama) charged with
issuing marriage licenses took the position that the injunction only
bound the named defendants to issue licenses to the named plaintiffs,

143. Appellants Suggestion of Mootness and Motion to Vacate Preliminary
Injunction, Waters v. Ricketts, 798 F.3d 682 (8th Cir. 2015) (No. 15-452), http://files.eqcf.
org/wp-content/uploads/2015/06/12706015-Mootness-and-Motion-to-Vacate-PI-.pdf.
144. Lederman, supra note 94; Wasserman, supra note 7; supra notes 89–98 and
accompanying text.
145. See, e.g., Strawser v. Strange, 44 F. Supp. 3d 1206, 1207 (S.D. Ala. Feb. 12, 2015);
Searcy v. Strange, 81 F. Supp. 3d 1285, 1291 (S.D. Ala. Jan. 23, 2015); Brenner v. Scott, 999
F. Supp. 2d 1278 (N.D. Fla. 2014).
146. Strawser, 44 F. Supp. 3d at 1207; Searcy v. Strange, No. 14-0208-CG-N, 2015 WL
328825, slip op. at 3 (S.D. Ala., filed Jan. 25, 2015); Brenner, 999 F. Supp. 2d at 1293.
147. Strange v. Searcy, 135 S. Ct. 940 (2015); Armstrong v. Brenner, 135 S. Ct. 890
(2015); see supra Part I.D.
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but had no effect beyond those parties.
They advised their
members that they were not obligated to issue licenses to any other
couples and, indeed, were still prohibited from doing so by state law.
In Alabama, Chief Justice Roy Moore asserted his authority as the
149
chief administrative officer of the state courts to advise against and
150
then prohibit
probate judges from issuing licenses.
Moore
emphasized the limited scope of the district court’s injunction, its
nonapplication to nonparty probate judges, and the limited
precedential authority of district court decisions.
In response, federal courts in both states issued orders
“clarifying” their injunctions. Both judges acknowledged that their
injunctions did not compel any nondefendant officers to issue licenses
151
and did not compel issuance of licenses to any nonplaintiff couples.
152
But, both judges insisted, “the Constitution” did require issuance of
licenses to other couples by nondefendant officials. And both courts
punctuated this point by recalling historical resistance to
153
desegregation decrees and constitutional change.
It is not clear
what the judges hoped to convey or what they meant by saying “the
Constitution” requires anything. At best, it is a point about
precedent—the Constitution as interpreted by that district judge in an
earlier case requires issuance of the licenses. Indeed, both judges
expressly, and properly, recognized that new couples could bring new
lawsuits and successfully obtain injunctions and attorney’s fees in
154
light of that precedent.
What both courts as well as most observers missed is that this
interpretation, as precedent, was persuasive only. “The Constitution”

148. Memorandum from Attorneys to FACC (Dec. 15, 2014), https://www.scribd.com/
doc/250336675/Greenberg-Traurig-Revised-Memo-December-15-2014; Michael Finch II,
Alabama Probate Judges Association Says Not to Issue Marriage Licenses to Same-Sex
Couples on Monday, AL.COM (Jan. 25, 2015, 5:58 PM), http://www.al.com/news/mobile/
index.ssf/2015/01/alabama_probate_court_judges_gay_marriage.html.
149. Memorandum from Chief Justice Roy S. Moore to Ala. Probate Judges (Feb. 3,
2015), https://www.scribd.com/doc/272411089/Chief-Justice-Moore-s-Memorandum.
150. Admin. Order of the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court (Feb. 8, 2015),
https://www.scribd.com/doc/272411125/CJ-Moore-Order-to-Ala-Probate-Judges.
151. Searcy v. Strange, No. 14-0208-CG-N (S.D. Ala. Jan. 28, 2015) (order clarifying
judgment), https://www.scribd.com/doc/272411158/Searcy-v-Strange-1-28-15; Brenner v.
Scott, No. 4:14-cv-107-RH/CAS, 2015 WL 44260, at *1 (N.D. Fla. 2015) (order on the
scope of the preliminary injunction).
152. Searcy v. Strange, No. 14-0208-CG-N (S.D. Ala. Jan. 28, 2015) (order clarifying
judgment) (emphasis added), https://www.scribd.com/doc/272411158/Searcy-v-Strange-128-15; Brenner, 2015 WL 44260, at *1 (emphasis in original).
153. Id.
154. Id.
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required issuance of licenses only because one district judge in a
single judicial opinion had so interpreted it. But this interpretation
was not binding on any other court or judge in any other case, unless
that second court chose to follow it. And because precedent does not
bind anyone outside of a court order, state officials could continue
deciding for themselves what the Constitution meant and what it
required.
Officials knew that the next court—including even that same
judge—might reach a different conclusion on the constitutional
question when these couples initiated new litigation. Unlike with
Supreme Court or court of appeals precedent declaring what “the
Constitution” required, district court precedent did not preordain the
outcome of subsequent litigation. However unlikely a different result
might have been—especially if the action were brought before the
same judge—the legal possibility remained.
This, in turn, means that persuasive authority offers less
incentive for officials to voluntarily comply rather than continuing to
follow their own constitutional interpretation and fight the issue.
Indeed, the compliance incentives worked very differently in the two
states. In Florida, the practical reality prevailed. Both the state
155
156
association of county clerks and the state attorney general
responded to the clarified order by acceding to clerks issuing licenses
without awaiting further lawsuits, orders, or appeals.
The clarifying order was far less effective in Alabama. While
some county officials began issuing licenses in response to the
157
clarified order, far from all complied.
What followed instead in
Alabama was an escalating game of litigation chicken amid a circus of
158
public confusion, which one of us discussed in detail elsewhere. The
Supreme Court of Alabama exercised its original jurisdiction to issue
a writ of mandamus prohibiting all state probate judges, other than
those bound by the federal injunction, from issuing marriage licenses
159
to same-sex couples.
Through it all rang comparisons of ongoing
155. Howard Wasserman, The Process of Marriage Equality, Redux, PRAWFSBLAWG
(Jan. 3, 2015, 9:31 AM), http://prawfsblawg.blogs.com/prawfsblawg/2015/01/the-process-ofmarriage-equality-redux.html.
156. News Release, Attorney General Pam Biondi, Attorney General Pam Bondi’s
Statement Regarding Judge Hinkle’s Order (Jan. 1, 2015), http://www.myfloridalegal.com/
newsrel.nsf/newsreleases/891D80F35B6D0B6985257DC0007E5358.
157. Wasserman, supra note 7, at 6, 9.
158. Id. at 10–11.
159. Ex parte Alabama ex rel. Ala. Policy Inst., No. 1140460, 2015 WL 892752 (Ala.
Mar. 3, 2015); Wasserman, supra note 7, at 211–12. In response, the plaintiffs converted
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events to former Alabama Governor George Wallace and resistance
to integration, with critics decrying Alabama’s “defiance” and
160
“rebellion” against the federal judiciary and the Constitution.
But this criticism misunderstood the nature of judicial relief and
the judicial process, the distinction between injunction and precedent
and the limited imperative for state officials to voluntarily comply
161
with precedent. In the end, it created a few weeks of intense public
focus on that state, while illustrating the all-too-common gap between
legal reality and popular rhetoric.
D. Civil-Rights Injunction Class Actions

The way to close the practical gap between an injunction and
persuasive district court precedent is through a class action. Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(2) permits class actions where “the
party opposing the class has acted or refused to act on grounds that
apply generally to the class, so that final injunctive relief or
corresponding declaratory relief is appropriate respecting the class as
162
a whole.”
The Supreme Court promulgated the rule in 1966 to
facilitate civil rights actions seeking injunctive relief applicable to
broad groups of plaintiffs and defendants. This new procedural
device was an explicit response to Massive Resistance and the
experience with post-Brown desegregation litigation.
In cases
involving other schools and other plaintiffs, courts often accorded
relief only to the named individuals, such as by ordering them to be
admitted into previously all-white schools. But they did not provide
the broad structural relief of integrating the schools in a way that
163
would benefit a broad class of people.
Class status in civil rights litigation resolves that inefficiency by
allowing for relief beyond the named individual plaintiffs and
164
defendants. Certification enables the court to legitimately impose a
broader injunction affording relief to all similarly situated people
165
against all similarly situated officers. These broader injunctions can
directly protect everyone in the class and directly obligate all officials
the pending federal suit into a class action, applicable to all same-sex couples seeking
licenses against every probate judge in the state. Wasserman, supra note 7, at 13; see infra
Part I.D.
160. Id. at 11–12.
161. Id.
162. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(2).
163. Carroll, supra note 14, at 15–16; Marcus, supra note 111, at 702–08; Marcus, supra
note 5, at 6–7.
164. LAYCOCK, supra note 5, at 217; Marcus, supra note 5, at 28.
165. LAYCOCK, supra note 5, at 217.
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to perform (or refrain from performing) some act with respect to
every class member. Because every similarly situated person is
protected by and subject to the class judgment, no one is left to rely
on subsequent litigation and the indirect precedential force of the
prior decision. And the obligations imposed on the defendants
extend to all class members.
Class certification seems particularly appropriate in marriage
equality litigation, since the underlying facts were identical in every
case and there was no possibility of legal, factual, remedial, or
166
administrative differences among plaintiffs.
Same-sex couples
wanted to get married, took the necessary steps to do so, and were
denied licenses by state officials following express state law
prohibiting couples from marrying because they were of the same sex.
The remedy would be the same for all couples—prohibiting state
administrators from enforcing the marriage ban and obligating them
to issue marriage licenses to all class members. David Marcus
categorizes this type of public-interest class action as involving
necessarily interdependent claims with plausibly indivisible
remedies—state law and state officials treated every couple the same,
although an injunction ordering licenses to one couple but not others
167
remained plausible.
He calls these the “paradigmatic” candidates
168
for 23(b)(2) certification.
At the same time, Marcus recognizes that class treatment may be
less necessary in these cases, given the plausibility of each couple
169
pursuing individual litigation.
Moreover, the likelihood of
voluntary compliance with precedent declaring a statute
unconstitutional, may provide a basis for government officials to
170
argue and courts to conclude, that class treatment is unnecessary.

166. Carroll, supra note 14, at 37; Marcus, supra note 14, at 61.
167. Marcus, supra note 5, at 27.
168. Id. at 50–51.
169. Id. at 27–28.
170. Mills v. Dist. of Columbia, 266 F.R.D. 20, 22 (D.D.C. 2010) (quoting Alliance to
End Repression, 565 F.2d at 980); see also Galvan v. Levine, 490 F.2d 1255, 1261 (2d Cir.
1973) (Friendly, J.) (affirming the district court’s denial of class certification on the ground
that “the judgment run[s] to the benefit not only of the named plaintiffs but of all other
similarly situated” claimants and the “State has made clear that it understands the
judgment to bind it with respect to all claimants”). Virginia made this argument in
opposition to class certification. See State Defendants’ Brief in Opposition to Plaintiffs’
Motion for Class Certification at *5–6, Harris v. McDonnell, 988 F. Supp. 2d 603 (W.D.
Va. Dec. 23, 2013) (No. 5:13-cv-77), https://www.scribd.com/doc/274519731/30-State-Defen
dants-Brief-in-Opp-to-Plff-Mot-for-Class-Cert-8-30-13.
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In response to the Supreme Court of Alabama’s mandamus
order, and some state officials continuing to refuse to voluntarily
171
comply with district court precedent, the Alabama plaintiffs turned
172
Judge Granade certified a plaintiff
to the injunctive class action.
class defined as:
All persons in Alabama who wish to obtain a marriage
license in order to marry a person of the same sex and
to have the marriage recognized under Alabama law,
and who are unable to do so because of the
enforcement of Alabama’s laws prohibiting the
issuance of marriage licenses to same sex couples and
173
barring recognition of their marriages.
The defendant class was defined as:
All Alabama county probate judges who are enforcing
or in the future may enforce Alabama’s laws barring
the issuance of marriage licenses to same-sex couples
174
and refusing to recognize their marriages.
In a separate order, Judge Granade extended the preliminary
injunction, previously entered against one probate judge in favor of
four couples, to prohibit the defendant class from enforcing the
state’s same-sex marriage ban. The order further required them to
issue marriage licenses to any member of the plaintiff class who
followed the proper steps towards obtaining a license. This extended
injunction required every Alabama probate judge to issue licenses to
any same-sex couples in Alabama who requested one, with every
175
judge subject to contempt for noncompliance.
Recognizing the “imminent” resolution of Obergefell, however,
Judge Granade stayed the class injunction “until the Supreme Court
176
issues its ruling.”
Following Obergefell, the plaintiffs argued, and
Judge Granade agreed, that the stay lifted as soon as the Court issued
its decision on June 26. The class-wide preliminary injunction
171. Supra notes 145–60 and accompanying text.
172. Cf. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(1), (2) (establishing standards for class certification).
173. Strawser v. Strange, No. 14-0424-CG-C, 2015 WL 2449251, at *1 (S.D. Ala. May
21, 2015).
174. Id.
175. Strawser, 2015 WL 2449468, at *1.
176. Id. at *6.
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became immediately effective and binding on every probate judge in
177
In other words, precedent was converted into an
the state.
injunction, and because of class certification, the injunction bound all
possible similarly situated defendants and ran in favor of all possible
similarly situated plaintiffs.
While the days immediately following Obergefell were marked
by scattered attempts by some probate judges to avoid issuing licenses
178
to same-sex couples or to avoid issuing licenses at all, the now
effective class injunction quickly ended those efforts by ensuring
compliance without need for that additional step. A couple denied a
license by a probate judge would not have to initiate a new lawsuit or
obtain a new injunction. They instead could go directly to Judge
Granade for an order enforcing the existing injunction, with no
further constitutional analysis required. The court would promptly
order the probate judge to issue licenses under the terms of the
injunction, with failure to comply sanctioned by civil contempt.
The post-Obergefell confrontation in Rowan County, Kentucky,
further illustrates the benefits of the class action strategy. The day
after Judge Bunning enjoined Rowan County Clerk Kim Davis (and
her deputies) from refusing to issue licenses, two couples were denied
179
licenses—one was a party to the case, and the other wasn’t.
Procedurally this was permissible as to the latter, because the
injunction only compelled the clerk to issue licenses to four named
couples. It was impermissible, however, as to the former, and could
180
have placed Davis in contempt. Of course, the plaintiffs recognized
these possibilities and had sought class certification; but the court,
without explanation, declined to rule on the request. That failure, in
turn, called into question the court’s later expansion of the injunction
181
beyond the parties to all eligible persons seeking marriage licenses.
E. What if Obergefell had come out the other way?

A final lens on the precedent/injunction distinction in marriage
equality litigation is through a counter-factual: What would have

177. Strawser v. Strange, No. 14-0424-CG-C (S.D. Ala. July 1, 2015) (order clarifying
preliminary injunction), http://www.nclrights.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/07/AlabamaJudge-Clarification-Order.pdf.
178. See, e.g., Wasserman, supra note 7, at 15; see supra notes 106–27 and
accompanying text.
179. Wasserman, supra note 7.
180. As discussed previously, see supra notes 22–25, 49–51 and accompanying text.
181. Supra notes 26–31, 52–61 and accompanying text.
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happened, procedurally, had the Supreme Court gone the other way
in Obergefell and ruled that the Fourteenth Amendment did not
protect the right of same-sex couples to marry?
In states under Article III-final injunctions prohibiting
182
enforcement of the same-sex marriage ban, state attorneys general
likely would have moved in the district courts under Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 60(b) to vacate the injunctions in light of the binding
183
change in constitutional law.
In fact, however, the precedentinjunction divide makes this move unnecessary.
Because the
injunctions only prohibited enforcement of the marriage bans as to
the named plaintiffs, the states had already satisfied those judgments
when those same-sex couples received marriage licenses or otherwise
had their marriages recognized.
All other licenses were issued to same-sex couples in those states
on the strength of officials’ voluntary compliance with that regionally
binding precedent. Of course, that voluntary compliance properly
would cease in light of superseding nationally binding precedent. As
soon as the counter-factual Obergefell came out, a state official could
decline to issue any further licenses, knowing that, if sued by new
couples, the district court would not find him liable or enjoin him to
issue licenses. In other words, the state could alter its voluntary,
precedent-guided behavior. There would be no need to return to
court for permission to do so. Further, the states would have no
ongoing procedural duty to recognize those marriage licenses that
184
were validly issued during the pendency of the litigation.
In states in which the injunction had not become Article III-final,
the state could ask the court of appeals to reverse the district court in
light of the new precedent and the change to Fourteenth Amendment
law. Courts of appeals generally apply the law in effect at the time it
decides a case, even if the law has changed subsequent to the trial
185
court decision.
Again, however, the revised judgment is only
182. This included California, Oregon, Utah, Oklahoma, Virginia, North Carolina,
Wisconsin, and Indiana.
183. Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 239 (1997); Rufo v. Inmates of Suffolk Cty. Jail,
502 U.S. 367, 388 (1992).
184. Two district courts found that the states were obligated to recognize validly
issued marriage licenses as a matter of due process. Evans v. Utah, 21 F. Supp. 2d 1192
(D. Utah 2014); Caspar v. Snyder, No. 4:14-cv-11499, 2015 WL 224741 (E.D. Mi. Jan. 15,
2015), https://www.scribd.com/doc/252720181/4-14-cv-11499-46.
185. United States v. Schooner Peggy, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 103, 110 (1801) (Marshall,
C.J.) (“It is in the general true that the province of an appellate court is only to enquire
whether a judgment when rendered was erroneous or not. But if subsequent to the
judgment and before the decision of the appellate court, a law intervenes and positively
changes the rule which governs, the law must be obeyed, or its obligation denied.”).
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necessary as to the named plaintiff couples. As to nonparties, state
officials remain in the same situation described above—they could
end their voluntary compliance, knowing that, if sued by new couples,
the district court would not find them liable or issue an injunction in
light of Obergefell. And to the extent the injunction was not stayed
pending appeal and the plaintiff couples already had received their
licenses, no further steps would have been necessary.
The one case in which state officials would have had to seek
formal reversal or vacatur of a district court injunction would have
been Strawser in Alabama. Because that injunction had been
extended to a class of every probate judge obligated to issue licenses
to a class of every same-sex couple seeking a license, the obligation to
issue licenses across the state came directly from the injunction, not
merely from precedent and voluntary compliance with precedent.
The class injunction would remain in force, albeit temporarily. The
counter-factual Obergefell would require the court to vacate its
judgment, although the defendants still would have had to take the
extra step of moving for that relief. This again demonstrates how the
class action device affects the injunction/precedent line.

II. Stays, Cert Denials, and the Supreme Court
After district courts began enjoining enforcement of same-sex
marriage bans and compelling the issuance of licenses and recognition
of same-sex marriages, the judges confronted when and how those
injunctions should take effect. The question of whether to stay a
judgment pending appeal, and the controversy and confusion it
created throughout the Article III judiciary, made marriage equality
largely unprecedented as a constitutional-litigation campaign.
We discuss the stay issue in a chronology, divided into four
phases, each defined by a different signal from the Court and a broad
range of responses to those signals from the lower courts. The initial
period involved the sui generis case from the District of Utah, the first
post-Windsor decision invalidating a state ban. The eleven-day
period from Christmas Eve 2014, when the court invalidated the
Beehive state’s ban, until January 7, 2014, when the Supreme Court
intervened with a stay, was a litigation steeplechase. The second
period began after the Utah controversy, with the Supreme Court
apparently signaling that lower courts should put on hold any
injunctions until the appeals process was completed. This message
lasted until October 2014, when the Supreme Court unexpectedly
denied certiorari in cases from three circuits, sending a third signal
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that the same-sex marriage bans likely would not withstand
Fourteenth Amendment scrutiny, so lower courts should not stay
injunctions during the appeals process. The fourth period began in
January 2015, when the Court granted certiorari in the case from the
Sixth Circuit that became Obergefell, lasting until the Court’s decision
on the merits in June. During this period, the lower courts split on
whether to stay judgments until the Supreme Court finally resolved
the issue once and for all.
Events within each period illustrate how different courts read or
ignored the prevailing signals from the shadow docket. They also
show that the “correct” answer to the stay question, at least for courts
relying on Supreme Court signals, arguably shifted in each new
period.
A. Injunctions and Stays

Three themes emerged on the question of stays in the same-sex
marriage litigation. First, these cases teed up the question of when
lower courts should stay judgments pending review by a higher court.
Generally, courts consider four factors in deciding whether to stay a
judgment: (1) whether the stay applicant (the loser in the lower court)
has made a “strong showing” that he is likely to succeed on the merits
of the appeal; (2) whether the applicant will be irreparably injured
absent the stay; (3) whether the stay will substantially injure other
186
interested parties; and (4) where the public interest lies. Although
stays and preliminary injunctions are distinction mechanisms, they
187
overlap in function and in the factors governing each.
A
preliminary injunction alters the status quo and the stay suspends that
188
alteration, leaving reviewing courts time and space to “responsibly
189
fulfill their role in the judicial process.”
But a court must not
190
The
“reflexively” hold every order in abeyance pending review.
decision to grant a stay involves the exercise of sound discretion and
191
the propriety of a stay depends on the circumstances of each case.
The likelihood-of-success prong presents two potential
difficulties, particularly for the district court that issued the
injunction. First, the inquiry requires the court to predict the losing
186. Nken v. Holder, 129 S. Ct. 1749, 1761 (2009) (quoting Hilton v. Braunskill, 481
U.S. 770, 776 (1987)).
187. Id. at 1758, 1761.
188. Id. at 1758.
189. Id. at 1757.
190. Id.
191. Id. at 1760.
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party’s likely success before a reviewing court—in other words,
predict how a higher court will decide the issue. This prediction
192
departs from a lower court’s ordinary approach to legal analysis.
Second, the stay decision may be affected by what one scholar calls
“lock in”—the court becomes tied to its position that the plaintiffs
were likely to succeed on the merits of their constitutional claim,
193
thereby justifying the injunction in the first instance.
The judge
struggles to conceive of the defendants prevailing on the merits on
194
In other words, having declared a marriage law
appeal.
unconstitutional, it would be difficult for the same judge to imagine a
higher court declaring the law to be constitutional.
The remaining factors, when considered together, seek to
balance the need for responsible, unpressured appellate review with
the prevailing party’s entitlement to prompt execution of orders
195
benefitting them.
Courts are less likely to stay a prohibitory or
negative injunction, such as an order barring the government from
enforcing a challenged law. For one thing, a negative injunction does
not prohibit enforcement of the challenged law against anyone other
196
than the named plaintiffs. If the injunction is reversed on appeal,
the state will have an opportunity to enforce the law, including
197
against the plaintiff. By contrast, courts might be more likely to stay
a mandatory or positive injunction requiring the state to take
affirmative steps, which cannot be undone (or can be undone only at
great difficulty and cost) should the injunction eventually be
198
reversed.
192. Michael C. Dorf, Prediction and the Rule of Law, 42 UCLA L. REV. 651, 690–93
(1995); compare id. at 679 with Evan H. Caminker, Precedent and Prediction: The
Forward-Looking Aspects of Inferior Court Decionmaking, 73 TEX. L. REV. 1, 74 (1994).
193. Kevin J. Lynch, The Lock-In Effect of Preliminary Injunctions, 66 FLA. L. REV.
779, 804 (2014).
194. Id.
195. Nken, 129 U.S. at 1757.
196. Doran v. Salem Inn, Inc., 422 U.S. 922, 929 (1975); Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S.
452, 456 n.3 (1974).
197. There is a nice question whether conduct engaged in under the protection of a
preliminary injunction can be the subject of a later prosecution if the injunction is reversed
and lifted. Compare Edgar v. MITE, 457 U.S. 624, 649-50 (1982) (Stevens, J., concurring
in part and concurring in the judgment) with id. at 657-59 (Marshall, J., dissenting); see
also Mike Dorf, Can a Federal Appeal Court Provide “Grandfather” Status to Utah SameSex Marriages if the District Court Ruling is Later Reversed on Appeal?, DORF ON LAW
(Dec. 30, 2013), http://www.dorfonlaw.org/2013/12/can-federal-court-provide-grandfather.
html. That question is beyond the scope of this paper.
198. Evans v. Utah, 21 F. Supp. 2d 1192, 1208 (D. Utah 2014) (citing University of
Texas v. Camenisch, 451 U.S. 390, 398 (1981)); see also Strange v. Searcy, 135 S. Ct. 940,
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The marriage cases were unique because the injunctions were
both prohibitory and mandatory. State officials were prohibited from
enforcing bans on same-sex marriage (a negative order) and also were
mandated to license or recognize same-sex marriages of the named
plaintiffs (a positive order). Thus, without a stay, the plaintiff couples
would be legally entitled to marriage licenses and state officials would
immediately be obligated to issue them. State officials also would
likely voluntarily comply with the precedent created by the
(unstayed) judgment and issue licenses to similarly situated couples.
But once a couple has been married, it is difficult for the state to
undo that marriage if the judgment were reversed on appeal based on
the reviewing court’s determination that bans on same-sex marriage
are constitutionally valid. States would face two unappealing options.
First, the state could continue to recognize a large number of samesex couples as legally married in the state, even though valid state
policy would continue to prohibit any other same-sex couples from
marrying. Second, and even worse, the state would have to
retroactively invalidate recognized marriages and suspend all
attendant benefits, including spousal support and custody
199
arrangements, that the couples had come to rely on.
Whether as
part of the irreparable harm, substantial injury, or public interest
prongs, the possibility of post-litigation chaos loomed in various ways.
The way to avoid chaos is to stay the injunction, ensuring that no
marriage licenses issue prior to the end of litigation.
Of course, it remains questionable whether chaos qualifies as
irreparable harm to the state justifying a stay. William Baude
wondered:
[W]hat was the irreparable harm suffered by the state
in the absence of a stay, if marriages were
provisionally recognized over the summer? . . . Or did
the Court as a whole intend to finally endorse the
categorical claim that “any time a State is enjoined by
a court from effectuating statutes enacted by

191 L. Ed. 2d 149 (2015) (Thomas, J., dissenting from denial of application of stay) (citing
San Diegans for Mt. Soledad Nat. War Memorial v. Paulson, 548 U. S. 1301 (2006)))
(Kennedy, J., in chambers) (staying an injunction requiring a city to remove its religious
memorial).
199. Cf. Andrew Koppelman, Too much for Hitler: Why same-sex marriage is
irreversible, BALKINIZATION (Oct. 8, 2014), http://balkin.blogspot.com/2014/10/too-muchfor-hitler-why-same-sex.html (arguing that it is “morally impossible” for a state to
invalidate marriages at a later date).
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representatives of its people, it suffers a form of
200
irreparable injury.”
The answer may be that the inability to enforce its laws simpliciter is
not irreparable harm, but the inability to enforce combined with the
chaos of inconsistent marital statuses, and the provisioning of marital
benefits, should be irreparable harm.
The second theme is the force and effect of what William Baude
calls the Court’s shadow docket. These are the summary decisions,
201
stays, cert denials, and other orders that the Court regularly issues,
202
typically with minimal, if any, briefing, reasoning, or explanation.
Through that shadow docket, the Court (or individual Justices)
engage in what Richard Re calls “signaling”—taking official actions
that do not establish conventional precedent or resolve ultimate
merits issues, but nonetheless suggest, perhaps deliberately, how
203
lower courts should decide cases. These unexplained stays and cert
decisions played a significant role in the marriage equality litigation.
At various points over the two years from Windsor to Obergefell, the
Court stayed or declined to stay lower court decisions, unexpectedly
denied cert in some cases, and unsurprisingly granted cert in other
cases, all without explanation and often without apparent dissent. At
the same time, lower courts appeared conflicted about what to do
with the penumbras emanating from the shadow docket—whether to
decide cases by exercising their best judgment applying the traditional
four factors in light of existing precedent or to be guided by the
Court’s non-precedential and unexplained signals.
The third and related theme revolves around the centrality of the
Supreme Court in constitutional litigation. The Justices have taken it
upon themselves to resolve a significant constitutional issue,
especially when it divides lower courts. This was especially true for
the same-sex marriage cases. The existence of identical laws in so
many states functionally created a nearly nationwide prohibition on
same-sex marriage. Resolving the constitutional validity of this policy
forms the core of the Court’s role of judicial review. Given that
inevitably, lower courts arguably were obligated to decide cases with

200. Baude, supra note 10, at 12–13 (quoting Maryland v. King, 133 S. Ct. 1, 3 (2012)
(Roberts, C.J., in chambers)).
201. Id. at 3.
202. Id. at 5.
203. Richard M. Re, Supreme Court Signals, PRAWFSBLAWG (Nov. 12, 2014), http://
prawfsblawg.blogs.com/prawfsblawg/2014/11/supreme-court-signals.html.
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an eye to minimizing issues that might complicate or hamper the
Court’s ultimate review. For example, district judges should have
recognized that thousands of marriages could be invalidated if the
Supreme Court were to ultimately uphold the bans. This should have
influenced what courts did to define and maintain the status quo
pending completion of litigation.
The Court exercised a high degree of control over when and how
it would decide the issue through a series of unexplained stay orders
and certiorari denials. It also attempted to control the status quo and
ensure that lower courts did not negatively affect its eventual review
or otherwise move too fast on the issue, through its stay and certiorari
decisions. The problem emerged that lower courts differed on the
deference owed to that procedural control. And the Court arguably
can be blamed for relying on its non-precedential orders that did not
explain what it was doing or how lower courts should respond. The
inferior courts were forced to read between the lines.
B. Phase I: Utah: Christmastime, 2013

The first phase of the marriage equality litigation began in—of
all places—Utah, a state whose admission to the Union was
contingent on restricting marriage to one man and one woman (stress
204
on “one”). On December 20, 2013, Judge Robert J. Shelby of the
District of Utah rendered the first post-Windsor decision invalidating
the states same-sex marriage ban, and immediately enjoining its
enforcement. Most significantly for our purposes, the court did not
impose a stay or delay the judgment to offer time to appeal. The
205
decision did not even address any of the stay factors.
Worse, the
judge issued the decision at 1:30 p.m. MST on the Friday before
Christmas. That afternoon, the Salt Lake County Clerk began issuing
206
marriage licenses to same-sex couples. In what CNN described as
“joyful mayhem,” hundreds of people lined up at the Clerk’s office, as
207
the office stayed open past 5 p.m.

204. On July 16, 1894, Congress enacted the Enabling Act that paved the way for
Utah’s admission to the Union. Section 3 provided, “[t]hat polygamous or plural
marriages are forever prohibited.” Enabling Act, UTAH STATE ARCHIVES, http://archives
.utah.gov/research/exhibits/Statehood/1894text.htm.
205. Kitchen v. Herbert, 961 F. Supp. 2d 1181, 1216 (D. Utah 2013).
206. Emergency Motion for Stay at 3, Kitchen v. Herbert, 755 F.3d 1193 (10th Cir.
2014), https://www.scribd.com/doc/272208444/13-12-20-Emergency-Motion-for-Stay.
207. Tom Watkins, In Utah, judge’s ruling ignites same-sex marriage frenzy, CNN
(Dec. 20, 2013), http://www.cnn.com/2013/12/20/justice/utah-same-sex-marriage-ruling/ind
ex.html.
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In a conference call with counsel several hours later, the district
court declined to stay the order sua sponte or to entertain an oral
208
Instead, Judge Shelby insisted that Utah file a
motion to stay.
209
written motion and ordered full briefing on the issue.
Unfortunately, a ruling following briefing would not be prompt
enough to avoid the issuance of more licenses. The Salt Lake County
Clerk was scheduled to open and resume issuing licenses to same-sex
210
couples at 8 a.m. on Monday, one hour before Judge Shelby’s
211
scheduled hearing.
Utah launched a two-pronged attack to preserve the status quo.
First, on Friday evening, Utah filed a written motion with Judge
Shelby for stay pending appeal. The Attorney General cited the
Ninth Circuit’s grant of a stay in Perry v. Schwarzenegger—the
challenge to California’s Prop 8 litigation—as demonstrating the need
212
“to preserve the status quo pending appellate determination.”
In
Perry, however, Judge Walker stayed his judgment only for six days,
213
leaving it to the court of appeals to put the mandate on hold. The
214
court of appeals did so four days later. The situation in Utah would
not play out so neatly. Second, Utah filed an emergency motion with
the Tenth Circuit to stay the injunction until Judge Shelby ruled on
215
the pending motion to stay. The Attorney General explained that
the district court would not rule before the Salt Lake County Clerk’s
office would reopen on Monday and the stay was necessary to give
Judge Shelby time to make his decision.
On Sunday, December 22, Tenth Circuit Judges Holmes and
Bacharach denied the state’s emergency motion. The motions panel
explained that the rules of appellate procedure only permit the court
to stay a final judgment pending appeal. The court could not stay a

208. Emergency Motion for Stay, supra note 206, at 2–3.
209. Id. at 3.
210. Id.
211. Kitchen v. Herbert, District Court Docket No. 95 (D. Utah. Dec. 21, 2013).
212. Defendants’ Motion to Stay Pending Appeal, Kitchen v. Herbert, 916 F. Supp. 2d
1181 (D. Utah Dec. 20, 2013), https://www.scribd.com/doc/272209007/13-12-20-Defen
dants-Motion-to-Stay-Pending-Appeal, citing Perry v. Brown, 671 F.3d 1052, 1070 (9th
Cir. 2012), vacated and remanded by Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652 (2013).
213. Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 702 F. Supp. 2d 1132, 1135 (N.D. Cal. 2010).
214. Perry v. Schwarzenegger, No. 10-16696, 2010 WL 3212786, at *1 (9th Cir. Aug.
16, 2010).
215. Emergency Motion for Stay, supra note 206, at 3.
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judgment pending the district court’s decision on a motion to stay.
The denial was without prejudice, giving the state leave to file a
proper motion for a stay pending appeal of a final judgment. Early
Monday morning, Utah filed with the Tenth Circuit a new emergency
217
motion for temporary resolution of stay motions, which Judges
218
Holmes and Bacharach promptly denied.
The court explained,
again, that the court of appeals cannot stay a judgment pending
219
Further, the court
district court resolution of a stay motion.
rejected the government’s “anticipatory request” to stay the district
court’s order in the event of an adverse ruling (on the motion for
220
stay) later that day.
At 9 a.m. that day, Judge Shelby held a hearing on the
government’s motion for stay pending appeal. At the end of the
hearing, he denied from the bench the written motion he had
221
requested, then issued a seven-page order later in the day.
Judge
Shelby offered four reasons for denying the stay. First, the state had
222
not submitted evidence showing a likelihood of success on appeal.
Second, Utah would suffer no harm by allowing same-sex couples to
marry while the appeal was pending. The “court only consider[ed]
the harm done to the State and not to the same-sex couples whose
223
marriage arrangements may be subject to legal challenge.” Third,
the court concluded that some of the couples “may be facing serious
illness or other issues that do not allow them the luxury of waiting for
224
such a delay.”
Finally, the public interest “weigh[ed] in favor of
protecting the constitutional rights of Utah’s citizens” to same-sex
225
marriage. Judge Shelby even rejected a request for a stay to allow
the Tenth Circuit to decide whether a stay is appropriate, insisting
that doing so would not maintain the status quo.
Part of the problem with Judge Shelby’s reasoning was a strange
understanding of the status quo. On Friday morning, the status quo
216. Kitchen v. Herbert, No. 13-4178 (10th Cir. Dec. 22, 2013) (order denying stay),
https://www.scribd.com/doc/273884289/13-12-22-Order-Denying-Motion-to-Stay.
217. Emergency Motion for Stay, supra note 206.
218. Kitchen v. Herbert, No. 13-4178 (10th Cir. Dec. 23, 2013) (order denying stay),
https://www.scribd.com/doc/272300692/13-12-23-Order-Denying-Renewed-Motion.
219. Id.
220. Id.
221. Kitchen v. Herbert, No. 13-4178 (D. Utah Dec. 23, 2013) (order denying stay),
https://www.scribd.com/doc/272300792/13-12-23-District-Courts-Order-on-Motion-to-Stay.
222. Id. at 3.
223. Id. at 5.
224. Id.
225. Id. at 6.
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was what it had been for a century—Utah would not issue marriage
licenses to same-sex couples. Judge Shelby’s order, without a stay,
immediately and perhaps irreparably altered the status quo. It now
became the new normal that same-sex couples were allowed to marry,
226
as the Clerk of Salt Lake County recognized. Thus, Judge Shelby
reasoned, a stay would amount to an injunction preventing county
clerks from issuing marriage licenses to same-sex couples. In other
words, an alteration of the status quo. But this misunderstands the
nature of injunctions and stays and their respective effects on the
status quo. The stay would alter the status quo on Monday only
because the court had already altered the status quo on Friday with
its injunction. The point of a stay would be to suspend that
227
alteration.
Had Judge Shelby issued the stay on Friday, the
practical status quo would have remained unchanged. Even if Judge
Shelby was correct in anticipating how the Supreme Court would
ultimately rule, at the time the decision wreaked of hubris. Michael
Dorf argued that Shelby’s decision not to stay the judgment reflected
both the “correct moral outcome” and the “correct legal outcome,”
but was “still wrong,” because “only a fool can confidently predict
228
exactly what the Supreme Court will do in this case.”
Shortly after the district court denied the stay on Monday, Utah
filed two emergency motions in the court of appeals for a stay
pending appeal and stay pending resolution of the motion to stay;
Judges Holmes and Bacharach promptly denied both the following
day. They insisted that Utah was not likely to succeed on appeal and
229
there was not a strong threat of irreparable harm absent a stay.
Utah then waited a full week before petitioning the Supreme
230
Court for a stay pending appeal on New Year’s Eve.
Justice
Sotomayor, as Tenth Circuit Justice, called for a response by January
231
3, 2014, although she did not issue a stay on her own initiative.

226. Id.
227. Nken v. Holder, 129 S. Ct. 1749, 1758 (2009).
228. Michael Dorf, Was Tenth Circuit Correct Not to Stay The District Court SSM
Ruling?, DORF ON LAW, (Dec. 24, 2013), http://www.dorfonlaw.org/2013/12/was-10thcircuit-correct-not-to-stay.html.
229. Herbert v. Kitchen, No. 2:13-CV-00217-RJS (10th Cir. Dec. 24, 2013) (order
denying emergency motion for stay and temporary motion for stay), https://www.scribd.
com/ doc/272301500/13-12-24-Order-Denying-Emer-Motion-for-Stay.
230. Herbert v. Kitchen Docket, Supreme Court Docket No. 13A687, http://www.sup
remecourt.gov/search.aspx?filename=/docketfiles/13a687.htm.
231. In contrast, also on New Year’s Eve, Justice Sotomayor both called for a
response and issued a stay against the enforcement of the Affordable Care Act’s
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Under the Supreme Court’s rules it takes five Justices to grant a
232
stay. On January 6, 2014, the full Court granted the stay, without
comment or dissent. The meaning of that order would remain hotly
contested in the lower courts for the next nine months.
Seventeen days after Judge Shelby’s order, the judgment was
finally stayed and same-sex marriages were put on hold. In the
interim, Utah issued over 1,300 marriage licenses to same-sex couples,
nearly 1,000 of which were solemnized. The recognition of these
233
marriages would be subject to future litigation.
Much of the blame for this disorder falls to Utah, which failed to
request a stay of the judgment in advance, a point Judge Shelby
234
emphasized in his order. Even if a stay might have been warranted,
judges are not obligated to do so sua sponte. Utah, however, was not
entirely at fault. It was likely unthinkable when summary judgment
motions were filed following Windsor that the court would invalidate
the law on the Friday before Christmas and let the judgment take
effect immediately, particularly without performing a stay analysis.
This was a mandatory injunction, requiring the state to take some
action, making a stay especially appropriate. And being the first
federal decision post-Windsor to invalidate a state ban should have
counseled further caution. That Judge Shelby ultimately denied from
the bench the written motion for a stay that he had requested,
followed a few hours later by a seven-page opinion, makes it fairly
apparent that he did not think a stay was warranted, whether or not
the state requested it. Similarly, the Tenth Circuit promptly denied a
stay pending appeal. In short, while Utah should be faulted for failing
to request a stay in advance, the state would not have received the
relief they ultimately requested.
contraceptive mandate against the Little Sisters of the Poor, see Little Sisters of the Poor
v. Sebelius Docket, Supreme Court Docket No. 13A691, http://www.supremecourt.gov/
search.aspx?FileName=/docketfiles/13A691.htm.
232. Stephen R. McAllister, Practice Before the Supreme Court of the United States,
J. KAN. B. ASS’N, April 1995, at 25, 37 (“It takes five votes to grant a stay, although it
takes only four votes to grant a cert petition.”).
233. Evans v. Utah, 21 F. Supp. 3d 1192, 1197 (D. Utah 2014). This was not the first
time there was a race to the courthouse for same-sex marriage licenses. In 2004, dozens of
gay and lesbian couples got married in New Mexico’s Sandoval County in a single day,
until the county clerk received orders from the attorney general to stop. The courts never
decided whether the marriages were valid, so the couples remained legally married. At
least one pair got divorced. So What Happens to the Same-Sex Marriage Licenses Issued in
Utah, WSJ LAW BLOG (Jan. 6, 2014), http://blogs.wsj.com/law/2014/01/06/so-what-happens
-to-the-same-sex-marriage-licenses-issued-in-utah/.
234. Kitchen v. Herbert, No. 2:13-cv-217 (D. Utah Dec. 23, 2013) (order denying
motion to stay), https://www.scribd.com/doc/272208577/13-12-23-District-Courts-Order-on
-Motion-to-Stay.
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C. Phase II: Certiorari Pending: January-October 2014

The lower courts divided over the significance of the Supreme
Court’s unexplained order in Kitchen. Some accepted it as a
command to stay judgments until the full process played out through
the courts of appeals and certiorari to the Supreme Court. Other
courts did not get the same message and either distinguished or
disregarded those orders. The overarching problem was the possible
gap between the signal emanating from one (and eventually two
more) unexplained Supreme Court orders and lower courts’ analysis
of the stay factors. Courts had to decide the weight to give that
unexplained order in a case with identical consequences in the denial
of the stay and to balance that against their independent equitable
analysis.
District courts fell into three groups. One group stayed
judgments until the appeals process was completed. A second group
did not stay their judgments pending appeal, but did issue stays to
give the court of appeals an opportunity to decide whether a stay was
warranted. Finally, a third group, which also included the Fourth and
Tenth Circuits, refused to stay their judgments at all, prompting the
Supreme Court to intervene, as it had in Utah.
1.

Staying the Judgment
235

Five district courts—the District of Oklahoma, Eastern District
236
237
of Virginia, Western District of Texas, Southern District of
238
Ohio, and Western District of Kentucky—got it right. Each
declared inavlid bans on same-sex marriage, but put their judgments
on hold pending the review process. They generally cited the
Supreme Court’s order in Kitchen.
Judge John G. Heyburn of the Western District of Kentucky’s
analysis was particularly measured. The Supreme Court “has sent a
235. Bishop v. U.S. ex rel. Holder, 962 F. Supp. 2d 1252, 1296 (N.D. Okla. 2014) (“[I]n
accordance with the U.S. Supreme Court’s issuance of a stay in a nearly identical case on
appeal from the District Court of Utah to the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals, see Herbert
v. Kitchen . . . the Court stays execution of this injunction pending the final disposition of
any appeal to the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals.”).
236. Bostic v. Rainey, 970 F. Supp. 2d 456, 484 (E.D. Va. 2014).
237. De Leon v. Perry, 975 F. Supp. 2d 632, 666 (W.D. Tex. 2014) (“In accordance
with the Supreme Court’s issuance of a stay in Herbert v. Kitchen . . . and consistent with
the reasoning provided in Bishop and Bostic, this Court stays execution of this preliminary
injunction pending the final disposition of any appeal to the Fifth Circuit Court of
Appeals.”).
238. Henry v. Himes, No. 1:14-CV-129, 2014 WL 1512541, at *1 (S.D. Ohio Apr. 16,
2014).
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strong message by its unusual intervention and order in [Kitchen]. It
239
cannot be easily ignored.” But he recognized the need to balance
the interests of plaintiffs, who appeared to have won important
constitutional rights, against the systemic interests in complete review
without chaos:
Perhaps it is difficult for Plaintiffs to understand how
rights won can be delayed. It is a truth that our
judicial system can act with stunning quickness, as this
Court has; and then with sometimes maddening
slowness. One judge may decide a case, but ultimately
others have a final say. It is the entire process,
however, which gives our judicial system and our
judges such high credibility and acceptance. This is
the way of our Constitution. It is that belief which
ultimately informs the Court’s decision to grant a stay.
It is best that these momentous changes occur upon
full review, rather than risk premature implementation
or confusing changes. That does not serve anyone
240
well.
Those systemic interests, in terms of the broader public-interest, even
overcame the apparent weakness of the state’s constitutional
arguments on the merits. Following Judge Heyburn’s lead, Judge
Timothy Black of the Southern District of Ohio found that the
government was unlikely to prevail on appeal and would not be
irreparably harmed. But on the chance that the government did
succeed on appeal, the result could be “confusion, potential inequity,
241
and high costs.”
The public interest warranted a stay because
“[p]remature celebration and confusion do not serve anyone’s best
interests. The federal appeals courts need to rule, as does the United
242
States Supreme Court.”

239. Bourke v. Beshear, 996 F. Supp. 2d 542, 558 (W.D. Ky.) rev’d sub nom. DeBoer
v. Snyder, 772 F.3d 388 (6th Cir. 2014) cert. granted sub nom. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S.
Ct. 1039 (2015) and cert. granted sub nom. Tanco v. Haslam, 135 S. Ct. 1040 (2015) and
cert. granted, 135 S. Ct. 1040 (2015) and cert. granted sub nom. Bourke v. Beshear, 135 S.
Ct. 1041 (2015) and rev’d sub nom. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S.Ct. 2584 (2015).
240. Bourke, 996 F. Supp. 2d at 558 (emphasis added).
241. Henry v. Himes, No. 1:14-CV-129, 2014 WL 1512541, at *1 (S.D. Ohio Apr. 16,
2014).
242. Id.
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Stays to Permit Appeals

Other judges stayed their judgments to allow the state to seek a
stay from the courts of appeals. Notably, this was similar to the
243
process that Judge Walker and the Ninth Circuit employed in Perry.
While this approach gave states time to review the injunctions and
avoided the immediate chaos of a race to the altar, it still occasioned a
mad scramble to obtain a stay before the judgment went into effect.
Such time-limited stays also created the risk that the court of appeals
would not intervene in time.
a. District of Idaho

After invalidating Idaho’s marriage ban, Chief Magistrate Judge
Candy Wagahoof Dale of the District of Idaho denied the state’s
motion to stay pending appeal, but set her injunction to take effect
244
less than 72 hours later. The state noticed its appeal that day, and
two days later the Ninth Circuit temporarily stayed the judgment
245
pending resolution of the stay motion.
Five days after that, the
246
court granted a stay pending the entire appeals process. It took the
Ninth Circuit eight days to consider the weighty matter, far more than
the three the district judge had initially allotted.
Notably, Ninth Circuit Judge Hurwitz concurred in the stay
order, but stressed that he did so solely because the Supreme Court
“has virtually instructed courts of appeals to grant stays in the
247
circumstances before us today.”
He insisted that he would have
reached a different conclusion “[i]f we were writing on a cleaner
state” and independently weighed the traditional four factors. He
also rejected the state’s irreparable harm argument, finding that
“[a]ny harm resulting from the possible invalidity of marriage licenses
issued pendente lite to same-sex couples would be primarily suffered
248
by the plaintiffs, not the State.”
Again, however, the analysis
turned on the public-interest element and here, even while

243. Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921, 1004 (N.D. Cal. 2010).
244. Latta v. Otter, 19 F. Supp. 3d 1054, 1087 (D. Idaho) aff’d, 771 F.3d 456 (9th Cir.
2014) cert. denied, No. 14-765, 2015 WL 2473531 (U.S. June 30, 2015) and cert. denied sub
nom. Idaho v. Latta, 135 S. Ct. 2931 (mem.) (2015).
245. Latta v. Otter, No. 14-35420 (9th Cir. May 15, 2014) (order granting temporary
stay), https://www.scribd.com/doc/270977326/Latta-v-Otter-14-5-15-Temporary-Stay.
246. Id.
247. Id.
248. Id.
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disagreeing with the conclusion, Judge Hurwitz captured the import
of the Kitchen order:
[A]lthough the Supreme Court’s order in Herbert is
not in the strictest sense precedential, it provides a
clear message—the Court (without noted dissent)
decided that district court injunctions against the
application of laws forbidding same-sex unions should
be stayed at the request of state authorities pending
249
court of appeals review.”
b. District of Utah (again)

In Evans v. Herbert, Judge Dale Kimball held that Utah must
recognize those 1,300 marriage licenses issued during the seventeenday interregnum following initial invalidation of Utah’s same-sex
250
marriage ban in Kitchen v. Herbert. He then stayed the decision for
twenty-one days (a much more reasonable time period) to allow the
state to seek a stay from the Tenth Circuit. The state appealed
eighteen days later and the Clerk of the Tenth Circuit temporarily
251
stayed the injunction. Three weeks later, a divided panel issued a
stay only to give the state time to seek a stay from the Supreme
252
Court.
Judge Kelly dissented from that order, insisting that the mandate
should be permanently stayed pending completion of review, “to
allow for an orderly resolution of this controversy and one based
253
upon the rule of law.”
He argued that denying the stay
“complements the chaos begun by the district court in Kitchen,”
where “the State was compelled to issue marriage licenses to
hundreds of same-gender couples” before “the Supreme Court
254
granted a stay.” The dissent highlighted the oddity of the situation:
even though the Supreme Court stayed the decision in Kitchen, the
court of appeals did not stay the resulting order in Evans. “The rule
contended for by the Plaintiffs—that a federal district court may
change the law regardless of appellate review and the State is stuck

249. Id.
250. Evans v. Utah, 21 F. Supp. 3d 1192, 1214 (D. Utah 2014).
251. Evans v. Herbert, No. 14-4060 (10th Cir. June 5, 2014) (order granting temporary
stay), https://www.scribd.com/doc/270979850/Evans-v-Herbert-2014-06-05-Temporary-St
ay.
252. Evans v. Herbert, 21 F. Supp. 3d at 1230 (Kelly, J., dissenting).
253. Id.
254. Id.
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with the result in perpetuity—simply cannot be the law. It would not
255
only create chaos, but also undermine due process and fairness.”
Further, “[i]t is disingenuous to contend that the State will suffer no
harm if the matter is not stayed; undoing what is about to be done will
be labyrinthine and has the very real possibility to moot important
256
issues that deserve serious consideration.”
Granting the “stay
would simply maintain the status quo until this case—and the broader
issue to ultimately be resolved in Kitchen—comes to a resolution via
the normal legal process, including that currently unfolding in the
257
Utah courts.” Rather, the “State and its citizens, and respect for the
law, are better served by obtaining complete, final judicial resolution
258
of these issues.” The Supreme Court would agree with Judge Kelly,
259
and once again promptly stayed the order, without recorded
260
dissent.
Evans reflected a pattern in the District of Utah and the Tenth
Circuit. For the second time, the district court declined to stay its
judgment, forcing Utah to seek an emergency stay from the Tenth
Circuit. For the second time, the court of appeals declined to stay the
255. Id.
256. Id.
257. Id.
258. Id.
259. Evans v. Herbert, No. 14A65 (U.S. July 18, 2014) (order granting stay pending
appeal), http://www.supremecourt.gov/orders/courtorders/071814zr_d18e.pdf.
260. In an interview, Justice Ginsburg suggested that the lack of a dissent from denial
of a stay does not indicate that an order was unanimous. See Justices Silent Over
Execution Drug Secrecy, WASH. TIMES (Aug. 3, 2014), http://www.washingtontimes.com/n
ews/2014/aug/3/justices-silent-over-execution-drug-secrecy/?page=all. Ginsburg further
suggested that it might depend on institutional concerns; see also Baude, supra note 10, at
3. Consider what Ginsburg said about Justice Sotomayor’s position on the grant of a stay
in Little Sisters of the Poor v. Sebelius:
“NLJ: A day after the Hobby Lobby decision, the court, with three dissents, issued an
injunction against the application of the contraceptive insurance requirement to Wheaton
College, a religious institution. Wheaton had objected to getting an exemption via a selfcertifying letter stating its objections to the coverage. You assigned the Wheaton dissent
to Justice Sotomayor as well and she wrote a blistering opinion.
GINSBURG: That may have been the same thing. She granted the stay in Little Sisters of
the Poor [raising similar objections to the letter] because she was the Tenth Circuit justice.
I think it was another case where she wanted to make clear what her view was. Besides,
there was enough in my dissent in Hobby Lobby. I had said everything I wanted to say on
that subject so it was appropriate for somebody else.” http://nationallawjournal.com/
module/alm/app/nlj.do#!/article/1701862687; see also Josh Blackman, Little Sisters of the
Poor v. Sebelius, Ginsburg, J., dissent from granting of stay on behalf of Sotomayor, J.,
after the fact, JOSH BLACKMAN’S BLOG (Aug. 22, 2014), http://joshblackman.com/blog/201
4/08/22/little-sisters-of-the-poor-v-sebelius-ginsburg-j-dissenting-from-granting-of-stay-onbehalf-of-sotomayor-j-after-the-fact/.
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judgment pending appeal, forcing Utah to seek an emergency stay
from the Supreme Court. And for the second time, the Supreme
Court promptly granted the stay. If the message was not clear after
the Supreme Court’s Kitchen order, it should have become
abundantly clear after Evans. Lower courts should continue to stay
all same-sex marriage rulings and must maintain the status quo ex
ante pending appeal.
c.

District of Colorado

Five days after the Supreme Court granted the stay in Evans,
Judge Raymond Moore of the District of Colorado discussed the
problem of conflicting authorities. On one hand, the Supreme
Court’s actions in Kitchen and Evans stood as “implied directives to
261
issue stays in these matters.” On the other hand, doing so arguably
is contrary to accepted standards for when to stay judgments under
262
the traditional four factors.
On the third hand, Moore noted that
263
the Tenth Circuit had twice reached the constitutional merits,
invalidating marriage bans in Utah and Oklahoma and enjoining
enforcement of those laws. These judgments made it “conceivable
that any perceived ‘directive’ from the Supreme Court to let appellate
264
courts consider this issue does not apply here.” On the fourth hand,
the Court had stayed the judgment in Evans only five days earlier.
This decision was a “wild card in the analysis,” and “it appear[ed] to
the [district c]ourt that it may well be that a message is being sent by
265
the Supreme Court.”
Yet Judge Moore insisted that he was unable to divine the
meaning of the Supreme Court’s two stays. “[T]his Court is not some
modern day haruspex skilled in the art of divination. This Court
cannot—and, more importantly, it will not—tell the people of
Colorado that the access to this or any other fundamental right will be
delayed because it ‘thinks’ or ‘perceives’ the subtle—or not so
266
subtle—content of a message not directed to this case.”
Unlike other courts, Judge Moore was unwilling to be bound by
the Supreme Court’s unexplained stay decisions. He also manifested

261. Burns v. Hickenlooper, No. 14-CV-01817-RM-KLM, 2014 WL 3634834, at *4 (D.
Colo. July 23, 2014).
262. Id.
263. Bishop v. Smith, 760 F.3d 1070 (10th Cir. 2014) (Oklahoma); Kitchen v. Herbert,
755 F.3d 1193 (10th Cir. 2014) (Utah).
264. Burns, 2014 WL 3634834 at *4.
265. Id. at *5.
266. Id.
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a very different conception of the rule of law than Judge Kelly had
proffered, concluding that the “rule of law demands more . . . .
Defendants are not entitled to a stay order under the applicable rules.
267
This is where this Court’s analysis must end.”
Judge Moore recognized that the Tenth Circuit or the Supreme
Court might issue a stay in this matter, so he stayed the injunction for
one month. And, in fact, the Tenth Circuit did just that several weeks
later, citing earlier stays and finding no reason to deviate from that
268
approach in this case. In doing so, the court of appeals noted that
the Supreme Court had granted a stay of a Fourth Circuit decision the
269
day prior.
d. Northern District of Florida

In August, Judge Robert Hinkle of the Northern District of
Florida declared that state’s ban unconstitutional. Echoing the
District of Colorado, Judge Hinkle explained that “it is a rare case in
270
which a preliminary injunction is properly stayed pending appeal.”
271
Once again, the potential for chaos
But “[t]his is the rare case.”
presented an additional public-interest consideration. “There is a
substantial public interest in implementing this decision just once—in
not having, as some states have had, a decision that is on-again, off272
again.” Beyond the tumult an immediate order causes the state, the
court observed that there is a possible harm to the couples deciding
whether to marry. “[A]llowing those who would enter same-sex
marriages the same opportunity for due deliberation that oppositesex couples routinely are afforded. Encouraging a rush to the
marriage officiant, in an effort to get in before an appellate court
273
enters a stay, serves the interests of nobody.”
A stay was
appropriate, although only “long enough to provide reasonable
assurance that the opportunity for same-sex marriages in Florida,
274
once opened, will not again close.”
267. Id.
268. Burns v. Hickenlooper, No. 14-1283 (10th Cir. Aug 21, 2014) (order granting stay
pending appeal), https://www.scribd.com/doc/270986446/BUrns-v-Hickenlooper-14-08-21Order-Granting-Stay.
269. Id.; see infra Part I.B.4.
270. Brenner v. Scott, No. 4:14CV107-RH/CAS (N.D. Fla. Jan. 1, 2015) (order
clarifying preliminary injunction).
271. Id.
272. Id.
273. Id.
274. Id.
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Judge Hinkle stayed the injunction until Supreme-Courtimposed stays pending petitions for certiorari from the Fourth and
Tenth Circuits were lifted, plus an additional ninety days. On
275
December 3, 2014, following the denial of certiorari in those cases,
an Eleventh Circuit panel ordered that the stay on Judge Hinkle’s
preliminary injunction would expire at the end of the day on January
276
5, 2015. By that point, petitions for certiorari had already been filed
from decisions of the Sixth Circuit upholding same-sex marriage bans.
Florida then sought an emergency stay from the Supreme Court on
December 15, which the Court denied. Justices Scalia and Thomas
277
dissented and would have granted the stay. On January 1, 2015
(four days shy of 90), the stay was lifted and the preliminary
injunction went into effect, even while a cert grant from the Sixth
278
Circuit was both inevitable and imminent and would be granted
only eleven days later.
3.

Stays Denied

The third category, and where things got ugly, involved judges
who did not issue stays at all, even in light of the signals from Kitchen
and Evans. District courts in four states ordered that same-sex
marriage licenses must be issued or recognized before a higher court
could intervene. Although in each case a higher court did issue a stay
after only a quick appeal, it was not soon enough to prevent a repeat
of the events in Utah. Hundreds of couples received marriage
licenses pendent lite, creating a new potential group of injured
plaintiffs should those injunctions be reversed.
a. Western District of Tennessee

Judge Aleta A. Trauger of the Middle District of Tennesse
believed she had identified one distinction with the prior stay cases.
Tanco v. Haslem was a recognition case, in which the court ordered
279
the state to recognize three out-of-state same-sex marriages.
But

275. See infra Part I.C.
276. Brenner v. Armstrong, No. 14-14061 (11th Cir. Dec. 3, 2014) (order denying
motion to extend stay of preliminary injunction), https://www.scribd.com/doc/270989229/
Brenner-v-Scott-14-12-03-Order-Motion-to-Stay.
277. Armstrong v. Brenner Docket, Supreme Court Docket No. 14A650 (Dec. 19,
2014), http://www.supremecourt.gov/search.aspx?filename=/docketfiles/14a650.htm.
278. The petition in Obergefell would be distributed only four days later on December
23, 2014. See Obergefell v. Hodges Docket, Supreme Court Docket No. 14-556, http://ww
w.supremecourt.gov/search.aspx?filename=/docketfiles/14-556.htm
279. Jesty v. Haslam, No. 3:13-CV-01159, 2014 WL 1117069, at *4 (M.D. Tenn. Mar.
20, 2014).
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the decision said nothing about whether the state had to issue
marriage licenses to anyone. Thus, comparing this case to Bostic,
280
Her
DeLeon, and Bishop was “comparing apples and oranges.”
order would “not open the floodgates for same-sex couples to marry
in Tennessee, nor does it require Tennessee to recognize all legal
281
same-sex marriages performed outside of Tennessee.”
Nevertheless, the Sixth Circuit promptly stayed the decision pending
full review by a merits panel, emphasizing that “[b]ecause the law in
this area is so unsettled, in our judgment the public interest and the
interests of the parties would be best served by this Court imposing a
stay on the district court’s order until this case is reviewed on
282
appeal.”
Four months later the Supreme Court stay in Evans
283
signaled that even recognition cases should be put on hold.
b. Eastern District of Michigan

In March 2014, following a two-week trial and a month of
consideration, Judge Bernard Friedman of the Eastern District of
Michigan invalidated Michigan’s ban and enjoined the state from
284
enforcing it. But he did not issue a stay. He did not even analyze
Kitchen or any other decision in which other courts had granted stays.
And, as in Utah, the decision triggered a race to the altar.
Approximately 300 couples obtained licenses in a twenty-four-hour
285
period, all seemingly knowing that a stay of the order was imminent.
As in Utah, United States Attorney General Eric Holder announced
that these couples could seek federal benefits without awaiting final
286
judicial resolution.
The following day, a Saturday morning, the Sixth Circuit ordered
the plaintiffs to respond to the state’s emergency motion for a stay
280. Id. at *3.
281. Id. at *4.
282. Id. citing Henry v. Himes, No. 1:14-CV-129, 2014 WL 1512541 (S.D. Ohio Apr.
16, 2014).
283. Herbert v. Evans Docket, Supreme Court Docket No. 14A54, http://www.sup
remecourt.gov/search.aspx?filename=/docketfiles/14a65.htm; see also supra notes 250-60
and accompanying text.
284. DeBoer v. Snyder, 973 F. Supp. 2d 757, 775 (E.D. Mich. 2014).
285. John Eligon & Erik Eckholm, Gay Couples in Michigan Seize Their Chance to Be
Married After Ruling, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 23, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/
03/23/us/gay-couples-in-michigan-seize-their-chance-to-be-married-after-ruling.html.
286. Statement of Attorney General Eric Holder on Federal Recognition of Same-Sex
Marriages in Michigan, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE (Mar. 28, 2014), http://www.justice.gov/
opa/pr/statement-attorney-general-eric-holder-federal-recognition-same-sex-marriagesmichigan.

300

HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY

[Vol. 43:2
287

pending review, thereby temporarily putting the injunction on hold.
Three days later, a divided panel granted the stay, finding that there
was no basis to distinguish Kitchen (and three other cases which we
address infra), which granted stays, and no reason to balance the
288
equities any differently.
Judge Helene White dissented from the
stay order, insisting that, although the Court stayed the injunction in
Kitchen, “it did so without a statement of reasons, and therefore the
289
order provides little guidance.” In other words, the shadow docket
was not precedential.
In January 2015, Judge Mark Goldsmith of the Eastern District
of Michigan ruled that the state was required to recognize the 300
marriages performed in the twenty-four hours between the injunction
290
and the Sixth Circuit stay. He stayed his judgment for twenty-one
days to allow for review, but the state, already defending its ban
291
before the Supreme Court, did not appeal.
c.

Western District of Wisconsin

After the tumult in Utah, the most chaotic marriage equality
appeal arose in Wisconsin. Through a combination of inexplicable
foot-dragging by the court and premature exuberance by state
officials, eight days elapsed before marriages were put on hold.
On Friday, June 6, 2014, Judge Barbara Crabb of the Western
District of Wisconsin declared that state’s ban unconstitutional, but
292
did not issue an injunction.
In all other cases, the injunction
accompanied the declaratory judgment in a single order. Instead,
287. DeBoer v. Snyder, No. 14-01341 (6th Cir. Mar. 22, 2014) (order directing
plaintiffs to file a response), https://www.scribd.com/doc/270993091/DeBoaer-v-Snyder-1403-22-Order-From-Sixth-Circuit.
288. DeBoer v. Snyder, 14-01341 (6th Cir. Mar. 25, 2014) (order granting stay),
https://www.scribd.com/doc/270993306/DeBoer-v-Snyder-14-3-25-ORder-Granting-Stay.
Typically, a stay request can be made to the court of appeals only if relief were sought
from the district court but the district court failed to afford the requested relief. FED. R.
APP. P. 8(a)(2)(A)(ii).
The Sixth Circuit found those requirements had been
“substantially met” when the district court failed to rule on the stay request.
289. Id.
290. Caspar v. Snyder, 2015 WL 224741, 4:14-cv-11499 (E.D. Mich. Jan. 15, 2015).
291. Gov. Rick Snyder: State will not appeal court decision on 300 same-sex couples
married in March, MICHIGAN.GOV (Feb. 4, 2015), http://www.michigan.gov/snyder/0,4668,
7-277-57577_57657-346819—,00.html. This decision not to appeal speaks to the near
impossibility of voiding marriages that were lawfully performed, and that society had
come to rely on. See supra note 199 and accompanying text.
292. Wolf v. Walker, 986 F. Supp. 2d 982, 1028 (W.D. Wis. June 6, 2014), judgment
entered (June 13, 2014), aff’d sub nom. Baskin v. Bogan, 766 F.3d 648 (7th Cir. 2014) cert.
denied, 135 S. Ct. 316 (2014) and cert. denied sub nom. Walker v. Wolf, 135 S. Ct. 316
(2014).
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Judge Crabb gave the parties ten days to file supplemental materials
concerning the state’s motion to stay the injunction and requested
proposed language for the injunction. It is not clear what additional
materials could have been filed, as the issue had been briefed a month
293
earlier. No other court made a similar request.
Declining to wait for an injunction, a number of clerks celebrated
early. Dane County Clerk Scott McDonnel announced on Friday that
“[t]he law right now is that the marriage ban is unconstitutional. If
someone comes in and says, ‘Can you marry me?’ I have to follow the
294
federal court.”
This was wrong, of course, as the court had not
issued an injunction, but merely declared the law unconstitutional.
McDonnel was under no legal obligation to follow the declaration,
295
although under he could find it persuasive and follow it. As in Utah
and Michigan, the decision triggered a race to the altar—over the
next eight days, more than 500 same-sex couples were issued licenses
296
in nearly seventy counties across the state.
On Friday evening, Wisconsin filed an emergency motion for a
297
The court took no action during the
stay with the district court.
weekend, even as hundreds of marriage licenses were being issued.
Rather, Judge Crabb scheduled a telephone hearing for 1 p.m.
Monday, June 9, 2014. Before the hearing was held, and while the
emergency motion for a stay was pending, Wisconsin filed an
298
emergency motion for a stay with the Seventh Circuit.

293. On May 23, 2014, Michigan filed a motion to stay to “preserve the status quo for
when an appeal is filed.” See Motion to Stay, Wolf v. Walker, 986 F. Supp. 2d 982 (W.D.
Wis. June 6, 2014) (No. 14-cv-64-bbc), (https://www.scribd.com/doc/271037666/Wolf-vWalker-14-05-23-Motion-to-Stay.
294. Weddings Continue after Judge Declares Ban Unconstitutional, WIS. ST. J. (June
7, 2014), http://host.madison.com/news/local/weddings-continue-after-judge-declares-banunconstitutional/article_100865d0-c06e-5254-8cee-0d4733f17942.html#ixzz3fPSnQjLe.
295. Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452, 469-70 (1974 (quoting Perez v. Ledesma, 401
U.S. 82, 124-26 (opinion of Brennan, J.)); Samuel L. Bray, The Myth of the Mild
Declaratory Judgment, 63 DUKE L.J. 1091, 1113 (2014).
296. Scott Walker & J.B. Van Hollen Appeal Gay Marriage Ruling, MILWAUKEE WIS.
J. SENTINEL (July 10, 2014), http://www.jsonline.com/news/statepolitics/scott-walker-jbvan-hollen-appeal-gay-marriage-ruling-b99308729z1-266644411.html.
Litigation to
establish the validity of those marriages never materialized and became moot when the
Supreme Court denied cert in the case in October. See infra Part I.C.
297. Emergency Motion to Stay, Wolf v. Walker, 766 F.3d 648 (7th Cir. 2014) (Nos.
14-2386, 14-2387, 14-2388, 14-2525), https://www.scribd.com/doc/272305270/14-06-06Emer-Motion-to-Stay.
298. Emergency Motion for Temporary Stay from Relief, Wolf v. Walker, 766 F.3d
648 (7th Cir. 2014) (Nos. 14-2386, 14-2387, 14-2388, 14-2525), https://www.scribd.com/
doc/272305369/14-06-09-Appellants-ER-Motion-for-Temp-Stay-From-Relief.
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Following the Monday conference, the district court denied
299
Wisconsin’s motion for an emergency stay. First, in an interesting
procedural wrinkle, Judge Crabb determined that she retained
jurisdiction over the case, even though Wisconsin had already filed a
notice of appeal that morning because “an appeal taken from an
interlocutory decision does not prevent the district court from
300
finishing its work and rendering a final decision.”
Wisconsin thus
made a similar mistake as Utah in seeking to stay an injunction that
had not yet issued. This is impossible procedurally, even though
clerks in the state were acting as if the injunction had been issued.
This dynamic presented a serious catch-22 for states—they cannot
stay an injunction that has not been issued, but the un-issued
injunction is the reason they need to seek a stay.
Second, Judge Crabb concluded that the Supreme Court’s stay
orders were inapplicable, because this case was different—she had
not issued an injunction yet and defendants did not cite any authority
for the proposition that a court may stay a stand-alone declaratory
301
judgment. On both fronts, Judge Crabb’s decision to invalidate the
law, but not issue an injunction, left Wisconsin in an interminable
bind—they could not do anything until the coercive order issued.
Third, the Court brushed off any responsibility for clerks issuing
marriage licenses, explaining that this was not a result of an
injunction, which had not issued. She insisted that the propriety of
clerks issuing these licenses in violation of state law was beyond the
302
scope of the case.
To the extent that “defendants believe that a
particular county clerk is issuing a marriage license in violation of

299. Wolf v. Walker, Nos. 14-2386, 14-2387, 14-2388, 14-2525 (7th Cir. June 9, 2014)
(order denying emergency motion for stay), https://www.scribd.com/doc/271058059/Wolfv-Walker-14-06-09-Order-Denying-Emerngency-Motion-for-Stay.
300. Id. (quoting Wis. Mutual Ins. Co. v. United States, 441 F.3d 502, 504–05 (7th Cir.
2006)). The Seventh Circuit confirmed that conclusion in a two-page unsigned order
issued on June 10, 2014, stating that “that the order appealed from may not be a final
appealable judgment within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1291,” because “[t]he district court
has not entered a Rule 58 judgment in this case,” as it “has yet to determine the specifics
of the injunctive relief which it intends to enter.” Wolf v. Walker, No. 14-2266 (7th Cir.
June 10, 2014) (order denying emergency motion for stay), https://www.scribd.com/
doc/271058839/Wolf-v-Walker-14-06-10-Order-Stating-Case-Not-Appealable. However,
without explanation, hours after issuing this unsigned order, in another unsigned order,
“The court, on its own motion, VACATES the June 10, 2014 order as erroneously issued.”
Id.
301. Wolf v. Walker, No. 14-2266 (7th Cir. June 10, 2014) (order denying emergency
motion for stay), https://www.scribd.com/doc/271058839/Wolf-v-Walker-14-06-10-OrderStating-Case-Not-Appealable.
302. Id.
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state law, that is an issue outside the scope of this case.” The only
viable option for Wisconsin would have been to initiate state court
proceedings against the seventy clerks who were issuing licenses in
304
violation of state law. This is formally correct, as the various clerks
were not operating under the compulsion of a federal court
305
Thus, they were not subject to the district court’s
injunction.
control. But the court was almost certainly aware of the potential
persuasive effect of her declaration on state officials and the
foreseeable effect of delays in issuing (and staying) the injunction.
Eight days after the declaratory judgment, Judge Crabb entered,
306
then immediately stayed, a preliminary injunction. While she would
not have granted a stay as a matter of first impression, she could not
ignore Kitchen or the other courts that had stayed injunctions in light
307
of Kitchen. Finally reaching the conclusion she should have reached
eight days earlier, Judge Crabb stated that although it was impossible
to know why the Supreme Court had stayed Kitchen because it had
not explained its action, every injunction since then had been stayed,
308
at least where the state had requested one.
Given her ultimately correct resolution of the stay issue, it is
difficult to fathom why Judge Crabb did not stay the judgment one
week earlier, especially given the mischief that ensued in the gap
between her declaration and the injunction. Blaming the clerks for
acting prematurely and lawlessly is legally correct, but ignores the fact
that Judge Crabb could have prevented the chaos by delaying her
declaratory judgment until the injunction was ready. A cynical
explanation may lie in Judge Crabb’s opinion granting the stay:
After seeing the expressions of joy on the faces of so
many newly wedded couples featured in media
reports, I find it difficult to impose a stay on the event
that is responsible for eliciting that emotion, even if
303. Id.
304. In fact, three states would take that very step to prevent clerks from issuing
licenses prior to an appellate decision. See infra Part III.A.
305. In any event, even had an injunction issued, most of these clerks were not parties
to Wolf and thus would not have been bound by that injunction. In reality, most of the
clerks would have been acting voluntarily, not under court compulsion, regardless of what
orders Judge Crabb had issued. See infra Part II.
306. Wolf v. Walker, 26 F. Supp. 3d 866, 870 (W.D. Wis. 2014), appeal dismissed (June
16, 2014).
307. Id.
308. Id.
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the stay is only temporary. Same-sex couples have
waited many years to receive equal treatment under
the law, so it is understandable that they do not want
309
to wait any longer.
As a procedural matter, this is problematic. Judge Crabb knew
from the outset that any injunction likely would be stayed in light of
Kitchen. And she knew from watching other states what would
happen on the ground in the absence of an express stay of the
judgment. By delaying the injunction and stay for a week, she
allowed the same race to the altar in Wisconsin. This race continued
until she cut it off, preempting the inevitable Seventh Circuit stay.
The most plausible explanation for this bizarre turn of events is that it
was a deliberate effort to allow marriages to proceed before the court
of appeals put them on hold, as it would have done following Kitchen.
d. Southern District of Indiana

In two decisions in spring 2014, Judge Richard Young of the
Southern District of Indiana ordered the state to recognize one outof-state same-sex marriage and then declared the state’s same-sex
310
marriage ban unconstitutional in its entirety.
He refused to stay
either order. In the May 9 recognition order, he largely ignored
decisions from courts staying injunctions, other than to insist that the
narrow recognition order should not be controlled by Kitchen’s
311
concern for staying a broad injunction.
(This was the same
reasoning Judge Trauger had used in the Western District of
Tennessee two months earlier; she was promptly reversed by the
312
Sixth Circuit ). But his second opinion, invalidating the ban on
same-sex marriage licenses, did not cite any previous orders from any
313
courts.
Unsurprisingly, given events in Utah, Michigan, and Wisconsin,
clerks in Indiana immediately began issuing licenses to same-sex
couples. An official from the Marion County Clerk’s Office in

309. Id. at 874.
310. Baskin v. Bogan, 983 F. Supp. 2d 1021, 1025 (S.D. Ind. 2014), appeal dismissed
(July 14, 2014).
311. Id.
312. Supra Part II.C.3.a.
313. Baskin v. Bogan, 12 F. Supp. 3d 1144, 1149 (S.D. Ind.) aff’d, 766 F.3d 648 (7th
Cir. 2014) cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 316 (2014) and cert. denied sub nom. Walker v. Wolf, 135
S. Ct. 316 (2014).
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Indianapolis told the New York Times “[i]t’s crazy busy.” Although
the Seventh Circuit immediately stayed the injunction hours after
Indiana submitted its application, and before a response was even
315
filed, nearly a thousand same-sex couples, including 550 in Marion
316
As in Utah, Indiana Governor Mike
County, received licenses.
Pence declined to recognize these “gap” marriages, insisting that the
marriage law “is in full force and effect and executive branch agencies
are to execute their functions as though the U.S. District Court Order
317
of June 25, 2014 had not been issued.” Without explanation, unlike
in Utah and Michigan, the Department of Justice did not issue a
statement that the federal government would recognize the Indiana
318
gap marriages.
e. Fourth Circuit

Demonstrating that the confusion over stays was not confined to
the district courts, the Fourth Circuit offered the most inexplicable
denial of a stay during the entire marriage equality litigation.
314. Jack Healy, U.S. Appeals Court Rejects Utah’s Ban on Gay Marriage, N.Y. TIMES
(June 26, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/06/26/us/us-appeals-court-rejects-utahs-banon-gay-marriage.html?_r=0.
315. Bogan v. Basin, No. 14-627 (7th Cir. June 27, 2014) (order granting stay),
https://www.scribd.com/doc/271034362/Bogan-v-Baskin-14-6-27-Order-Granting-Stay.
Notably, Judges Posner, Williams, and Hamilton were on the motions panel for Bogan v.
Baskin, and these judges also served as the merits panel for Baskin, which was
consolidated with Wolf v. Walker. In contrast, in the Sixth Circuit none of the judges on
the motions panel for DeBoer v. Snyder (Rogers, White, and District Judge Caldwell)
were on the merits panel (Sutton, Cook, and Daughtry). Similarly, in the Eleventh
Circuit, of the three judges on the motions panel (Kelly, Lucero, and Holmes), only
Holmes was on the two-judge motion panel. For a discussion of how two Judges on the
Seventh Circuit—Posner and Easterbrook—often retain merits appeals of cases they
heard as motions judges, see Margaret v. Sachs, Superstar Judges as Entrepreneurs: The
Untold Story of Fraud-On-The-Market, 48 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1207, 1237 (2015) (“If the
motions panels had instead surrendered the appeals for reassignment to merits panels, the
prevailing pattern in every other circuit, 180 some percentage of the merits panels would
almost certainly not have included Judge Easterbrook or Judge Posner.”). See generally,
Alison Frankel, At 7th Circuit Unseen Judicial Mechanics Drive Decisions, REUTERS (Dec.
3, 2014), http://blogs.reuters.com/alison-frankel/2014/12/03/at-7th-circuit-unseen-judicialmechanics-drive-decisions-new-paper/.
316. State Recognizes June Marriages of Same-Sex Couples, USA TODAY (July 9,
2014), http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2014/07/09/state-recognize-june-marria
ges-sex-couples/12410207/.
317. General Counsel to Gov. Mike Pence, Status of Same-Sex Marriages According to
Indiana Law and Pursuant to Court Order (July 7, 2014), https://s3.amazonaws.com/s3.doc
umentcloud.org/documents/1214271/status-of-same-sex-marriages-according-to.pdf.
318. Ian Thompson, What’s the Holdup DOJ?, SLATE (Sept. 10, 2014, 9:00 AM),
http://www.slate.com/blogs/outward/2014/09/10/married_same_sex_couples_in_indiana_an
d_wisconsin_deserve_recognition.html.
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In July 2014, a divided panel affirmed a district court order
declaring Virginia’s same-sex marriage ban unconstitutional.
Although the Supreme Court by that point had twice intervened and
four sister circuits (Sixth, Seventh, Ninth, and Tenth) had stayed
district court injunctions, the majority did not even address the issue.
Accepting the stayed district court judgment as a permanent
injunction, the court of appeals announced that the injunction would
319
go into full effect once its mandate issued three weeks later. Twelve
days after a motion for a stay pending the filing of a petition for
320
certiorari, Judges Floyd and Gregory issued a brief, three-sentence
order denying the motion. In what can be charitably described as
deliberate indifference, the court order offered no citation or
discussion of any of the orders from the Supreme Court or other
321
circuits.
Because Virginia was no longer defending the law, a
county clerk sought a stay from Supreme Court, faulting the Fourth
Circuit for ruling without mentioning Kitchen and without engaging
322
in any substantive analysis. As it had done in Kitchen and Evans,
323
the Court promptly granted the stay without recorded dissent.
And so ended the third epoch of same-sex marriage appeals,
where the clear message was to stay judgment and mandates pending
complete appellate review.
D. Phase III: Certiorari Denied & Circuit Splits: October 2014January 2015

The signal changed radically on the first day of the October 2014
term. The Court unexpectedly, and without published dissent, denied

319. FED. R. APP. P. 41(b) (“The court’s mandate must issue 7 days after the time to
file a petition for rehearing expires, or 7 days after entry of an order denying a timely
petition for panel rehearing, petition for rehearing en banc, or motion for stay of mandate,
whichever is later. The court may shorten or extend the time.”). Opponents to Gay
Marriage in Virginia Ask for Delay in Issuing Licenses to Couples, NBC WASH. (Aug. 14,
2014), http://www.nbcwashington.com/news/local/Virginia-Gay-Marriage-Fight-One-StepCloser-to-the-Supreme-Court-271091751.html.
320. Bostic v. Schaeffer, Motion for Stay of Mandate Pending Filing of Petition for
Writ of Certiorari (4th Cir. Aug. 1, 2014), https://www.scribd.com/doc/271064286/Bostic14-08-01-Motion-by-Appellant-to-Stay-Mandate.
321. Bostic v. Schaeffer, No. 14-1167 (4th Cir. Aug. 13, 2014) (order denying motion to
stay),
https://www.scribd.com/doc/271064616/Bostic-14-08-13-4thDistCtOrderStayDenied
20140813-1.
322. McQuigg v. Bostic, Application to Stay Mandate Pending Appeal (Aug. 14,
2014), at 3 https://www.scribd.com/doc/236849402/McQuigg-Stay-Application.
323. McQuigg v. Bostic, No. 14A196 (Aug. 20, 2014) (order granting motion to stay
pending appeal), http://www.supremecourt.gov/orders/courtorders/082014zr_i4dk.pdf.
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certiorari in the Bostic troika from the Fourth Circuit, Bogan and
325
Wolf from the Seventh Circuit, and Bishop and Kitchen from the
326
327
This shocked Court watchers, who had been
Tenth Circuit.
328
awaiting Court action on the marriage cases.
The cert denials produced Article III-final judgments requiring
officials in five states to issue marriage licenses to same-sex couples.
They also spoke to the respective roles of the Supreme Court and
lower courts in constitutional decision-making and to the Court’s
discretion as to when to exercise its jurisdiction. Two weeks earlier in
remarks at the University of Minnesota Law School, Justice Ginsburg

324. McQuigg v. Bostic, 135 S. Ct. 314 (2014); Schaefer v. Bostic, 135 S. Ct. 308 (2014);
Rainey v. Bostic, 135 S. Ct. 286 (2014).
325. Bogan v. Baskin, 135 S. Ct. 316 (2014); Walker v. Wolf, 135 S. Ct. 316 (2014).
326. Smith v. Bishop, 135 S. Ct. 271 (2014); Herbert v. Kitchen, 135 S. Ct. 265 (2014).
327. The cert denials were contained in an 89-page order list, which included the
results of the September “Long Conference” in which the Court decides the thousands of
cert petitions from the summer recess. See Linda Greenhouse, How Not To Be Chief
Justice: The Apprenticeship Of William H. Rehnquist, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 1365, 1368
(2006).
The order list was posted to the Court’s recently redesigned, but still buggy, web site. U.S.
Supreme Court Technical Glitch, WBRZ, Oct. 6, 2014, http://www.wbrz.com/news/highcourt-glitch-delays-news-on-gay-marriage/. Marcia Coyle of the National Law Journal
commented that: “A mad scramble ensued to search for the orders list on the Supreme
Court’s newly redesigned website. ‘Where the [expletive] is the orders list?’ came a
frustrated shout from one end of the pressroom. ‘Wait, wait, it’s up now,’ shouted
another.” See Marcia Coyle, “Behind the Scenes: SCOTUS Media Room on Opening
Day,” NAT’L L.J. (Oct. 6, 2014), http://www.nationallawjournal.com/legaltimes/
home/id=1202672471618?kw=Behind%20the%20Scenes%3A%20SCOTUS%20Media%
20Room%20on%20Opening%20Day&et=editorial&bu=National%20Law%20Journal&c
n=20141006&src=EMC-Email&pt=Legal%20Times%20Afternoon%20Update&slreturn
=20140906163648.
328. Adding to the drama, the paper list distributed to the press by the Public
Information Office was missing thirty-three pages, including the pages containing the
seven cert. denials. As Coyle relayed the story: “Everyone looked at the bulky list first for
any sign of the seven pending same-sex marriage petitions. Seeing none, reporters tweeted
that the court had said nothing about same-sex marriage Monday. But as reporters, most
on deadlines, continued to comb the list for other news, NBC’s Pete Williams suddenly
called out, ‘The list goes from page 17 to 50.’ Where were the missing 33 pages, and more
importantly, what was on those pages?” Id. Garret Epps remarked that “a number of
reporters went upstairs for oral argument, not knowing that history was being made. (I
was one.).”
Supreme Court spokesperson Kathy Arberg blamed the problem on “technical glitches.”
Coyle added that the “high court’s copy machine apparently had a bad morning, but
perhaps not as bad as those editors and reporters who soon regretted those early
advisories of no news on same-sex marriage.” See Josh Blackman, SCOTUS Press Room
Confusion – 33 Pages of Orders Missing Due to Technical Glitches, JOSH BLACKMAN
BLOG (Oct. 6, 2014), http://joshblackman.com/blog/2014/10/06/scotus-press-room-confus
ion-33-pages-of-orders-missing-due-to-technical-glitches/.
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hinted that “when all the courts of appeals are in agreement there is
329
no need for us to rush to step in,” although “[s]ooner or later, yes,
330
the question will come to the Court.”
The cert denials seemed inconsistent with the Court’s signals in
granting multiple stays over the previous eight months. As Baude
argued, “one would have guessed that the stays were premised on the
probability that the Court would take up the issue. So something
331
unusual was going on, but we don’t know what.”
The cert denials shifted the analysis in three respects. First, it
might have tempted lower courts to treat the denials as, if not a
decision on the merits, a strong signal that the Court agreed with the
332
decisions invalidating state laws.
Second, it raised the possibility
that the Court might leave the constitutional issue to the lower
courts—at least, Justice Ginsburg suggested, so long as they all went
the same way, as had been the case to that point. Third, it signaled
that the Court was no longer concerned with preserving its
opportunity to speak before the lower court judgments took effect or
with states issuing marriage licenses to same-sex couples on the
persuasion of lower court decisions.
There was no practical
difference in licenses issued on the strength of an Article-III final
judgment as opposed to on the strength of an unstayed district court
order—the result is marriage licenses issuing before the Supreme
Court has spoken.
Although there was no dissent from the orders denying cert.,
Justice Thomas, joined by Justice Scalia, subsequently revealed his
disagreement in a dissent from a denial of a stay in an unrelated case
a month later. Citing Hollingsworth v. Perry (the Prop 8 case),
Justice Thomas argued that, “we often review decisions striking down
state laws, even in the absence of a disagreement among lower
333
courts.”
Referring to the cert. denials in the same-sex marriage

329. Lyle Denniston, Mixed Signals on Same-Sex Marriage, SCOTUSBLOG (Sept. 18,
2014), http://www.scotusblog.com/2014/09/mixed-signals-on-same-sex-marriage/.
330. Id.
331. Baude, supra note 10, at 7–8.
332. But see Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 456 (1953) (“We have frequently said that
the denial of certiorari ‘imports no expression of opinion upon the merits of a case.”)
(citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
333. Maricopa Cty., Arizona, et al., v. Angel Lopez-Valenzuela, 135 S. Ct. 428 (Nov.
13, 2014) (Thomas, J., dissenting from denial of application for stay) (citing Hollingsworth
v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652 (2013)).
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cases, however, “for reasons that escape me, we have not done so
334
with any consistency, especially in recent months.”
Lower courts reacted to this shift in signals almost immediately.
1.

Ninth Circuit

Just over thirty hours after the cert denials, writing for a Ninth
Circuit panel, Judge Stephen Reinhardt declared unconstitutional
335
marriage bans in Idaho and Nevada. The court remanded the cases
to the district courts for entry of permanent injunctions. Rather than
336
waiting the typical seven days before issuing a mandate, the panel
337
ordered its mandate to take effect that day.
The Nevada Governor and Attorney General announced that
338
the state would take no further action in this matter.
But Idaho
launched a multi-pronged attack. On October 8 at 5:30 a.m. EDT, it
filed an emergency motion with the Ninth Circuit to recall the

334. Id. Seven months later, the two Justices also dissented from denial of certiorari
in Maricopa (as opposed to denying a stay), stating that “discretion [to review cases]
should be exercised with a strong dose of respect for state laws. In exercising that
discretion, we should show at least as much respect for state laws as we show for federal
laws . . . . Our indifference to cases such as this one will only embolden the lower courts to
reject state laws on questionable constitutional grounds.” Maricopa Cty., 135 S. Ct. at
2046.
335. The Idaho case was Latta v. Otter. The case from Nevada was Sevcik v. Sandoval.
Sevcik is a unique case with a lengthy posture. In 2012, the district court found Nevada’s
marriage law constitutional, and it was appealed to the Ninth Circuit of December 4, 2012,
six months before United States v. Windsor was decided. The case was stayed until July 18,
2013—after the decision in Windsor—and was not argued, along with Latta, until
September 8, 2014.
336. FED. R. APP. PROC. 41.
337. Latta v. Otter, No. 14-35420 (9th Cir. Oct. 7, 2014) (order issuing mandate),
https://www.scribd.com/doc/271297775/Latter-v-Otter-14-10-07-Mandate-Forthwith. As in
Hollingsworth v. Perry, Judge Reinhardt (who was on both panels) did not wait twentyfive days for the mandate to issue before dissolving the stay.
338. Ninth Circuit Strikes Marriage Bans in Idaho and Nevada, WASH. BLADE (Oct. 7,
2014),
http://www.washingtonblade.com/2014/10/07/ninth-circuit-strikes-marriage-bansidaho-nevada/. At some point on Wednesday morning (exactly what time is unclear),
Nevada District Court Judge Robert C. Jones, who had previously upheld Nevada’s samesex marriage ban, recused rather than lift the stay and let gay marriages proceed in
Nevada. No explanation was given for the recusal. Around 4:22 ET on Wednesday, the
case was reassigned to Judge James Mahan. Chris Geidner, Conservative Nevada Juge
Recuses Himself from Ending Marriage Ban, BUZZFEED (Oct. 8, 2014),
http://www.buzzfeed.com/chrisgeidner/conservative-nevada-judge-recuses-himself-fromending-marria#.hdlb9XJgGq. Sevcik v. Sandoval, No. 2:12-cv-00578-RCJ-PAL (D. Nev.
Oct. 8, 2014) (recusal order), https://www.scribd.com/doc/271304203/Sevcik-v-Sandoval14-10-08-recuse.
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mandates. A few hours later, it filed an emergency application to
stay the mandates with Circuit Justice Kennedy. The application
explained that without a Supreme Court stay, marriage licenses would
have to be issued to same-sex couples that day at 8 a.m. MDT, or 10
340
341
a.m. EDT.
At 9:47 a.m. EDT, with thirteen minutes to spare,
Justice Kennedy stayed the mandate pending further orders and
342
requested a response from the plaintiffs by October 9.
But there was a problem with Justice Kennedy’s order, perhaps
caused by the haste with which the motion was filed. He ordered the
recall of the mandate not only in the Idaho case, but also in the
Nevada case, inadvertently putting on hold same-sex weddings there
343
even though the state was no longer litigating the issue. The Clark
County, Nevada, clerk tweeted at 11:30 a.m. EDT that the “issuance
of marriage licenses to same-sex couples is on hold due to an order
344
from the U.S. Supreme Ct.”
Reporter Lyle Denniston explained
that the error was due to the fact that the caption on the Ninth Circuit
345
order included both cases. Someone in Justice Kennedy’s chambers
likely copied and pasted the caption from the Ninth Circuit’s order,
even though only Idaho appealed.
Finally, at 3:18 p.m, Justice Kennedy issued a revised order,
346
vacating the stay in the Nevada case.
Same-sex marriages in
Nevada proceeded, albeit delayed by five hours. The stay for the

339. Appellants’ Emergency Motion for Recall of Mandate, Latta v. Otter, 771 F.3d
456 (9th Cir. Oct. 8, 2014) (Nos. 14-35420 & 14-35421), https://www.scribd.com/
doc/271299136/Latter-v-Otter-14-10-08-Emergency-Recall-Mandate.
340. Emergency Application of Governor C L “Butch” Otter to Stay Mandate
Pending Disposition of Applications for Stay Pending Rehearing And Certiorari, Latta v.
Otter, 135 S. Ct. 344 (2014) (No. 14A374), https://www.scribd.com/doc/271299344/Latterv-Otter-Emergency-Stay-Motion-10-8-14.
341. Lyle Denniston, Idaho Same-Sex Marriage Delayed, SCOTUSBLOG (Oct. 8,
2014), http://www.scotusblog.com/2014/10/idaho-asks-same-sex-marriage-delay/.
342. Latta v. Otter, No. 14A374 (Oct. 8, 2024) (order granting stay), https://www.
scribd.com/doc/271299469/Latter-v-otter-14-10-08-SCOTUS-Granting-Motion-to-Stay.
343. Chris Geidner, Justice Anthony Kennedy Halts 9th Circuit Marriage Ruling,
BUZZFEED (Oct. 8, 2014), http://www.buzzfeed.com/chrisgeidner/justice-anthonykennedy-halts-9th-circuit-marriage-ruling-fr#.gjokgAjXBZ
344. Id.
345. Lyle Denniston, Same-Sex Marriage OK in Nevada, SCOTUSBLOG (Oct. 8,
2014), http://www.scotusblog.com/2014/10/same-sex-marriages-in-nevada-maybe-yes-may
be-no/. Fittingly, the original title of the post was “Same-Sex Marriage in Nevada—
Maybe Yes, Maybe No.”
346. Latta v. Otter, No. 14A374 (Oct. 8, 2014) (revised order), https://www.scribd.
com/doc/271300597/Latta-v-Otter-14-10-8-Revised-Order; see also Lyle Denniston, SameSex Marriage OK in Nevada, SCOTUSBLOG (Oct. 8, 2014), http://www.scotusblog
.com/2014/10/same-sex-marriages-in-nevada-maybe-yes-maybe-no/.

BLACKMAN&WASSERMAN_FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

Winter 2016]

THE PROCESS OF MARRIAGE EQUALITY

11/30/2015 4:34 PM

311

Idaho case remained in effect pending further orders from Justice
Kennedy or the Court.
At 5:51 p.m. EDT, the Ninth Circuit issued an order
“interpret[ing]” the Supreme Court’s revised order “as a directive to
347
recall the mandates” in the Idaho case, which the court did. It is not
clear why the court did this. Justice Kennedy’s order had expressly
requested a response from the plaintiffs as to the stay. It did not
order or suggest that the court of appeals do anything, particularly
withdrawing the mandate, which would moot the application before
the Supreme Court. Ostensibly disregarding the Ninth Circuit’s
order, the Supreme Court late Friday afternoon denied the stay and
348
vacated its previous order, without any noted dissent. This was the
first denial of a stay by the Supreme Court, following on the heels of
the cert denials four days earlier. According to one commenter,
“courts likely will take this move as a sign that stays are no longer
349
required during marriage appeals.”
On October 15, 2014, the same Ninth Circuit panel dissolved its
350
original stay in Latta, which had remained in effect even after the
351
Supreme Court’s order. The per curiam opinion offered a helpful
recitation of the turn of events and of the significance of the Court’s
352
denial of certiorari and denial of stay in Latta. It explained that the
Ninth Circuit’s stay was issued a number of months ago, before
relevant factual and legal developments, including decisions
invalidating marriage laws in Latta and in other circuits. Those
decisions, in tandem with the cert denials, altered the calculus so that
Idaho could no longer meet the standard for granting or continuing a

347. Latta v. Otter, No. 14-35420 (9th Cir. Oct. 8, 2014) (order recalling mandates),
https://www.scribd.com/doc/271301173/Latta-v-Otter-10-8-14-Order-Recall.
348. Latta v. Otter, No. 14A374 (Oct. 10. 2014) (order denying motion to stay),
https://www.scribd.com/doc/271301531/Latta-v-Otter-14-10-10-deny-stay.
349. Chris Geidner, Supreme Court Allows Idaho Same-Sex Marriages to Proceed,
BUZZFEED (Oct. 10, 2014), http://www.buzzfeed.com/chrisgeidner/supreme-court-allowsidaho-same-sex-marriages-to-proceed-end#.boaybr9Mdj.
350. Latta v. Otter, No. 14-35420 (9th Cir. May 15, 2014) (order granting temporary
stay), https://www.scribd.com/doc/270977326/Latta-v-Otter-14-5-15-Temporary-Stay.
351. Latta v. Otter, No. 14-35420 (9th Cir. Oct. 15, 2014) (order and opinion dissolving
stay), https://www.scribd.com/doc/271302160/Latta-v-Otter-14-10-15-Ca9-Another-Stay.
Rather than seeking another emergency appeal to the Supreme Court, Idaho filed a
petition for rehearing en banc before the Ninth Circuit. On January 9, 2015, the petition
was denied over the dissents of Judges O’Scannlain, Rawlinson, and Bea. Ultimately, the
Supreme Court denied certiorari on June 30, 2015. See Latta v. Otter, 135 S. Ct. 345
(2014).
352. Latta v. Otter, 771 F.3d 496, 498 (9th Cir. 2014).
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stay. Specifically, when the “Supreme Court denied certiorari in all
the pending cases, it was aware that there were cases pending in other
circuit courts that had not yet been decided but that might
subsequently create a conflict. The existence of those pending cases,
and the possibility of a future conflict, did not affect the Court’s
353
decision to permit the marriages to proceed.”
The cert denials
signaled that the Justices were now content with same-sex marriage
becoming the law within the regional circuit even while other
petitions for certiorari remained outstanding.
Interestingly, in upholding the marriage laws in Kentucky,
Michigan, Ohio, and Tennessee two months later, Judge Jeffrey
Sutton of the Sixth Circuit drew the opposite lesson from the cert
354
denials.
He minimized the significance of the seven denials from
among the 1,575 cases in the orders list that first Monday in October.
He explained that “this kind of action (or inaction) ‘imports no
expression of opinion upon the merits of the case, as the bar has been
355
told many times.’” Sutton further argued that “[j]ust as the Court’s
three decisions to stay those same court of appeals decisions over the
past year, all without a registered dissent, did not end the debate on
this issue, so too the Court’s decision to deny certiorari in all of these
appeals, all without a registered dissent, does not end the debate
356
either.” In either direction, a decision not to decide is a decision not
to decide.
A few loose ends remained in the Ninth Circuit. On October 12,
2014, Judge Timothy M. Burgess of the District of Alaska declared
that state’s marriage ban unconstitutional and immediately enjoined
357
the state from enforcing it.
Alaska appealed and the panel only
granted a stay to give the state an opportunity to seek a stay from the
358
Supreme Court. Curiously, Judge O’Scannlain would have granted
359
the stay pending the entire appeals process.
His dissent relied on
the Kitchen stay order, but disregarded that fact that the Court had
denied certiorari in that case a few days earlier and had signaled in
353. Id. at 499.
354. DeBoer v. Snyder, 772 F.3d 388 (6th Cir. 2014).
355. Id. at 402 (citing United States v. Carver, 260 U.S. 482, 490 (1923)). “The ‘variety
of considerations [that] underlie denials of the writ’ counsels against according denials of
certiorari any precedential value.” Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 296 (1989) (internal
citation omitted).
356. Id.
357. Hamby v. Parnell, 56 F. Supp. 3d 1056, 1073 (D. Alaska 2014).
358. Hamby v. Parnell, No. 14-35856 (9th Cir. Oct. 15, 2014) (order granting stay),
https://www.scribd.com/doc/272313595/14-10-15-Order-Granting-Stay.
359. Id.
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Latta that it would not grant further stays. For O’Scannlain, the
weight of the stay trumped the weight of the cert denial. As would
become the new normal, the Supreme Court denied Alaska’s
360
emergency motion for a stay, without noted dissent.
On October 17, 2014, Judge John Sedwick immediately enjoined
Arizona’s marriage ban in light of Ninth Circuit precedent,
complaining that “it is clear . . . that the High Court will turn a deaf
361
ear on any request for relief from the Ninth Circuit’s decision.” In a
testament to how quickly things had changed with respect to the
same-sex marriage appeals, that same day Arizona Attorney General
Tom Horne—a lame duck who had lost the Republican primary—did
not seek a stay, claiming that such a frivolous appeal would warrant
Rule 11 sanctions:
The probability of persuading the 9th Circuit to
reverse today’s decision is zero. The probability of the
United States Supreme Court accepting review of the
9th circuit decision is also zero. I have decided not to
appeal today’s decision, which would be an exercise in
futility, and which would serve only the purpose of
362
wasting taxpayers’ money.
Horne was correct about the practical futility and the desirability
of not wasting taxpayer money, although his Rule 11 argument is
overstated.
2.

Fourth and Seventh Circuits

While chaos reigned in the Ninth Circuit, matters were much
more orderly in the Fourth and Seventh Circuits. By denying
certiorari, the Supreme Court created Article III-final judgments in
both circuits and both courts of appeals lifted stays of their
363
364
mandates, causing the injunctions to take effect.
Same-sex

360. Hamby v. Parnell, No. 14A413 (Oct. 18, 2014) (order denying stay), https://www.
scribd.com/doc/272313694/14-10-18-deny-stay.
361. Majors v. Horne, 14 F. Supp. 3d 1313, 1315 (D. Ariz. 2014).
362. Arizona Attorney General Press Release, Attorney General Tom Horne Will Not
Appeal Same-Sex Marriage Ruling (Oct. 17, 2014), https://www.azag.gov/pressrelease/attorney-general-tom-horne-will-not-appeal-same-sex-marriage-ruling.
363. While a mandate issues twenty-five days after the judgment, “if the petition is
denied, the mandate issues forthwith.” SUP. CT. R. 45.
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marriages began almost immediately in the affected states of Virginia,
365
Wisconsin, and Indiana.
Federal district courts in North Carolina, where litigation was
366
pending but not yet appealed, lifted their own stays.
Officials in
South Carolina began issuing licenses without awaiting an order
367
declaring invalid that state’s law.
The Fourth Circuit denied a
request by the South Carolina Attorney General for a stay and any
368
additional time to seek a stay from the Supreme Court. The high
369
court denied that stay, over dissents of Justices Scalia and Thomas.
3.

Tenth Circuit

Following the cert denials, the Tenth Circuit similarly lifted stays
in cases from Utah, Oklahoma, and Colorado, immediately putting
370
into effect the preliminary injunctions that were previously stayed.
Nevertheless, district courts within the circuit—now bound by circuit
precedent to declare state laws unconstitutional—still exercised some

364. Bostic v. Schaeffer, No. 14-1167 (L) (4th Cir. Oct. 6, 2014) (mandate),
https://www.scribd.com/doc/271071787/Bostic-14-10-6-mandate; Wolf v. Walker, No. 142525 (7th Cir. Oct. 7, 2014) (order affirming district court), https://www.scribd.com/doc/
271071351/Wolf-14-10-07-AFFIRMING-District-Court; Baskin v. Bogan, No. 14-2386 (7th
Cir. Oct. 7, 2014) (mandate), https://www.scribd.com/doc/271071539/Baskin-14-10-7-order.
365. President Obama said of the cert denials: “In some ways, the decision that was
just handed down to not do anything about what states are doing on same-sex marriage
may end up being as consequential—from my perspective, a positive sense—as anything
that’s been done.” Jeffrey Toobin, How Obama Transformed the Federal Judiciary, THE
NEW YORKER (Oct. 27, 2014), http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2014/10/27/obamabrief.
366. Fisher-Borne v. Smith, No. 1:12-cv-589 (M.D.N.C. Oct. 8, 2014) (order lifting
stay), https://www.scribd.com/doc/271073702/NC-14-10-08-Order-Lifting-Stay; Bradacs v.
Haley, No. 3:13-cv-02351-JMC (D.S.C. Oct. 7, 2014), https://www.scribd.com/doc/
271074754/SC-14-10-07-Order-Lifting-Stay; McGee v. Cole, No. 3:13-24068 (S.D. W. Va.
Oct. 7, 2014) (order lifting stay), https://www.scribd.com/doc/271073868/Wv-Stay-LiftedOct-7.
367. Condon v. Haley, 21 F. Supp. 3d 572, 580 (D.S.C. 2014).
368. Emergency Application to Stay U.S. Dist. Court Order, Condon v. Haley, 135 S.
Ct. 702 (2014) (No. 14A533), http://sblog.s3.amazonaws.com/wp-content/uploads/2014
/11/14A533_Stay_Application.pdf.
369. Wilson v. Condon, 135 S. Ct. 702 (2014).
370. Herbert v. Kitchen, No. 13-4178 (10th Cir. Oct. 6, 2014) (order lifting stay),
https://www.scribd.com/doc/271071169/Kitchen-Herbert-14-10-6-order; Bishop v. Smith,
Nos. 14-5003 & 14-5006 (10th Cir. Oct. 6, 2014) (order lifting stay), https://www.scribd
.com/doc/271071207/Bishop-Oklahoma-14-10-06-Order. Burns v. Hickenlooper, No. 141283 (10th Cir. Oct. 6, 2014), https://www.scribd.com/doc/ 271074943/Hickenlooper-14-1007-Order. Judge Raymond P. Moore of “haruspex” fame entered a permanent injunction
ten days later on 10/17/14. Burns v. Hickenlooper, No. 14-cv-01817-RM-KLM (D. Co.
Oct. 17, 2014) (order granting unopposed motion), https://www.scribd.com/doc/2723
14979/14-10-17-Order-Granting-Unopposed-Motion.
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caution. In Wyoming, Judge Scott W. Skavdahl stayed the injunction
for six days to give the state a chance to appeal, which it declined to
371
do.
The situation was more complicated in Kansas. Judge Daniel D.
Crabtree granted a one-week stay as the “safer and wiser course” to
372
give the state time to prepare to honor the injunction.
After the
Tenth Circuit refused to stay the case, Kansas sought a stay from the
373
Supreme Court.
Circuit Justice Sotomayor stayed the order to
374
375
await a response, but the full Court denied the stay two days later.
Perhaps signaling another shift, Justices Scalia and Thomas
would have granted the stay. This was the first time since the cert
denials that any Justices registered a dissent on the marriage
376
377
appeals. (A dissent from the South Carolina case would come two
weeks later). What changed? On November 6, 2014, the Sixth
Circuit became the first (and ultimately only) court of appeals to
declare that same-sex marriage bans did not violate the Constitution.
This created a circuit split, virtually ensuring the Court would grant
certiorari and resolve the constitutional issue that term. Justices
Scalia and Thomas apparently believed all other cases should be
placed on hold pending the Court’s resolution by the following July.
Once there was a circuit split, they dissented from the denial of every
subsequent stay application.
It is worth considering how positions on stays shifted following
the cert denials. It takes five votes to grant a stay, meaning at least
five Justices had previously voted for the stays in Kitchen, Evans, and
Bostic. Given that Scalia and Thomas continued to want to stay
judgments, at least three Justices who previously voted for stays must
have changed positions. The other two dissenters in Obergefell—
Roberts and Alito—never registered any disagreement with respect

371. Guzzo v. Mead, No. 14-CV-200-SWS, 2014 WL 5317797, at *9 (D. Wyo. Oct. 17,
2014).
372. Marie v. Moser, 65 F. Supp. 3d 1175, 1206 (D. Kan. 2014).
373. Marie v. Moser Docket, Supreme Court Docket No. 14A503, http://www.sup
remecourt.gov/search.aspx?filename=/docketfiles/14a503.htm. The Supreme Court can
grant a stay from “any case in which the final judgment or decree of any court is subject to
review by the Supreme Court,” even if the parties bypass the court of appeals. 28 U.S.C.
2101(f).
374. Marie v. Moser, No. 14A503 (Nov. 10, 2014) (order granting stay),
http://www.supremecourt.gov/orders/courtorders/111014zr_0971.pdf.
375. Moser v. Marie, 135 S. Ct. 511 (2014).
376. Id.
377. Supra notes 367–69 and accompanying text.
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to the stay denials. On the other hand, none of the five Justices in the
Obergefell majority spoke either to the earlier stay grants or the
current stay denials.
4.

Eleventh Circuit

Florida’s challenge followed a similar path to Kansas’s. Recall
that Judge Hinkle had stayed his injunction until ninety days beyond
378
the cert denials from the Tenth Circuit, a period due to expire on
379
January 5, 2015.
In December, the Eleventh Circuit declined to
extend the stay beyond that date, stating that the “decision not to
extend the stay is consistent with the Supreme Court’s treatment of
380
this issue.”
At that time, there was no stay in place from the
Supreme Court in any case and no stay had remained in effect for
more than two days since the cert denials. The Eleventh Circuit
would never even have the case argued before the stay in Florida was
lifted. In December, the Supreme Court denied Florida’s stay
request, again with Justices Scalia and Thomas dissenting, again
381
without explanation.
Two weeks later, on January 1, 2015, more than four months
after his original injunction, Judge Hinkle described Florida’s losing
streak:
I stayed the ruling in this case while those stays were in
effect and for 91 more days—long enough to allow the
defendants to seek a further stay in the United States
Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit and, if
unsuccessful there, in the United States Supreme
Court. The defendants did that. They lost. The
United States Supreme Court allowed the ruling in
382
this case to take effect.

378. See supra notes 275–78 and accompanying text.
379. Brenner v. Scott, No. 4:14-cv-107-RH/CAS (N.D. Fl. Nov. 5, 2014) (order
denying the motions to alter stay), https://www.scribd.com/doc/272302072/14-11-05-OrderDenying-Motions-to-Alter-Stay.
380. Brenner v. Scott, No. 14-14061 (11th Cir. Dec. 2, 2014) (order declining to extend
stay), https://www.scribd.com/doc/272315872/14-12-03-Order-Motion-to-Stay.
381. Armstrong v. Brenner, 135 S. Ct. 890 (2014).
382. Brenner v. Scott, No. 4:14CV107-RH/CAS, 2015 WL 44260, at *1 (N.D. Fla.
2015).
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Fifth Circuit

In November 2014, Judge Carlton Reeves of the Southern
383
District of Mississippi invalidated that state’s marriage ban.
Although he declined to issue a stay pending appeal, he stayed the
injunction for fourteen days to give the State time to appeal and allow
384
the Fifth Circuit to decide whether a stay was appropriate.
He
captured the choice as one between “a race to the courthouse—with
same-sex couples rushing to the circuit clerk’s office, and the State
rushing to the Fifth Circuit,” which, he insisted, “does not serve
385
anyone’s interest.”
A unanimous panel of the Fifth Circuit granted the stay pending
386
appeal, something no other circuit had done since the cert. denials.
Once again, the newly created circuit split loomed and may have
affected the decision. The court insisted that it “is not our task today
to resolve the merits of this conflict in deciding the instant motion,
however, we are convinced by the opinions of our sister circuits that
‘a detailed and in depth examination of this serious legal issue’ is
387
warranted before a disruption of a long standing status quo.” The
court also emphasized the need to avoid confusion and the
“inevitable disruption that would arise from a lack of continuity and
388
stability in this important area of law.”
In contrast, the Eleventh
Circuit was not moved by the circuit split, denying a stay the
following month.
6.

Eighth Circuit

Three district judges in the Eighth Circuit took an unexpectedly
narrow approach. They invalidated state laws but nevertheless stayed
389
their judgments.
Each court minimized the effects of the cert
denials and the subsequent stay denials in Moser, Parnell, and Latta.
The key was that those stay denials arose in circuits (Fourth, Ninth,
and Tenth) that had previously entered Article III-final judgments

383. Campaign for S. Equal. v. Bryant, 64 F. Supp. 3d 906, 953 (S.D. Miss. 2014) aff’d,
No. 14-60837, 2015 WL 4032186 (5th Cir. July 1, 2015).
384. Id.
385. Id.
386. Campaign for S. Equal. v. Bryant, 773 F.3d 55, 58 (5th Cir. 2014).
387. Id. (quoting Baylor Univ. Med. Ctr., 711 F.2d at 40).
388. Id.
389. Jernigan v. Crane, 64 F. Supp. 3d 1260, 1276 (E.D. Ark. 2014); Rosenbrahn v.
Daugaard, 61 F. Supp. 3d 862, 876 (D.S.D. 2015); Lawson v. Kelly, 58 F. Supp. 3d 923, 936
(W.D. Mo. 2014).
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recognizing the constitutional right to same-sex marriage. Those stay
denials therefore allowed judgments to take effect that were
supported by binding precedent. By contrast, the Eight Circuit had
not yet ruled on the constitutional question. Within the circuit,
therefore, the situation was the same as prior to the cert denials—
district courts had enjoined state laws in the absence of binding
precedent and stays were appropriate until those judgments became
390
final or until binding precedent issued.
On the other hand, such a formalistic approach disregards the
Supreme Court’s role as traffic cop in major constitutional cases.
Through its shadow docket, the Supreme Court took steps to
maintain the status quo throughout the courts of appeals, without
granting certiorari or hearing cases on the merits. In fact, one
commentator suggests that this approach enabled the Court to decide
Obergefell while limiting its dramatic effect on broader U.S. society
and the Court’s institutional legitimacy. By delaying its decision on
the merits, the Court allowed lower court decisions to establish
marriage in more states over a longer period of time, leaving
391
Obergefell to clean up in about a dozen stragglers at the final point.
E. Phase IV: Certiorari Granted: January 16-June 26

On January 16, 2015—three months after the October cert
denials and the denials of stays from Idaho, Alaska, South Carolina,
Kansas, and Florida (the last two over dissents by Justices Scalia and
Thomas)—the Court finally granted certiorari of the divided Sixth
Circuit decision upholding marriage bans in Kentucky, Michigan,
392
Ohio, and Tennessee.
At that time, a number of cases remained pending in the district
courts. The judges’ easiest option would have been to stay the

390. Lawson v. Kelly, No. 14-0622-CV-W-ODS (W.D. Mo. Nov. 25, 2014) (order
denying motion to stay), https://www.scribd.com/doc/272318247/14-11-25-Order-DenyingMotion-to-Lift-Stay; Rosenbrahn, 61 F. Supp. 2d at 876.
391. Chris Geidner, Cert.Denied, Stays Denied, Marriage Equality Advanced: How
the Supreme Court Used Nonprecedential Orders to Diminish the Drama of the Marriage
Equality Decision, 76 OHIO ST. L.J. FURTHERMORE 161, 171 (2015), http://moritzlaw.osu.
edu/students/groups/oslj/files/2015/11/Vol.-76-161-172-Geidner-SCR-Essay.pdf.
392. The case would be Obergefell v. Hodges before the Court because the petition for
certiorari from Tennessee was filed first, had the lowest docket number. Much to the
chagrin of law professors and students for generations to come, Obergefell (pronounced
“OH-ber-guh-fell”) was also the most difficult name to pronounce of all the petitioners.
Richard Wolf, Grieving widower takes lead in major gay marriage case, USA TODAY (Apr.
10, 2015), http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2015/04/10/supreme-court-gay-marr
iage-obergefell/25512405/; Compare the aptly named Love v. Beshear, 989 F. Supp. 2d 536,
539 (W.D. Ky. 2014).
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litigation, given that a final, binding resolution of the constitutional
issue was only a few months away. There was nothing to be gained
from new lower court precedent. And there certainly was nothing to
be gained from states issuing new marriage licenses based on a
constitutional judgment that might be overruled in short order. One
district court in the Middle District of Alabama did just this, denying
393
the state’s motion to dismiss, then immediately staying the litigation
394
The Eighth
until that definitive ruling from the Supreme Court.
Circuit stayed an injunction from Nebraska. Opting for the leastefficient approach, the Eleventh Circuit declined to stay the
injunction, as did the Supreme Court, prompting a vigorous written
dissent from Justices Thomas and Scalia.
1.

Eighth Circuit

District courts in the Eighth Circuit continued to grant timelimited stays or stays pending appeal, although with limited analysis.
After invalidating Nebraska’s marriage law, Judge Joseph E.
395
Bataillon granted a one-week stay.
Ironically, the district court
justified its decision by citing to the Supreme Court’s denial of a stay
396
and Justice Thomas’s dissent on the issue. In other words, a single
dissent from the denial of a stay from two Justices trumped the
significance of six consecutive and unexplained denials of stay from
seven Justices. Similarly ignoring the Court’s newer signals, the
Eighth Circuit, without any analysis or noted dissent, stayed the
397
injunction pending appeal four days later.
By issuing the stay in the face of the Court’s recent denials, these
courts echoed in reverse those judges in Michigan and Indiana who
had refused to grant stays when the prevailing signal from the Court
398
was to grant them.
All were saying, in essence, that the Court’s
decisions with respect to stays—orders from its shadow docket—

393. Hardy v. Bentley, No. 2:13-CV-922-WKW, 2015 WL 1043159, at *1 (M.D. Ala.
Mar. 10, 2015).
394. Hardy v. Bentley, No. 2:13-CV-922-WKW (M.D. Ala. Mar. 10, 2015) (order
granting stay), https://www.scribd.com/doc/272319130/15-03-10-Order-Staying-Case-UntilDisposition-of-Supreme-Court-Cases.
395. Waters v. Ricketts, 48 F. Supp. 3d 1271, 1290–91 (D. Neb. 2015).
396. Id. at 1287 n.15 (citing Strange v. Searcy, 135 S. Ct. 940 (2015)).
397. Waters v. Rickets, No. 15-1452 (8th Cir. Mar. 6, 2015) (order granting motion to
stay),
https://www.scribd.com/doc/272319674/15-03-06-Order-Granting-Motion-to-StayAppeal.
398. DeBoer v. Snyder, 973 F. Supp. 2d 757, 775 (E.D. Mich. 2014); Baskin v. Bogan,
12 F. Supp. 3d 1144, 1149 (S.D. Ind. 2014).
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carried no precedential force. As Judge White of the Sixth Circuit
had observed while dissenting from the stay in the Michigan case, the
stay in Kitchen was “without a statement of reasons, and therefore the
399
order provides little guidance.”
The same went for the denials of
stay and denials of certiorari in subsequent cases.
2.

Eleventh Circuit

The final leg in this relay race involved challenges to Alabama’s
marriage ban. Almost overnight, Alabama sparked the most intense
media attention, as well as the greatest legal, judicial, and political
400
confusion.
On January 23, 2015—one week after the Obergefell
cert. grant—Judge Granade of the Southern District of Alabama
declared that state’s marriage ban unconstitutional and enjoined its
401
enforcement. Two days later, she stayed the judgment for fourteen
days to give the Eleventh Circuit an opportunity to determine
402
whether a stay would be appropriate. That same day, in a parallel
case by same-sex couples seeking marriage licenses, Judge Granade
again declared the ban invalid, enjoined its enforcement, and stayed
403
the order for fourteen days.
Less than two weeks later, the Eleventh Circuit denied stays in
the consolidated cases, consistent with its approach since the October
404
cert denials.
Later that day, Judge Granade denied the Plaintiffs’
motion to immediately lift the stay, but ordered that “[i]f the
Supreme Court denies a stay or does not rule before February 9,
2015, this court’s stay will still remain in place until that date to allow
the Probate Courts of this state to be completely prepared for
405
compliance with the rulings in this case and the Strawser case.”

399. DeBoer v. Snyder, No. 14-01341 (6th Cir. Mar. 25, 2014) (order granting stay),
https://www.scribd.com/doc/270993306/DeBoer-v-Snyder-14-3-25-ORder-Granting-Stay
(White, J., dissenting).
400. See Wasserman, supra note 7, at 2.
401. Searcy v. Strange, 81 F. Supp. 3d 1285, 1286 (S.D. Ala. Jan. 23, 2015).
Unfortunately, the case itself had inherent procedural problems—it involved a married
couple seeking a second-parent adoption rather than couples seeking licenses, and the
only named defendant was Attorney General Luther Strange, who had no role to play in
either the adoption or issuance of marriage licenses. Wasserman, supra note 7, at 3–4.
402. Searcy, 81 F. Supp. 3d at 1288–89.
403. Strawser v. Strange, No. 14-0424-CG-C (S.D. Ala. Jan. 26, 2015) (order granting
stay), https://www.scribd.com/doc/272322643/15-01-26-Order-Granting-Stay.
404. Searcy v. Strange, No. 15-10295-C (11th Cir. Feb. 3, 2015) (order denying stay),
https://www.scribd.com/doc/272322995/15-2-3-denial-stay.
405. Searcy v. Strange, No. 1:14-cv-208-CG-N (S.D. Ala. Feb. 3, 2015) (order denying
motion to lift stay), https://www.scribd.com/doc/272323118/15-2-3-denying-motion-liftstay-pdf.
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On February 9, the Supreme Court denied the eighth and final
application for a stay in a same-sex marriage cases. Once again,
Justices Thomas and Scalia dissented from the denial of the stay.
Perhaps recognizing that this would be the final opportunity to
address the stay issue, Justice Thomas (finally) explained his
reasoning. His explanation captured the ebb and flow of the four
paradigms leading to this point and offered a rare insight into the
inner workings of the shadow docket.
He began by citing Kitchen, explaining that the “ordinary
practice” when a lower court enjoins state officials from enforcing
laws declared unconstitutional is to “suspend those injunctions from
406
taking effect pending appellate review.”
Thomas insisted that it
would be the “rare case” in which a state could not make some
showing of likelihood of success on the merits. Similarly, a state
suffers irreparable injury whenever it is precluded from enforcing
laws that had been duly enacted by the public’s representatives.
Thus, he insisted, it was “no surprise” that the court had stayed the
orders from the Fourth and Tenth Circuits in Kitchen, Evans, and
Bostic.
Further, it was “of no moment” that the Court had recently
denied several stay applications in Latta and others, because those
followed the October cert denials. While disagreeing with those stay
denials, he acknowledged that there was at least an argument that the
October decision justified an inference that the Court would be less
likely to grant a writ of certiorari to consider subsequent petitions.
But that dynamic was inverted anew by the cert grant in Obergefell,
which guaranteed a decision on the merits by the end of the Term.
The October inference was “no longer credible.” Thomas labeled it
“regrettable” that the district court in the Alabama case made no
effort to preserve the status quo pending the Supreme Court’s
407
decision on a difficult and open constitutional question.
He then jumped to the real heart of the matter—the Court’s
shadow docket and the way an unexplained order had effectively
preordained the outcome:
This acquiescence may well be seen as a signal of the
Court’s intended resolution of that question. This is
406. Strange v. Searcy, 135 S. Ct. 940 (2015) (Thomas, J., dissenting from denial of
application for stay).
407. Id. at 941 (Thomas, J., dissenting from denial of application for stay) (citing
United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2695–96 (2013)).
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not the proper way to discharge our Article III
responsibilities. And, it is indecorous for this Court to
pretend that it is. Today’s decision represents “yet
another example of this Court’s increasingly cavalier
408
attitude toward the States.”
Denying the stay, Justice Thomas concluded, does not show “the
people of Alabama the respect they deserve and preserve[] the status
quo while the Court resolves this important constitutional
409
question.”
In Thomas’s view, this was the most blatant example of the Court
signaling substantive results through shadow-docket orders,
eliminating any possible doubt that the district court injunction would
410
stand. He accused the rest of the Court of “cavalier[ly]” washing its
hands of its responsibility to maintain the status quo before
Obergefell would definitively resolve the issue only three months
later.
F.

The Shadow Docket and High-Stakes Litigation

The same-sex marriage cases offer an important lesson for highstakes civil rights litigation—the Justices, and not the inferior courts,
decide when and how momentous constitutional issues are resolved.
Each of the district courts that declined to grant a stay did so based
on their own independent judgment of how the traditional four
factors balanced. In the quotidian case, a district court judge’s
individual assessment of whether the plaintiffs are likely to succeed
on the merits or whether there would be irreparable harm, would
suffice to resolve whether a stay should be granted.
This was not your everyday civil rights litigation, however. From
the initial decision to stay the judgment in Utah, the Supreme Court
maintained total control over how the litigation would proceed
throughout the lower courts. In keeping with the Justices’ broader

408. Id. (Thomas, J., dissenting).
409. Id. (Thomas, J., dissenting). In his dissent in Arizona State Legislature v. Arizona
Independent Redistricting Commission later that term, Justice Thomas sounded a similar
theme, citing to the October cert denials and commenting that “Court’s lack of respect for
ballot initiatives is evident not only in what it has done, but in what it has failed to do.”
135 S. Ct. 2652, 2698 (2015) (Thomas, J., dissenting). Id. (“The Court ‘refused to grant a
stay pending appeal of a decision purporting to require the State of Alabama to issue
marriage licenses to same-sex couples, even though Alabama’s licensing laws had not been
challenged in that case.”) (citing Strange v. Searcy, 135 S. Ct. 940 (2015)).
410. Searcy, 135 S. Ct. at 941 (Thomas, J., dissenting from denial of application for
stay).
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sense of taking the cases when they thought the country was ready for
nationwide same-sex marriage, the Justices also attempted to exercise
oversight over how the lower courts managed the issues. Between
Utah’s judgment, and the denials of certiorari in October, district and
circuit judges that disregarded the signals from the shadow docket
were quickly reversed by per curiam stays, with no explanation.
Should the judges who exercised their independent judgment—in
conflict with signals from the Supreme Court’s shadow docket—be
faulted? It depends on the proper orientation of this type of
litigation.
On the one hand, if we start from the proposition that each
district court has the authority to decide cases or controversies before
it, bound only by actual circuit or Supreme Court precedent, the
courts that declined stays acted properly. A single-sentence order
from the Supreme Court, without analysis or explanation, is not
binding or even persuasive precedent. The lower courts thus could
not be faulted for predicting—correctly as it turned out—that the
marriage laws were unlikely to survive on appeal and that same-sex
couples would suffer injuries during the litigation process. This
perspective offers the greatest defense for judges that refused to grant
stays.
On the other hand, such a formalistic approach disregards the
Supreme Court’s role as traffic cop in major constitutional cases.
Through its shadow docket, the Supreme Court took steps to
maintain the status quo throughout the courts of appeals, without
granting certiorari or hearing cases on the merits.
And this dynamic need not be limited to the marriage cases. For
example, religious nonprofits in nearly every circuit alleged that an
accommodation to the Affordable Care Act contraception mandate
violated the Religious Freedom Restoration Act. Even though the
courts of appeals have uniformly upheld the accommodation and
would have allowed the mandate against the plaintiffs to go into
effect, the Supreme Court has repeatedly halted enforcement of the
411
mandate pending appeal. It will be up to the Supreme Court, and
412
Even if the
not the lower courts, to resolve this important issue.

411. Little Sisters of the Poor Home for the Aged v. Sebelius, 134 S. Ct. 1022 (2014);
Wheaton Coll. v. Burwell, 134 S. Ct. 2806, 2807 (2014); Zubik v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2924
(2015).
412. Professor Blackman filed a brief in support of certiorari in Little Sisters of the
Poor v. Burwell. See Brief for the Cato Institute as Amicus Curiae in Support of
Petitioners, Little Sisters of the Poor v. Burwell, 794 F. 3d 1151 (10th Cir. 2015), cert
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Court ultimately upholds the accommodation, the status quo will be
maintained until the Justices decide otherwise.
The stays in Kitchen, Evans, and Bostic were not routine orders,
but quick and unanimous repudiations of courts that immediately
altered the status quo before the Court had formally evaluated the
issue. Only after the Court considered and denied the petitions for
certiorari could the stays be lifted. The Long Conference when the
voted to deny the petitions constituted the first official opportunity
for the Justices to share their views. After that point, by rejecting the
petitions, the Justices had then effectively stamped their imprimatur
on marriage equality—seeing no need to reverse the lower courts—
and allowed the district judges to let their judgments go into effect.
With the same-sex marriage cases, the Supreme Court
aggrandized for itself the role as the arbiter of the status quo in highstakes civil rights litigation, albeit silently. District judges—even
those who blanch at this repudiation of their independent
judgments—are now on notice that injunctions should be put on hold
413
after the Supreme Court has taken an interest in an issue. In future
high-stakes constitutional litigation, judges and parties must
understand this and work in accordance with this background
principle.

III. State Litigation and Federal-State Conflicts
With the tide in lower federal courts moving ineluctably and
irreversibly towards recognition of a constitutional right to same-sex
marriage, officials in several states sought to at least slow, if not stem,
the tide through state court litigation. Three states initiated state
mandamus actions in an effort to forestall same-sex marriages by
preventing county-level officials from voluntarily complying with
414
persuasive federal precedent.
This created a potential new
procedural hurdle, as attorneys general then attempted to use the
state litigation they had initiated to keep federal courts from hearing
and ruling on the constitutional question. Federal courts uniformly—
and appropriately—rejected these arguments. But their decisions
granted in part, 2015 WL 6759642 (U.S. Nov. 6, 2015) (No. 15-105),
http://www.scotusblog.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/08/15-105-tsac-Cato-Institute.pdf.
413. In a related context, the Supreme Court has shown a propensity for granting
certiorari a second time on cases that already have drawn its interest. In recent years, the
Court has twice granted certiorari in Bond v. United States, Zivotofsky v. Clinton, Horne v.
U.S. Department of Agriculture, and Fisher v. University of Texas. See Richard Re,
SCOTUS Repeaters, PRAWFSBLAWG (Jan. 16, 2015), http://prawfsblawg.blogs.com/
prawfsblawg/2015/01/scotus-repeaters.html.
414. Supra notes 304–05 and accompanying text.
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illustrate another round of issues that may arise in future civil rights
litigation.
A. State Mandamus Proceedings

We previously discussed conflicts in Kansas and South Carolina,
where county-level officials indicated their intent to voluntarily
comply with binding circuit precedent addressing identical laws in
other states. Officials in both states, recognized the inevitability of a
federal lawsuit and adverse judgment that would invalidate their state
415
bans, enjoining their enforcement, and imposing attorney’s fees. In
response, attorneys general in both states initiated actions in the state
Supreme Court’s original jurisdiction, seeking a writ of mandamus to
416
stop local officials from this voluntary compliance.
Neither state
court reached the merits of the constitutional issue, but both
temporarily stayed local officials from issuing licenses, at least until
resolution of then-pending challenges to the state laws in federal
417
district court.
In both cases, the local officials named as
respondents on the mandamus petition took no position on the merits
and simply simply asked the state Supreme Court to provide guidance
418
on how they should proceed.
A similar tactic might have been appropriate in Wisconsin, where
clerks statewide began issuing marriage licenses to same-sex couples
following the district court declaration’s of the ban’s
419
unconstitutionality but before entry of any injunction. The district
court insisted, correctly, that these clerks were not acting under
compulsion of a court order and thus were not subject to the court’s
420
control.
A mandamus action by the attorney general in the
Wisconsin Supreme Court, ordering clerks to cease granting licenses
until a binding federal order issued, would have been an appropriate
move to stop this voluntary compliance.
421
Reflecting a common theme, things got far more complicated
and confrontational in Alabama, the third state in which an original
415. Supra notes 102, 105 and accompanying text.
416. State ex rel. Schmidt v. Moriarty, No. 112, 590 (Kan. Oct. 10, 2014); State ex rel.
Wilson v. Condon, 764 S.E. 2d 247 (S.C. 2014).
417. Schmidt, No. 112, 590; Wilson, 764 S.E. 2d at 247.
418. Id.
419. See supra notes 292–309 and accompanying text.
420. Wolf v. Walker, No. 14-cv-64-bbc (7th Cir. June 9, 2014) (order denying
emergency motion for stay), https://www.scribd.com/doc/271058059/Wolf-v-Walker-14-0609-Order-Denying-Emerngency-Motion-for-Stay.
421. Wasserman, supra note 7, at 10.
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jurisdiction mandamus petition pulled the state Supreme Court into
the mix. Judge Granade invalidated the state ban and ordered one
422
state probate judge to issue licenses to four named couples.
Two
private parties, acting as relators of the State, then initiated the
423
This action
mandamus action in the Supreme Court of Alabama.
was potentially broader than the ones in Kansas and South Carolina,
as it sought to prohibit all probate judges in the state from issuing
licenses to any same-sex couples, in the wake of numerous judges
voluntarily complying with Judge Granade’s decision.
Most importantly, unlike in Kansas and South Carolina, the
Supreme Court of Alabama reached the merits of the constitutional
question. In a 134-page per curiam opinion, six justices—the
controversial Chief Justice Moore recused—held that Alabama’s
same-sex marriage ban was constitutionally valid and must be
enforced. The court rejected concerns about the organizations’
standing as relators, questions about the court’s own jurisdiction,
contrary decisions from the Southern District of Alabama and
numerous other lower federal courts, and repeated signals from the
424
Supreme Court of the United States.
The result of this judgment
was statewide uniformity going forward—no same-sex couples could
obtain marriage licenses, except for those four couples already
entitled to licenses from one probate judge under Judge Granade’s
injunction. Importantly, the court did not invalidate the marriages of
those four couples or any other couple voluntarily issued a license by
other judges in the state.
As a starting point, there is nothing inherently problematic with
a decision by a state court contradicting, or simply declining to defer
to, a decision by a lower federal court. Interpretations of federal law
by lower federal courts do not bind state courts, except to the extent
425
state courts choose to be bound as a matter of state law.
State
courts are presumed to have concurrent jurisdiction over federal law

422. See supra notes 55–57, 400–02 and accompanying text.
423. Ex parte State ex rel. Ala. Policy Inst., No. 1140460, 2015 WL 892752, at *43 (Ala.
Mar. 3, 2015). Because Attorney General Strange was enjoined from enforcing the samesex marriage ban, Strawser v. Strange, No. 14-0424-CG-C, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8439, at
*4 (S.D. Ala. Jan. 26, 2015), he did not, and arguably could not, litigate the mandamus
petition.
424. Ala. Policy Inst., 2015 WL 892752, at *25, *43; see also Wasserman, supra note 7,
at 11–12.
425. Frost, supra note 28, at 55; Logan, supra note 28, at 236–37.
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426

issues and function as inferior federal tribunals.
They are vested
with the same interpretive leeway on the meaning of federal law as
any lower federal court, bound only by Supreme Court precedent and
427
subject only to Supreme Court review.
The Supreme Court of
Alabama could diverge from a federal district court on a
constitutional question, just as two federal district courts (even within
the same state or the same district) can diverge.
State courts were entirely within their unquestioned power and
discretion in not treating the Fourteenth Amendment issue as
conclusively resolved and in reaching a different constitutional
conclusion than did the federal district court. One might disagree
428
with the merits of that decision. But disagreement with a state court
decision on a question of federal law does not render that decision
illegitimate any more than disagreement with the federal judge
renders her decisions illegitimate. Nor do divergent results mean that
the state court has rebelled against the federal court, since they stand
on equal footing.
B. Abstention

The state mandamus actions raised the separate question of
whether potential federal-state conflicts presented by permissible
parallel state court litigation should have limited new or pending
federal constitutional litigation.
While the state courts were
rendering their decisions, there were lawsuits pending in the District
429
430
of South Carolina and the District of Kansas, as well as motions to
certify the Southern District of Alabama case as a class action and to
431
extend the existing injunction.
Officials in all three states argued
that the federal courts were required to abstain, on a number of
different bases, in deference to these state judicial and political
processes.

426. Claflin v. Houseman, 93 U.S.130, 136 (1876). Josh Blackman, State Jurisdictional
Sovereignty, 2016 ILL. L. REV. (forthcoming 2016), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers
.cfm?abstract_id=2466845.
427. James E. Pfander, Federal Supremacy, State Court Inferiority, and the
Constitutionality of Jurisdiction-Stripping Legislation, 101 NW. U. L. REV. 191, 234 (2007).
428. See generally Adam Lamparello, Why Chief Justice Roy Moore and the Alabama
Supreme Court Just Made the Case for Same-Sex Marriage, 17 U. PA. J. CONST. L.
(ONLINE) 1 (2015).
429. Condon v. Haley, 21 F. Supp. 3d 572 (D.S.C. 2014).
430. Marie v. Moser, 65 F. Supp. 3d 1175 (D. Kan. 2014).
431. Strawser v. Strange, No. 14-0424-CG-C, 2015 WL 2449468, at *1, *6 (S.D. Ala.
May 21, 2015); see supra Part I.D.
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Pullman Abstention
432

Federal courts abstain under Pullman when the challenged
state law is ambiguous, difficult, uncertain, or unclear; by abstaining,
federal courts afford state courts an opportunity to interpret the state
law and perhaps to eliminate the federal constitutional defect,
433
thereby obviating the federal constitutional question. Importantly,
however, abstention is appropriate only when the challenged law is
ambiguous and reasonably capable of a construction that would
“render unnecessary or substantially modify” the federal
434
constitutional question.
Moreover, the uncertain or difficult
question must go to the challenged law itself, not the validity of that
law under the federal or state constitutions. And Pullman is not an
exhaustion requirement—state courts need not be given a first
opportunity at determining the law’s validity, including under parallel
435
state Equal Protection or Due Process provisions.
The District of Kansas recognized that Pullman was inapplicable,
as there was no ambiguity or lack of clarity in Kansas’s marriage laws.
The laws “unequivocally prohibit plaintiffs and other same-sex
couples from procuring a marriage license and marrying a person of
the same sex in Kansas,” and had been applied consistent with that
plain meaning. There was no way a state court could interpret the
436
laws to avoid the constitutional concerns.
The Kansas decision contrasts with the Ninth Circuit’s
inappropriate use of Pullman in a pre-Windsor same-sex marriage
case. The difference in their approaches demonstrates how quickly
understandings of marriage equality, and its constitutional status,
evolved. In 2006, the Ninth Circuit held that a district court properly
abstained under Pullman from a challenge to the state’s then-existing
statutory ban on same-sex marriage in deference to ongoing litigation
challenging that ban under the state constitution. Abstention was
proper because that state litigation could have resolved the
constitutionality of the same-sex marriage ban and the court of

432. Railroad Comm’n of Texas v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496 (1941).
433. Arizonans for Official English v. Ariz., 520 U.S. 43, 76 (1997); Pullman, 312 U.S.
at 51; see also Ashwander v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288, 341 (1936) (Brandeis, J.,
concurring).
434. City of Houston v. Hill, 482 U.S. 451, 468 (1987); Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400
U.S. 433, 438–39 (1971).
435. Constantineau, 400 U.S. at 437–39.
436. Marie, 65 F. Supp. 3d at 1195.
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437

appeals could not predict its outcome. The court never considered
the complete absence of ambiguity in the underlying marriage ban
being challenged. Nor did the court recognize its misstep in treating
Pullman as an exhaustion requirement, an obligation to allow state
courts to offer a first answer to the constitutional question.
While legally erroneous, the Ninth Circuit’s decision may be a
product of its time. In 2004, voters in eleven states approved
measures to amend state law or the state constitution to preclude
438
same-sex marriage.
It was inconceivable that, less than two years
later, a federal court would declare that such bans violate the
Constitution. Abstention doctrines often are criticized as too-readily
manipulable, offering federal courts a way to avoid confronting
439
important constitutional questions. Smelt reflects that tendency, at a
time when reaching a decision on the merits only could have
produced a constitutional decision adverse to the plaintiffs. Of
course, this erroneous decision arguably proved beneficial to the
marriage equality movement, as the district court in Perry (five years
later, but a world away socially) did not have adverse binding
precedent to overcome.
2.

Younger Abstention
440

Younger abstention prohibits federal courts from interfering
with an ongoing state proceeding, specifically through the issuance of
an injunction or declaratory judgment that would result in a stay of
441
the state proceedings.
Younger rests on “Our Federalism,” under
which state institutions must be given an opportunity to decide
federal constitutional questions in the course of their own

437. See Smelt v. Cty. of Orange, 447 F.3d 673, 678–82 (9th Cir. 2006). Ultimately, the
Supreme Court of California held that the marriage ban violated the equal protection and
due process provisions of the state constitution. See In re Marriage Cases, 43 Cal. 4th 757
(2008). California voters overruled that decision several months later, overwhelmingly
approving Proposition 8, which amended the State Constitution to provide that: “Only
marriage between a man and a woman is valid or recognized in this state.” Proposition 8
was declared invalid by a federal district court in Perry in 2011, starting the two-year sprint
to nationwide marriage equality.
438. Daniel A. Smith, Matthew DeSantis & Jason Kassell, Same-Sex Marriage Ballot
Measures and the 2004 Presidential Election, 38 STATE & LOCAL GOVT. REV. 78 (2006).
439. MARTIN H. REDISH, FEDERAL JURISDICTION: TENSIONS IN THE ALLOCATIONS
OF POWER (1990); Burt Neuborne, The Myth of Parity, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1105, 1109–10,
1117 (1977).
440. Younger v. Harris, 403 U.S. 37 (1971).
441. Samuels v. Mackell, 403 U.S. 66, 71–72 (1971); Younger, 403 U.S. at 49.
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442

proceedings.
The Supreme Court recently insisted that Younger
only applies to three categories of state proceedings—criminal
prosecutions; civil, “quasi-criminal” enforcement proceedings; and
civil proceedings involving certain orders uniquely in furtherance of
443
state courts’ ability to perform their judicial functions. In addition,
the state proceeding must be one in which the federal plaintiff would
have an adequate opportunity to litigate the federal constitutional
444
issues.
Finally, Younger prohibits federal courts from halting
ongoing state proceedings; it does not apply to parallel state-federal
445
litigation that happens to deal with similar issues.
As applied to the same-sex marriage cases, Younger arguments
failed for several reasons. First, because the federal plaintiffs were
not parties to the state mandamus proceedings, they did not have an
adequate opportunity to litigate their federal claims in those
446
proceedings.
Second, mandamus actions did not fit in any of the
three categories of state proceedings warranting Younger abstention.
These federal actions did not challenge laws affecting state courts’
power to enforce judgments, such as contempt statutes or appellate
bond requirements. Rather, they challenged the way state officials
performed the executive function of issuing marriage licenses in light
447
of state laws banning same-sex marriage.
Third, the federal action did not seek an injunction that would
halt or otherwise interfere with the state mandamus proceedings. A
federal injunction requiring defendant officials to issue marriage
license to same-sex couples might impose obligations on those
officials that conflicted with the state mandamus obligations. But
Younger is not concerned with simple parallel litigation or conflicting
obligations derived from competing litigation. There are other ways
to deal with those potential conflicts without the federal court staying
its hand entirely. For example, the Alabama mandamus decision
allowed officials subject to an ongoing federal injunction an
448
opportunity to be excused from the mandamus.

442. Younger, 403 U.S. at 44–45.
443. Sprint Commc’ns, Inc. v. Jacobs, 134 S. Ct. 584, 591 (2013).
444. Middlesex Cty. Ethics Comm’n v. Garden State Bar Assn., 457 U.S. 423, 432
(1982).
445. Sprint, 134 S. Ct. at 593.
446. Marie v. Moser, 65 F. Supp. 3d 1175, 1197 (D. Kan. 2014).
447. Id.; Condon v. Haley, 21 F. Supp. 3d 572, 581 (D.S.C. 2014).
448. See, e.g., Ex parte State ex rel. Ala. Policy Inst., No. 1140460, 2015 WL 892752, at
*42 (Ala. Mar. 3, 2015); Wasserman, supra note 7, at 12–13.
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Rooker-Feldman and its Misuse
449

Rooker-Feldman
derives from an interpretation of the
respective statutory grants of federal jurisdiction to the Supreme
Court and the federal district courts. The latter can only exercise
original jurisdiction over federal constitutional claims, while review of
final state court judgments on federal questions is vested exclusively
450
in the former. In practice, Rooker-Feldman prevents a “state-court
loser” from bringing an action in federal court claiming a
constitutional injury caused by a state judgment or order that was
451
entered prior to initiation of the federal action.
Such a federal
lawsuit improperly invites district courts to review and reject a state
judgment. But Rooker-Feldman plays no role where the federal
action challenges conduct independent of a state court order.
Moreover, as the Supreme Court recently clarified, the doctrine is not
triggered by parallel litigation or the potential preclusive effects of
452
parallel federal-state litigation.
Federal courts easily swept aside this argument as to the state
mandamus proceedings. Most obviously, the federal plaintiffs were
not parties to the mandamus action, so they could not qualify as
453
“state-court losers.”
Nor did the federal plaintiffs challenge the
state court judgments imposing the mandamus.
Rather, they
challenged the state prohibition on same-sex marriage and the refusal
of state officials—not the state courts—to perform the executive
454
function of issuing marriage licenses.
That a federal action may
overlap or conflict with the state proceeding did not strip the federal
455
court of jurisdiction.
Interestingly, the failure of parties and the court to recognize
genuine Rooker-Feldman issues contributed to some of the confusion
in Alabama in the months prior to Obergefell. That failure produced
an arguably premature and ineffectual federal decision that had no

449. See Dist. of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983); Rooker
v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923).
450. Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 291–92 (2005);
compare 28 U.S.C. § 1257 with 28 U.S.C. § 1331.
451. Exxon Mobil, 544 U.S. at 284.
452. Id. at 292.
453. Marie v. Moser, 65 F. Supp. 3d 1175, 1190–1200 (D. Kan. 2014); Strawser v.
Strange, No. 14-0424-CG-C, 2015 WL 2449468, at *1, *6 (S.D. Ala. May 21, 2015).
454. Marie, 65 F. Supp. 3d at 1200.
455. Id.
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meaningful legal effect and did not fit with broader efforts of couples
to obtain marriage licenses.
The first case in which Judge Granade of the Southern District of
Alabama declared the state marriage ban unconstitutional was Searcy
v. Strange. The plaintiffs in Searcy were a couple, Cari Searcy and
Kimberly McKeand; they were lawfully married in California, and
wanted Searcy to second-parent adopt McKeand’s biological son.
Under Alabama law, a stepparent may adopt the child of a
456
“spouse.” But because state law prohibited same-sex marriages or
the recognition of out-of-state same-sex marriages, Searcy and
McKeand could not qualify as spouses and Searcy was ineligible to
457
adopt McKeand’s biological child. The state trial court denied the
petition, the Alabama Court of Civil Appeals affirmed, and the
plaintiffs did not seek further review, rendering the state court
458
judgment final.
Searcy and McKeand then sued in federal court, seeking to
enjoin enforcement of the state marriage bans. The couple insisted
that “they ‘have exhausted all avenues of legal recourse in Alabama
state courts and [are] left without the remedy they seek—the
459
Alabama Probate Judge Don Davis, who had denied
adoption.’”
the adoption petition, was initially named as defendant, but the
parties voluntarily dismissed the claims against him (rather than
contest his motion to dismiss). The case proceeded only against
Attorney General Luther Strange. And although Strange played no
role in the adoption action, in late January 2015, the district court
nevertheless enjoined him from enforcing the marriage ban as to
460
these plaintiffs.
Rooker-Feldman should have stripped the district court of
jurisdiction over this action. Searcy and McKeand were state court
losers. They sought the adoption in state court and were denied by
the state courts in clear judicial acts by Judge Davis and the Court of
461
And their complaint in federal district court
Civil Appeals.
456. ALA. CODE § 26-10A-27.
457. In re Adoption of K.R.S., 109 So. 3d 176 (Ala. Civ. App. 2012).
458. Id.
459. Searcy v. Strange, No. 14-0208-CG-N, 2014 WL 4322396, *2 (S.D. Ala. Aug. 28,
2014).
460. Searcy v. Strange, 81 F. Supp. 3d 1285 (S.D. Ala. Jan. 23, 2015).
461. Judge Davis moved to dismiss the action against him by insisting that he enjoyed
judicial immunity from suit for the judicial act of denying the adoption; the plaintiffs
voluntarily dismissed him from the action, so the court never acted on the motion. His
judicial immunity argument was wrong as a matter of law, since judicial immunity does not
apply to claims for injunctive or declaratory relief, although the plaintiffs must seek
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expressly sought a judgment rejecting the state courts’ conclusion,
declaring that Searcy was legally entitled to adopt McKeand’s child,
and ordering the state court to approve that adoption. Although the
plaintiffs framed their federal action as a challenge to the
constitutionality of the same-sex marriage ban, the cause of their
constitutional injury was the denial of the adoption by the state
courts, based on the conclusion (commanded by the state marriage
ban) that Searcy was not McKeand’s spouse. Having exhausted their
state court options, the couple’s next move should have been to seek
review of the final judgment in the Supreme Court of the United
462
States. Unfortunately for the plaintiffs, that option was foreclosed
because they never raised their federal constitutional challenge to the
463
marriage ban in the state adoption proceeding. But failure to raise
necessary issues in state court and to preserve them for Supreme
Court review does not expand the jurisdiction of a federal district
court to review or overrule a state court judgment.
The result in Searcy was a legally ineffectual injunction that,
while not creating actual mischief, certainly created confusion. The
injunction prohibited Attorney General Strange from enforcing the
state marriage ban, but did not provide Searcy and McKeand with
any relief because Strange played no role in granting adoption
petitions or in controlling how probate judges decide adoption
petitions. The injunction did not—and could not—require the state
courts to grant the adoption petition. Nor did the injunction
guarantee same-sex couples marriage licenses, since the plaintiffs
were not seeking a marriage license. This confusion reached its nadir
in early February when the stay of the Searcy injunction was lifted
and the plaintiffs sought to hold Judge Davis in contempt for failing
to issue marriage licenses to same-sex couples. Judge Granade
properly denied the motion, recognizing that Davis was not a party to
the action and thus not bound by the injunction or obligated to do
464
anything under it. Had the parties and Judge Granade recognized

declaratory relief first and only may obtain an injunction if declaratory relief fails to
provide a remedy.
462. 28 U.S.C. § 1257(a).
463. In re Adoption of K.R.S, 109 So. 3d at 178.
464. Searcy v. Strange, No. 14-0208-CG-N, 2015 WL 519725, at *1 (S.D. Ala. Feb. 9,
2015); Wasserman, supra note 7, at 6. Simultaneously, in an action brought by same-sex
couples seeking marriage licenses, Judge Granade granted plaintiffs leave to amend their
complaint to add Judge Davis as a defendant, then extended her earlier injunction,
requiring Judge Davis to refrain from enforcing the state marriage ban and to issue
licenses to the plaintiff couples. Strawser v. Strange, 44 F. Supp. 3d 1206, 1207–09, 1210
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the Rooker-Feldman concerns in the first instance, the case never
would have reached this point.
Several days after Judge Granade expanded the Strawser
465
injunction to prohibit Judge Davis from enforcing the marriage ban,
Judge Davis issued an interlocutory order in the Searcy-McKeand
adoption petition. He granted Searcy temporary parental rights, but
ordered that the “[d]ecree is qualified in nature, and the Court will
not issue a final adoption order until a final ruling is issued in the
466
United States Supreme Court on the Marriage Act cases before it.”
Searcy in turn filed a new lawsuit against Davis in the Southern
District of Alabama (again assigned to Judge Granade), seeking an
injunction ordering Davis to grant the adoption without further delay
467
and to strike the interlocutory order, as well as damages.
The Rooker-Feldman problem with this lawsuit was even more
glaring than the first. Once again, Searcy had sought a remedy—the
final adoption—in state court and was denied, making her a state
court loser. She then went to federal district court seeking to enjoin
the state judges to grant that very remedy, as well as damages caused
by the denial of the adoption in state court. A federal judge only
could grant those remedies by concluding that the state judge erred in
468
not granting the adoption, precisely what Rooker-Feldman prohibits
federal district courts from doing.
The several lawsuits involving the Searcy-McKeand adoption
arguably reflected the worst misunderstandings of federal jurisdiction
and procedure, in a legal controversy full of them. This is not to
suggest that Alabama’s ban on same-sex marriage did not deprive
these women of their constitutional rights, only that they picked the
469
wrong process through which to vindicate those rights.

(S.D. Ala. 2015); Wasserman, supra note 7, at 6–7. That injunction then began driving the
issuance of licenses in the state. Id.
465. Strawser, 44 F. Supp. 3d at 1207–09.
466. Brendan Kirby, Mobile probate judge won’t approve adoption in gay marriage
case; plaintiffs file new suit, AL.COM (Feb. 24, 2015), http://www.al.com/news/mobile
/index.ssf/2015/02/mobile_probate_judge_wont_appr.html.
467. Howard Wasserman, Another twist in the march to marriage equality,
PRAWFSBLAWG (Feb. 24, 2015), http://prawfsblawg.blogs.com/prawfsblawg/2015/02/ano
ther-twist-in-the-march-to-marriage-equality.html.
468. The lawsuit suffered from two additional problems. Unlike in the first action,
Judge Davis would have been entitled to judicial immunity from the claims for damages.
And the claims for injunctive relief would have failed for lack of an initial declaratory
judgment. See Wasserman, supra note 7.
469. Two weeks after Obergefell, Alabama courts began granting adoptions to samesex couples. See Lee Roop, Alabama courts end legal limbo, begin approving same-sex
couple adoptions, AL.COM (July 17, 2015, 6:30 AM), http://www.al.com/news/huntsville
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And the lasting lesson of the marriage equality litigation
demonstrates that process matters in constitutional litigation.

/index.ssf/2015/07/alabama_courts_end_legal_limbo.html. A July 24, 2015 hearing date
was set for the Searcy-McKeand adoption.

